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ABSTRACT 
  This research examines the relationships between the tripartite of Client, 
Consultant Engineer, and the Contractor during construction project implementation. It 
examines contract behaviour and how collaborative practices build inter-organisation 
Trust in construction contracts. Five projects were selected for the study. Three were 
trust-based Public Private Partnership contracts, while two were Traditional standard 
contracts. The initial research question was:  How do inter-organisational Trust 
relationships affect construction project management with respect to Cost, Time and 
Quality? 
 This qualitative research identified the threefold nature of Trust as Contractual Trust, 
Competence Trust, and Goodwill Trust. By analysing and clustering of respondent 
themes, two overarching concept themes emerged on how to build Trust between the 
Client, the Consultant, and the Contractor. The first theme was on financial matters, 
which included Working Capital Advance payment and Materials pre-purchase schemes. 
Addressing this theme created inter-party collaboration and Trust which positively 
affected project Cost, Program and Quality. The second theme was on creation of 
tripartite Trust by aligning Contractor and Consultant skills, capacity, and experience. 
The evidence indicated that it was essential to take advantage of any history of previous 
professional acquaintance and to frequently work together. It emerged that if 
collaborative action was taken on the basis of the above two themes, Trust could be built 
and used for more equitable construction project risk sharing. The actionable knowledge 
was that the numerous indemnity clauses, Working Capital Advance guarantees and 
excessive experience requirement of Site staff are all project constraints which must be 
removed. Clients were using indemnity Clauses to shirk away from Risk and 
responsibility. Contract start dates and liquidated delay damages must be coordinated 
with the payment date for the Advance in the standard Traditional Contracts.  In some 
cases, time overruns arose because Contract signatures and start dates were preceding the 
Advance payment date by three months. The Contractor was failing to commence actual 
construction work due to delays in the release of the Advance payment. The study 
furthermore found that trust, collaboration and risk sharing is essential to facilitate short-
term transactions in Traditional standard contracts.   
  There was evidence that in order to get repeat work the Contractor was punitively 
depending on the Client‟s goodwill and benevolence. A paradigm shift based on 
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implementing recommended action on the two themes of financial issues and technical 
capacity building could reduce this dependency or eliminate it altogether.   
The research revealed that as of 2017 there were less than five Public Private Partnership 
(PPP) contracts implemented in Zimbabwe and Malawi. This number of PPP projects 
was insignificant given the gaping need in these countries to construct public user 
infrastructure such as roads, electricity generation, ICT, water, and sanitation. 
  The study also synthesized the problem of the massive brain-drain and the fragility of 
the economies of these two countries which has resulted in the lack of appropriately 
skilled and experienced construction project site staff. The study proposed to alleviate 
this skills shortage with the formation of a Retired Engineers and Allied Professional‟s 
Organization. No such organizations exist in these two countries. 
 
KEYWORDS 
Trust building, Collaboration, Competence Trust, Contractual Trust, Goodwill 
Trust; Risk sharing, Working Capital advance payment, Materials pre-purchase, Site 
staff experience.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION   
   To implement Infrastructure Civil Engineering Construction Projects, one can use 
Traditional or Relational contracts between the Client or Employer and the Contractor or 
Builder. In Traditional standard contracts, every activity is defined by an economic 
transaction. A Bill of Quantities is used. The Bill of Quantities has estimates of the work 
to be carried out in the Construction. As work progresses, each activity is measured in 
standard units and multiplied by a previously agreed rate, to get the amount due. Thus the 
transactions are short-term and enable continuous progress as the Contractor is regularly 
paid. In Relational contracts, on the other hand, the emphasis is on the social benefits of 
the project, and some issues are left unstated. The Contractor arranges his own financial 
and material resources to complete the construction. He will recoup his investment and 
make a profit through user charges when the building is complete. The period during 
which he collects revenue from the project is called a concession. 
National Governments have successfully fulfilled their mandate to provide public 
infrastructure services such as Roads, Electricity, Water and Sanitation using Relational 
Contracts. Some of the Relational contracts include Joint Ventures (JV), Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPP), and Private Finance initiatives (PFI). When I started the research, I 
wanted to study relational contracting and show how it could be used to enhance PPP, 
PFI, JV construction projects. According to the Project Management Body of Knowledge 
(PMBOK), 20 % of construction projects are inexplicably not completed in spite of being 
adequately resourced. I wondered why? Could it be that the Client, Consultant, and 
Contractor lost Trust in each other and took uncompromising positions that brought the 
projects to a halt? The context of my research is the two Sub- Sahara African countries of 
Zimbabwe and Malawi. The demand for infrastructure in these two developing countries  
is very high and yet the appetite for Public-Private Partnerships, Private Finance 
Initiatives, and Joint ventures is meager and there are numerous uncompleted projects. 
      These questions made me focus on the role of creating Trust, Collaborating and Risk 
sharing between the Client, Consultant, and Contractor. From the literature review, I 
defined Trust as the acceptance of vulnerability from the future actions of others. I 
selected five projects, 2 in Zimbabwe and 3 in Malawi. Of these projects two were based 
on traditional Engineering Procurement and Construction contracts, while three were on 
relational Turnkey, PPP or JV contracts. As I gathered evidence through narrative 
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enquiry, interviews of project staff and artefacts, I observed that there was interplay 
between Collaboration, Trust and Risk. My focus, therefore, changed from researching 
inter-organization Trust just to enhance and increase the number of Relational Contracts. 
I now wanted to determine the collaboration, Trust creating and Risk sharing strategies 
between Clients, Consultants, and Contractors project management. I aimed to use, 
collaboration practices, Trust and Risk sharing inter-play to improve construction Project 
management. Typical of qualitative research, another theme emerged during my study. I 
observed that all the projects had Cost, Program and Quality risk.  I noted that the 
Contractor seemed to bear the bulk of the risk. The Contract burdened the Contractor with 
onerous Working Capital Advance payment guarantee requirements, Site staff demands, 
and late or non-payment of Invoices. I show in the study how this risk allocation anomaly 
can be corrected. The study noted that project progress can be enhanced using a paradigm 
shift which encourages fair risk sharing instead of risk allocation.  The research is 
relevant because it looks at the relationships that must exist between the Client, 
Consultant, and Contractor for successful and efficient project implementation. It 
identifies and explores how various forms of Trust and collaboration can be used to 
mediate the Risk allocated to the Client, Consultant, or Contractor.  
  From the literature study, Macneil (1974) is cited for saying that Relational contracts are 
long-term contracts sometimes with informal agreements and unwritten codes of conduct 
sustained by Trust and the value of future relationships. In another earlier seminal paper, 
he also stated that in Relational Contracting the legal procedures are not strictly followed, 
but that the parties to the contract govern transactions through mutually acceptable social 
behaviour guidelines based on Trust. The roles of the Client, Consultant, and Contractor 
become blurred. It is clear from the extant literature that the focus in Relational Contracts 
is on trust, cooperation, and commitment to the project objectives and goals. 
     As stated above, inter-entity Trust emerged as a significant theme as I proceeded with the 
data collection and analysis. Later in the study, I began to notice the importance of 
collaboration, Trust and Risk interplay. I, therefore, started to investigate the effect of 
abandoning some of the contractual requirements of risk allocation. I refer to these 
contractual obligations as exonerating indemnity clauses. Some authors, including 
Marshall (2016) have said that reflection and self-study are a means to increase the 
quality of a practice. In order to improve the quality of my practice, I therefore reflected 
and intervened to replace some indemnity Clauses with Trust and collaboration in the 
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Contracts I was supervising. From the evidence, I argued and showed that Trust lubricates 
performance on construction projects, and some of the strict Contractual requirements 
like irrevocable Bank guarantees for Advance payment and Site staff with 20years 
experience could be relaxed. These can be taken as construction risks which can be 
mitigated in a joint and collaborative manner.  
 My thesis is structured as follows: First I carried out a thorough Literature review which 
revealed the various schools of thought on the definition and forms of Trust. I found no 
Literature on Trust building and its mitigation of construction Risks on projects in 
Zimbabwe and Malawi.  Initially, I selected two projects to investigate my original 
research on inter-organizational Trust. One project was based on Traditional engineering 
procurement and construction contracts, while the second one was a Relational Turnkey 
contract. After I started data collection, I added three more projects because I realized that 
there was not enough scope to articulate the inter-entity Trust in the original two projects. 
I ended up with five projects. Two projects were in Zimbabwe, and three were in Malawi. 
Of these five projects, two were based on Traditional short-term Transaction type of 
Contracts, while the other three were on Relational contracts, that is, Public-Private 
Partnership, Joint Venture, and Turnkey Projects.   
My data collection consisted of narrative interviews with Clients, Consultants, and 
Contractors on the projects. I also collected project documentation such as Minutes of 
Site meetings and other artifacts. I found financial and trust building issues in both my 
Traditional contract projects and Relational contract projects. Project Cost, Program, and 
Performance were the three main criteria against which I evaluated the role of Trust in 
Construction Projects. 
However, as the study proceeded, another theme developed. This theme tracked the 
interplay between collaboration, Trust and Risk. I found evidence in my five projects that 
Trust building is critical to managing construction projects. In all the five Contracts it 
appeared construction Risk was allocated to the Contractor, instead of sharing it between 
the Client, Consultant, and Contractor. My argument was then that this subjective 
construction Risk allocation to the Contractor is detrimental to project progress.   
  I looked for the interplay between collaborative practices, trust and risk using 
Action Research in my evidence.  I synthesized construction management problems in the 
five projects and found that the issues fell into two categories. The first category of the 
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issues was on financial matters, in particular, Bank Guarantees, Working Capital Advance 
Payment and late payments. The second category of problem issues was Trust building in 
the face of limited financial resources and Site staff experience. I analysed these issues 
and took deliberate action to find practical, actionable solutions. To construct necessary 
infrastructure for sustainable economic growth requires a substantial financial 
commitment. I argued that this must also include an investment in collaborative practices 
and Trust relationship between the Clients, Consultants, and Contractors. Trust 
encouraged the construction Risk sharing. In my qualitative Action Research, I found that 
through construction risk mediation, Trust relationships motivated the Client, Consultant 
and Contractor tripartite to partner and successfully implement these projects. Inter-
organizational Trust led to confidence that each counterpart would meet its future 
obligations to the project objectives. If there was participation in contract collaborative 
practices, Trust could be created and then the Client, Consultant and Contractor were 
willing to share construction Risks.  My research shows what collaborative practices were 
possible and how Trust could be built.  
 
1.1  Background 
Relational contracting is found in many businesses where the contracting emphasis is 
on social benefits and provision of Public service for a future cash inflow. This 
arrangement suits large complex projects that have high uncertainty and high risk. 
Chan & Yeung (2010) argued that this is because such projects have the highest 
potential for gain-share (or pain-share) in their implementation. Infrastructure Projects 
are by nature substantially risky. However, the return on infrastructure investment is 
also very attractive. Only a few studies have been carried out to empirically determine 
strategies that can be used to foster the creation of Trust and mitigating risk in 
construction projects in Africa, a continent where there are scarce financial resources. 
Scarce financial and skilled manpower resources motivate the Public sector to make 
Public Private Partnership arrangements for infrastructure construction. This way, the 
Governments can provide and maintain the mandated public services. The literature 
reveals several types of Relational Contracts in the Construction Industry. These are 
Trust based. Some Researchers such as Fischer, R. (2011), Yeung, Chan & Chan 
(2011), Vincent-Jones (2012) and others identified five main types of Relational  
Projects. These include Public-Private Partnership (PPP), Private Finance Initiative 
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(PFI), Project Alliance (PA), Joint Ventures (JV) and Strategic Project (SPP) 
Partnerships.   In developing countries such as Zimbabwe and Malawi, there is a gap 
in infrastructure construction. There is, therefore, the pressure to identify potential 
projects.   Further, these two Governments are required to complete the infrastructure 
not only as soon as possible, but also outside the national budget balance sheet. Only 
a handful of PPP projects have however been implemented in these two countries. 
These are listed below as follows:  
1. New Limpopo River Bridge at the South African- Zimbabwean Border (in 
1994, the first PPP project in Africa) 
2. Zimbabwe, Bulawayo to Beitbridge Railway line 
3. Newlands By-pass road in Harare. 
4.  One project for Civil Aviation in Malawi. 
5. There are others such as the Shire Valley Irrigation Project (SVIP) in Malawi, 
which is still at feasibility study stage. 
In all the Relational projects above, the strategy was to complete construction as soon 
as possible and immediately enjoy the social and economic benefits, in anticipation of 
future income flows. 
  The International Federation of Consulting Engineers   (FIDIC) Standard Contracts, 
the New Engineering Contract (NEC), and the Joint Contract Tribunal (JCT) are 
some of the Traditional standard contracts. These consist of short-term economic 
transactions between a Client and a Contractor during the span of the Project 
construction.  There is no long-term view of the contractual relationship. The 
Traditional standard Contracts are characterized by monthly financial transactions 
from the Client to the Contractor or Consultant.  The Client is the employer. There is 
an emphasis on Transactional management through strict Contract clauses and Bills of 
Quantity or fixed lump sum. The various forms of Traditional Contracts are on the 
first premise that the Client is the project owner and he has enough financial resources 
to immediately pay the Contractor and Consultant for work done, up to the 
completion of the project. If the Client has no funds, however, then he makes a direct 
arrangement with a Funding Agency who becomes a Financier and fourth player 
outside the main Construction contract.  Secondly, the premise is that the Contractor 
should have adequate skills, equipment, and human resources to perform the work. 
The third assumption is that there is a Consultant who can be an Engineer, Architect 
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or Project Manager. The Consultant has the dual role of being the client's professional 
agent, but at the same time, he is an independent and fair mediator between the Client 
and the Contractor. I argue that, in managing these Contracts, the Consultant follows 
contract documents which unfairly pass most of the construction risk to the Contractor 
and that he has a bias towards the Client who pays him. 
 Relational contracting, when contrasted with Traditional Contracting, is a partnering 
and risk sharing arrangement premised on, cooperation and commitment to the project 
by the Client, Consultant, and Contractor. In practice, the Contractor becomes 
responsible for the funding, design, construction, and maintenance of the 
infrastructure, in return for future income flows. The tenure of the Relational Contract 
is called a concession.  The Contractor is supposed to recoup his investment and make 
a profit through the projected income flows during the concession period. In this 
study, I found that some of the contract management problems are similar in both 
Traditional and Relational Contracts.  Based on the themes of significant research 
interview statements, I coded and categorized the construction problems into two and 
viewed them as either Financial or Trust creation related. These research findings are 
significant because they can be used to implement projects in the Central African 
context. The results ensure that the Cost, Quality and Time objectives are fulfilled.   
1.2  Aims of the Study   
  
a) The first aim of the study was to use a phenomenological and lived-experience 
approach to discover what collaborative practices the tripartite could participate in to 
create inter-organisational Trust. The study was contextual to Sub-Sahara Africa. 
b) The second aim was then to develop these project participants‟ collaborative 
practices which could balance the building of Trust and Risk sharing in projects. The 
objective was to ensure effective construction project governance, cost control, good 
quality deliverables and completion on time. 
c) The overall aim of the research, however, remained to contribute to the body of 
knowledge on the role of collaboration between the Client, Consultant and Contractor 
in building Trust and sharing Risk in the management of Construction projects.   
 
 
 
 
16 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction to Literature Review 
In this literature review Chapter, I first discuss the various definitions of trust. I then 
look at the forms of Trust and the current strategies for building this trust between 
organizations. My reading of the literature made me realise that there is no universal 
definition of trust, but its concept affected both standard traditional Contracts and the 
more recent relational Contracts. There is limited empirical research of the interplay 
between Collaboration, Trust and Risk sharing in construction projects management, 
particularly in the context of Southern Africa. 
Structure of the Literature review Chapter 
My literature review chapter is structured as follows; In Section 2.1 I give a brief chapter 
introduction. In Section 2.2 I discuss the role of trust in construction projects, with 
particular emphasis on Traditional contracts and the new innovative Trust-based 
Relational agreements. I then examine the existing literature definitions of inter-
organisation Trust in Section 2.3 and differentiate personal Trust from inter-
organizational Trust. In this Section, I also identify Contractual Trust, Competence Trust 
and Goodwill Trust as the primary three forms of inter-organizational Trust in 
construction projects. In Section 2.4, I explore the extant literature for the basic Contract 
behaviour and list the Trust-based types of Relational contracts currently in use. At this 
stage of my research, I was under the misconception that Trust was only required in 
Relational agreements and that collaboration and performance in standard Traditional 
Contracts was entirely covered by written down contractual clauses. I then discuss the 
literature arguments on the forms and usage of Trust in Section 2.5. I review the crucial 
factors and strategies used to build inter-organization Trust in Section 2.6. In Section 
2.7, I discuss the difficulties of evaluating Trust. In Section 2.8 I look at the literature 
contentions on the impact of Trust on Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). In this 
section, I also recap on the developments of Macneil's (1974) norms of relational 
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contracting as seen by the more recent researchers. In Section 2.9, I discuss what the 
literature is saying regarding Trust and organizational policy and culture. I compare the 
definitions of Competence Trust, Contractual trust and Goodwill trust with three other 
types of trust identified by Smith, & Rybowski (2012), Wong et al. (2007) and Cheung 
et al. (2003) as System trust, Cognitive trust and Affect trust. I searched the literature for 
the connection between Risk and Trust in Section 2.10. That is when I realised that Trust 
is not just a Performance enhancing factor in the newer Relational contracts, but it also 
affected standard Traditional Contracts 
In Section 2.11, I elaborate on the schools of thought regarding the effect of Trust and 
collaboration on repeat business.  Section 2.12, contains what the literature is saying 
about the impact of Trust on performance and contract governance. I confirmed that 
some authors (for example; Rahman, Kumaraswamy & Ling, 2007; Laan, 2008; Smith 
& Rybowski, 2012; Strathorn et al., 2015) were arguing that Trust is the cornerstone of 
not only Relational Contracting but also Traditional standard contracts.   In Section 2.13 
I reviewed the causes and impact of lack of Trust. I finally summarize the Literature 
review in Section 2.14 and explain how it influenced my thinking, the questions it raised 
and its effect on my research. 
2.2 The role of Trust in Construction Projects. 
This Section tracks the arguments supporting the use of Trust in both Traditional 
standard contracts and the newer Relational agreements in construction projects. I briefly 
and critically review the relevant previous research and raise questions which guided this 
study. Traditional construction contracts are implemented through a tripartite structure of 
Employer, Consultant, and Contractor. The Employer or Client is the project owner and 
traditionally responsible for the inception and funding of the project. There are many 
examples of these structured construction contracts such as the International Federation 
of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) Standard contracts, the New Engineering Contract 
(NEC), and Joint Contract Tribunal (JCT) contract. In these standard traditional and 
structured contracts, the Engineer or Architect has a dual role. First, he has the role of 
being the Client's agent and secondly that of an independent mediator to administer the 
Contract between the Contractor (builder) and the Client (Employer). His control and 
governance of the project Cost, Program and Quality are through various enforceable 
contract clauses or disclaimers. 
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However, the more recent and innovative contracts are Trust-based. The theory of 
Trust-based Relational Contracts was first proposed by Macneil (1969). He defined 
Relational Contracts as contracts that are based on relationships between the contracting 
parties.  In coming up with this definition, the first query he faced was whether "there are 
more accurate and comprehensive descriptions of contract behaviour?"  Latter, Macneil 
(1974) defined Relational contracts as long-term contracts, sometimes with informal 
agreements and unwritten codes of conduct sustained by the value of future 
relationships. In his seminal paper, he proposed ten norms for a Relational Contract 
Theory. These included collaboration, integrity, solidarity, reciprocity and 
"harmonization with the social matrix." The norms led to one of his first conclusions, 
that "every transaction is embedded in complex relations." While Macneil (1974) came 
up with these norms, he did not explain how the potential Risk in the unwritten clauses 
could be mitigated using Trust.  I started questioning how Trust, Collaboration and Risk 
sharing were linked. The question that arose is that can some of the risks and 
impediments to project progress such as Cost, construction Program and lack of site 
management experience be successfully tackled with Trust and lead to collaboration? 
Strathorn et al. (2015) also investigated the role of Trust and collaboration in 
standard Traditional construction contracts. They blamed Traditional contracts for 
motivating opportunistic behaviour and a tendency to exploit work variations and other 
contract weaknesses. They viewed Trust as a "fundamental requirement of any human 
interaction." For this reason, they proposed that even in standard Traditional construction 
contracts, this interaction should be designed to have "prescriptive protocols for 
developing and maintaining Trust." It is however not clear in their research what these 
protocols are, nor their universality. Further, if their solution to build Trust were based 
on rigid rules as implied by "prescriptive protocols," this would destroy the very spirit of 
Trust because one argues that its very nature is based on unwritten clauses of expected 
positive human behaviour. The literature does not show much research on Trust building 
and collaboration in standard Traditional Construction contracts.  An examination of 
these Traditional Contracts revealed that there is a strong emphasis on Risk allocation to 
the contract tripartite of Client, Consultant, and Contractor. Traditional contracts were 
observed to be short-term and consisted of discrete economic transactions.  Some 
researchers had studied inter and intra-entity organization Trust building. However, the 
extant research has not been contextual and specific to infrastructure construction. Some 
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of the researchers who have studied inter and intra-organisation Trust include (Chan & 
Yeung, 2010; Laan, 2008; Ning & Ling, 2013; Oyegoke et al.,2009; Rahman, 
Kumaraswamy & Ling, 2007;  Vincent –Jones,2011; Yeung & Chan, 2011;). My 
research focused on inter-organization trust and the resultant collaboration in 
construction projects management. In all the Contracts, I found that the Contractor was 
required to issue to the Client several Bonds and Guarantees. These included Bonds to 
Bid, Bonds that the Contractor would perform and Bonds that would enable the 
Contractor to get Working Capital Advance. If all these Bonds are given to the Client, 
then what risk does the Client have? After noting this excessive Bonds requirement 
culture of the Traditional standard contracts, I examined the newer trust-based Relational 
Contracts. My Region of study is Southern Africa, in particular, Zimbabwe and Malawi. 
I found that there is very little research on Trust-based Relational contracts in the 
Southern African Region. These Trust-based Relational contracts are the Public Private 
Partnerships and Joint Ventures.  There was a solitary research by Zinyama & Nhema, 
(2015) who argued that the failure to flourish of trust-based Relational Construction 
Projects in these two countries is due to the absence of a legal framework and 
uncertainty of the political environment. Further, according to a significant Financier, the 
African Development Bank, the establishment of policy, regulatory and legal framework 
for Public-Private Partnerships provides an enabling environment for trust-based 
Relational contracting. Later research has however now revealed that the Government of 
Zimbabwe established Public and Private Partnership Guidelines in 2009 and that the 
Government of Malawi established the Malawi Public Private Partnership Commission 
through an Act of Parliament in 2011. In spite of this initiative, however, Trust-based 
Relational projects such as Public-Private Partnerships or Joint Ventures have not 
thrived. I noted the many Project failures in Zimbabwe and Malawi. Early evidence from 
my research suggested the importance of Trust between the Client, Consultant, and 
Contractor.  The Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) also stated that an 
average of 20 % of construction projects is inexplicably not completed in spite of being 
adequately resourced.  Due to the above reasons, I decided to contextually research inter-
organisation trust, collaboration and risk sharing in managing Construction Contracts in 
Zimbabwe and Malawi. 
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2.3 Definition of Inter- organization Trust   
Inter-organisation Trust has been defined by many researchers.  McEvily, & Perrone, 
(1998) describe inter-organization trust as "the extent to which members of one 
organization hold a collective trust orientation toward another organization." Mayer et 
al. (1995) define trust as "when one believes in and is willing to depend on another 
party."  Smith et al. (2003) also defines trust as “a willingness to be vulnerable."  
Nooteboom (2002, 2006,) defines trust as „expectation that things or people will not fail 
us". All these definitions have two critical themes that stand out, that of inter-dependence 
with others and the second is on acceptance of being vulnerable.  The definitions are well 
summed up by Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Caterer (1998) who defined trust as "a 
psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations of the intentions or behaviors of another” This definition, like that by 
McEvily, & Perrone, (1998) indicates that trust occurs in a person's mind when going into 
a contract. It is an expectation of positive behavior. Laan (2008) concurs and argues that 
personal or individual trust can be aggregated in persons of one organization. This idea 
leads to viewing of Trust in two forms. The first is that there is individual or personal 
Trust. The second is to view the aggregation of this Trust in individuals of one company 
as the organisational Trust. Lau & Rowlinson (2011) researched the implication of Trust 
in construction projects using "real life evidence." They concluded that the impact of 
Trust and its real meaning was multifaceted. Thus, Trust has many dimensions, and its 
definition varies across the disciplines because it is complicated and dynamic. The extant 
literature shows that there is no universal definition of Trust. It however agrees that Trust 
is a state of mind accepting possible vulnerability from others' actions. According to Lau 
& Rowlinson (2011), extended time horizons change inter-organizational behaviour.  This 
observation is essential in construction projects because they take a long time to 
implement. From inception to completion, even a small project on average takes two 
years and the effect of time horizons has to be considered. Lau & Rowlinson (2011) also 
define and argue that to Trust is to accept risk and uncertainty.  The key word here for 
this research is that all the parties to the contract must accept risk and vulnerability. They 
state that both personal trust and organizational trust must be built because "trust is not 
self- generating." However, the assertion of lack of self- propagation of Trust can be 
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argued. This is because certain unsaid Contractual positions force the Client or the 
Consultant or the Contractor to trust each other without making a deliberate effort to 
create Trust. It can then be said that dependence generates Trust. Deliberate efforts have 
however to be made to enhance it to the extent that it becomes a business and project 
success strategy.  Lau & Rowlinson (2011) in their paper, state that interpersonal Trust is 
more important than inter-organization Trust. They argue that this is because, besides a 
requirement to meet technological and economic needs, construction projects are also 
required to achieve moral and social objectives.  However, it is worth noting that in their 
argument they accept that inter-organisational Trust is the sum of interpersonal or intra-
organisational Trust. 
 I discuss the interplay between inter-organisation Trust and intra-organisation Trust 
under essential Trust factors in Section 2.6.   In that Section, I look at the schools of 
thought by Zaheer & Harris (2006), Fulmer & Gelfand (2012), and Laan (2008).  In their 
survey of inter-organisational Trust literature, they found that intra-organization trust or 
personal trust is much more delicate and needs to be differentiated from the 
organisational Trust. I argue that for both the individual and inter-organisational 
perspective, Trust is affected by time because of the expectation of future income flows. 
Time becomes one of the Trust building variables. 
Some researchers have suggested that Trust is captured in three forms. For example 
Broadbent et al. (2003), Das & Teng (2001), Vincent-Jones (2012), and Zaghloul & 
Hartman (2002) argue that the first form is the Contractual trust which is defined by the 
contract documents and contractual clauses. Contractual trust is the stated and written 
down contractual obligations which govern and control either party's performance 
concerning construction time, cost, and quality of deliverables. The second form of Trust 
defined in the literature is Competence trust. This, according to Hartman (1999), comes 
from the ability to perform the task; it is the answer “Yes we can do the job." Thirdly, as 
quoted from Swan et al. (2002), there is Goodwill trust, which is "a by-product of 
previously working together." These three forms of Trust appear to be the ones accepted 
as the Trust spectrum for Construction Contracts in the extant literature. I have used this 
three-fold form of Trust to evaluate the existence and role of Trust in this research 
because of its proximity to the manner in which Construction Contracts are controlled and 
managed. First, Contracts have to be drawn up between the tripartite of Client, 
Consultant, and Contractor. For the Contracts to be consummated there has to Contractual 
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Trust. Second, any of the three parties have to have Trust that the other side is competent 
to carry out its obligations. Thus the Client has to be responsible for paying, the 
Consultant has to be qualified to design and specify the works, and the Contractor has to 
be competent to construct the works as defined within time, budget and with good quality. 
These Contractor obligations are enshrined in the Competence Trust before project 
implementation. Thirdly, Goodwill Trust which can be presumptive or from a history of 
previous work together can govern the future contract behaviour of the tripartite. 
Some researchers, including Dyer & Chu (2003), Fischer (2011), Lau & Rowlinson 
(2011), Rahman & Kumaraswamy (2008), Shazi (2014), Vincent-Jones (2012), and 
Zaheer & Harris (2012) have looked at the long-term overview of Trust relationships. 
However, these glimpses have not been specific to Construction projects.  This left a gap 
which needed to be investigated, particularly in Relational Projects which have a long 
tenure in the form of a concession. However, Rahman & Kumaraswamy (2008) ranked 
Trust and Trust-based operational strategies as significant incentives for relational 
contracting and team building in Singapore. They hinted at how such executive 
arrangements could be used for "post-contract partnerships in Relational Contracts," but 
did not specifically refer to how project risk and uncertainty can be mitigated with Trust.  
The literature identifies five types of Trust-based Relational Contracts in construction. 
These comprise of Public Private Partnership (PPP), Project Funding Initiative (PFI), 
Project Alliancing (PA), Strategic Project Partnering (SPP) and Joint Venture (JV). 
Several authors including Bloomfield (2006), Geringer (1988), Li et al. (2005), Mowery 
et al. (1998), and Walker et al. (2002) argued that all these relational contracts are based 
on trust. Indeed there was an expectation of future income flows to recoup the financial 
investment and make a reasonable profit. In these trust-based Relational Contracts, the 
role of the Client, Consultant, and Contractor became blurred. 
As stated earlier, in contrast to trust-based Relational Contracts, standard Traditional 
Contracts have distinct tripartite roles of Client, Consultant, and Contractor. The original 
functions are that the Client is the employer. The Client comes up with a project concept 
and has adequate funds to implement the project. The Engineer has a dual role of being an 
agent of the Client as well as an independent mediator in managing and supervising the 
construction contract without being party to it. The Contractor has an agreement with the 
Client, and his role is to marshal Manpower, Materials, and Machines to implement the 
project within a specified period. 
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2.4 Basic Contract Behaviour 
The basic Contract behaviour is to get value for money or fair payment for work 
done once all the Contractual obligations have been met. Dyer & Chu (2003) have argued 
that the Traditional Contract is based on a theoretical framework of short-term 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). They illustrated their argument by using a sample of 
344 suppliers and car makers from the United States, Japan, and Korea, and found that 
Trust reduced Transaction costs significantly.  
What is significant in their research is that in the absence of Trust the Car supplier 
was observed to charge up to five times more than a trusted supplier. Transaction costs 
can be reduced by removing opportunistic behaviour in contracts. In the Dyer & Chu 
(2003) research, we see that Trust was a competitive advantage because it cut Transaction 
cost. The question was whether this Trust -Transaction cost saving phenomenon could 
also be used as a collaborative strategy to minimize Construction projects costs. 
  On analysis, the International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC), New 
Engineering Contract (NEC) and the Joint Contract Tribunal (JCT) standard traditional 
contracts are no more than, structured contracts, focusing on incorporating numerous 
enforcing clauses and disclaimers. These enforcing clauses allocate responsibility and 
risks to parties to the agreement. In a way, this contract structuring is not dependent on 
Trust in spite of the supportive evidence from Dyer & Chu (2003), that the more Trust 
there is, the less the Transaction Costs. Never-the-less it forces a specific Contract 
behaviour to get value for money. To understand inter-organization Trust, I reviewed the 
literature for both the standard Traditional construction contracts and the Relational 
Public Private Partnership or Joint Venture construction contracts which emphasized 
Trust. English & Baxter (2010) studied the changing nature of agreements between 
Government and the Private sector. Although their interest was in the prison services in 
Australia, they tracked the change and metamorphosis of contracts and found an overall 
preference for Trust-based Relational contracting. They concurred with earlier researchers 
that Contractual Trust came from the written Contract clauses. Competence Trust was 
based on the capability to meet obligations to perform and finally that Goodwill Trust was 
based on the dependability of behaviour. Even in the face of unexpected turn of events, 
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Goodwill Trust gave protection from the possible threats of opportunistic behaviour. Thus 
according to English and Baxter (2010), Contract behaviour should sustain a Trust-based 
relationship with emphasis on a risk-sharing and fair rewarding. 
As seen earlier, Macneil's original (1974) Relational contract theory defined Trust-based 
Relational contracts as being anchored in 10 norms which include collaboration, integrity, 
social harmony, expectation, solidarity and restrained use of power. His theory is relevant 
because it informs on possible Contract behaviour by clearly distinguishing that trust-
based Relational contracts were different from standard Traditional and structured 
Contracts.  He argues that much of the current Traditional Contract behaviour could be 
covered by just a few written clauses which were based on discrete short-term 
transactions and cost economics. He states that the unwritten Clauses could be guided by 
socially constructed Contract behaviour. Other researchers, for example Cohen (2010), 
Hartman (1999), and Strathorn et al. (2015) also showed from "lived experience" research 
that even traditional standard Construction Contracts do indeed require inter-organisation 
Trust to moderate contract behaviour. The above literature brought to the fore my view of 
the importance of Trust in contracts. To illustrate the dynamics of Trust, I examined the 
Fulmer and Gelfand (2012) review of 375 articles covering a period of 10 years from 
2000 to 2011. They found that Trust has multiple organizational levels starting with 
individual trust, and then secondly team trust and finally organisational level trust. They 
noted the importance of Trust to various management areas like teamwork, leadership, 
human resources management and strategic alliances among other areas. They 
differentiated the effect of Trust at the organizational level by using Transactional cost 
economics theory and Relational exchange theory. They argued that equity and 
reciprocity are essential for inter-organizational level trust. Further, from the Relational 
Exchange Theory, they observed and confirmed that the antecedents to organizational 
level trust include integrity, shared characteristics, previous work together, 
communication, voluntary compliance with external regulations and asset specificity. 
This supports the argument by Lau & Rowlinson (2011) that organizational Trust is an 
aggregation of individual Trust shared by the people in each organization.   From this 
research, they were able to consider Trust at the three levels of individual, team and 
overall organisation. Thus, Fulmer and Gelfand (2012) found that the impacts of Trust for 
an Individual, a Team, and an Organisation were different, but the Trust could be inter 
and intra-aggregated between levels because of common project objectives.  I was 
influenced to think that that the way they argued can be extrapolated for Trust in 
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construction projects because there are also three organizational level referents consisting 
of the Client, Consultant, and Contractor. Therefore, in each organisation, if the project 
objectives are the same, there has to be individual Trust and team Trust which can be 
aggregated to inter-organisational Trust. What is inherent in the trust based relational  
Contract arrangements like PPP, JV, PFI etc. is that Contract behaviour is influenced by 
long-term relationships motivated by lack of financial, technical and intellectual 
resources. Above all, there has to be value for money in the provision of services or 
construction of essential infrastructure. 
Cohen (2010) also studied Integrated Project Deliverables (IPD) using a scorecard. He 
used 6 case study building projects ranging from schools to hospitals. Participants were 
then required to evaluate 6 IPD characteristics. The IPD characteristics to be assessed 
were shared risk or reward, early participant involvement, multi-party contract, 
collaborative decision making, absence of Liability waivers and mutually developed 
project targets.  I saw that these IPD essential elements are closely related to Trust and 
Risk. Further, what was thought -provoking was the fact that Cohen (2010) put the 
absence of a waiver of liabilities on his scorecard. This can be interpreted as dislike of 
Indemnity Clauses in standard Traditional Contracts.  The score in the Cohen (2010) 
scorecard showed the degree of savings on Project costs that could be achieved through 
Trust and Trust-based Relational contracts. The emphasis was on trust, appropriate risk 
and reward sharing, with minimum bureaucracy. Throughout the Cohen (2010) article, 
there is an emphasis on Trust, risk sharing, and blurred boundaries and but at the end, 
they advocate for a matrix of responsibilities showing distinct roles for each party to the 
construction contract. This seems incongruous though, with Trust contract behaviour 
based on shared risk, reward, and absence of liability waivers.  Further, although at the 
top of Cohen's (2010) IPD scorecard there was "mutual respect and trust" based on 
integration between the Client, Consultant and Contractor in project delivery, all the 
contracts contained "to sue clauses," which were then waived. The presence of these to- 
sue-clauses in a way suggested non- integrated and positional behaviours, which were 
contrary to a Trust and Risk-sharing relationship. 
After noting the adversarial attitude and low productivity in Traditional contracts, Smith 
and Rybowski (2012) questioned the capacity of new project implementation methods 
such as IPD, Lean Construction, and Relational Contracting to depend on Trust.  They 
reiterate in their literature review that blurring of roles is a natural correction of the 
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overemphasis of the positions and "fear of liability" by Clients, Architects, Engineers, and 
Contractors in project implementation. They recommended further research to "determine 
if IPD and Lean construction can be used to systemically support higher levels of Trust 
than traditional methods of structured contracts." The evidence showed that both 
Traditional standard contracts and Trust-based Relational Contracts have many Indemnity 
Clauses. Presumptive Trust which should be the backbone of Relational agreements is 
demanded, documented and enforced by Indemnity Clauses. It appears in these contracts 
that you first trust, and then second you seek to be indemnified against specific 
occurrences. I argue that these Indemnity Clauses are contrary to the spirit of Trust. 
Further, these Indemnity clauses arise from Risk allocation instead of Risk sharing 
between the Clint and the Contractor. I will show with evidence from my research that 
risk is almost wholesale allocated to the Contractor, both in Relational and Traditional 
Contracts. 
Some authors for example Rahman, Kumaraswamy & Ling (2005), and Swan et al. 
(2002) argue that the pressure for IPD and Integrated Team Work comes from the need 
for innovative and cost-saving work methods.  Further, they found that the demand for 
productivity and quality construction has risen due to increasing uncertainty and 
complexity of the projects. The uncertain and incomplete project specifications require 
that some issues be solved as the project progresses. This, they argued, can be done 
through Trust-based relations.   Blois (1998) further carried out a case study using 
interviews and observations. He showed that the background of the Client, Consultant and 
Contractor forming the Temporary Multi-Party Organization (TMO) established to 
implement a project has a significant influence on their Contract behaviour. He argued 
that a sound business to business relationship based on Trust leads to better insights and a 
reduction in transaction costs. In a subsequent research Mouzas & Blois (2013) were 
concerned with the efficacy of framework or incomplete contracts which left out many 
contractual clauses. What is interesting is that Mouzas & Blois (2013) still recognized 
that disputes must be mutually resolved and that they are caused by four factors as 
follows:  
1. Divergent expectations 
2. Asymmetric information 
3. Uncertainty about the nature of interaction 
4. Either party has locked itself into unfavorable irreversible commitments 
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The common thread from the argument by Mouzas & Blois (2013) and other researchers 
above is that Trust is essential for all types of Contracts. 
 The basic contract behaviour that has been shown above is to obtain the value for 
money and excellent quality outputs. I questioned if this could be done through 
collaborative practices and creation of Trust. The extant literature defined Contract 
Trust, Competence Trust and Goodwill Trust as the three fold forms of Trust that should 
be considered in construction contracts to reduce transaction costs and mitigate the 
uncertainty of the outcomes. In the next Section, I discuss these different forms of Trust 
as identified in the literature. 
2.5 Forms of Trust. 
Some researchers including Fulmer & Gelfand (2012), Laan (2008), Lau & Rowlinson 
(2011), and Zaheer & Harris (2006) suggested that Trust first exists as inter-personal 
Trust. This is when individuals accept to be vulnerable to the future action of others. 
Trust comes with vulnerability or liability in Construction projects. However, the 
individuals recognize that their associates will act in their best interest. Fulmer & 
Gelfand (2012) researched how this inter-personal Trust aggregates first from personal 
individual level to team Trust and then to inter-organizational level Trust. The forms of 
Trust identified from the literature, and their referent is shown in the following Table 1. 
As shown in this table, I realised that some types of Trust have significance only at a 
personal individual level, while others aggregate to have significance at an 
organisational level. This supports the view by McEvily& Perrone (1998) that Trust is a 
state of the mind and it must, therefore, start with the individual. 
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Table1: Forms of Trust 
Item Form of Trust Definition Significance 
level 
 Prominent 
Researchers 
1. Contractual Trust Trust based on Contract 
Documents and 
Guarantees 
Organisational 
 
Broadbent et al. 
(2003), Vincent-
Jones (2012), Das & 
Teng(2001), 
2. Competence Trust Trust based on partners‟ 
capability to perform 
Organisational 
 
 Hartman (1999), 
Broadbent et al., 
(2003), Faem et. al 
(2008) 
3. Goodwill Trust Trust based on 
reputation and history of 
previous work done 
together 
Organisational Dyer and Chu. 
(2003), Das & 
Teng(2001), Swan et 
al. (2002) 
4. Intuitive Trust Trust based on emotions 
or "gut feeling." 
Individual  Hartman (1999), 
Zaheer et al. (1998) 
5. Integrity Trust Trust based on ethics 
and dependability 
Individual Hartman (1999), 
Zaheer et al. (1998) 
                                           
After scanning the literature and concluding that in all cases Trust was embodied as the 
acceptance of vulnerability from the action of others, I then looked specifically at the types of 
Trust that were relevant to construction projects. Construction projects only commence after 
participants have drawn up a contract to provide services at an agreed amount. It is then 
apparent that contracting parties must consider Contractual Trust important. Secondly, I also 
noted that Construction projects involved large sums of money and the Client requires value 
for money and the Competence of the Consultant and the Contractor was essential to get 
value for money. For this reason, I concluded that Competence Trust was important in 
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construction projects. Finally, for a sustainable business activity, Managers must look at 
repeat contracts through Customer satisfaction. This made Goodwill Trust important. In 
Table 1 above, it is worth noting that Hartman (2000) later attempted to explain the three 
forms of Trust further, but somewhat differently. However, the meaning remained the same. 
First, he said Competence Trust was cognitive trust, which is based on skill and capacity to 
perform. Second, he added intuitive trust as an affect-based trust which is based on emotions. 
Thirdly he added integrity trust and referred to it as individual trust. In this research, 
however, I focused on the insight and analysis of inter-organizational Trust between the 
Client, the Consultant and the Contractor in construction projects. I, therefore, turn my 
attention to Competence, Contractual and Goodwill Trust for the rest of my research in the 
five projects I selected.  
 After realizing the threefold nature of Trust, I wondered if Trust was influenced by the 
culture of the country where the contract was implemented. The effect of culture and working 
environment on Trust was discussed by several authors including Dyer & Chu (2003). Their 
research was not specific to construction projects, although the findings reflected on how 
culture affected Trust building in contracts in general. They perceived Japan as being a "high-
trust environment," America as "low-trust environment" and Korea as a "mixture of both high 
and low trust." Unfortunately, they did not rank Europe and Africa in the Trust-culture 
spectrum. The Dyer & Chu (2003) argument shows that Trust is a competitive economic 
asset. Thus Trust can be used to reflect the efficiency of national financial institutions and 
how to do business in those countries. Edkins & Smyth (2006) suggested that the strength of 
relationships in a contract is proportional to the amount of inter-entity Trust that is built in it. 
This supports my thinking that Trust management could be used for construction project 
management.  In their argument, a contract starts with faith and hope, and through the 
mediation of Trust, it moves to confidence and legalities.  While Faith is intangible, but it can 
be argued that once it emerges, Contractual Trust will have been formed and the Contract can 
be consummated, through legal clauses which are tangible. In the Edkins & Smyth (2006) 
proposal, the components of the intangible Trust were Expectation, Faith, Hope, and 
Confidence that the partners would perform their obligations.  I linked these intangibles and 
unwritten procedures to the creation of Competence and Goodwill Trust in a construction 
contract. 
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2.5.1 Affect Trust, Strategic Trust and System Trust 
In this Section, I briefly discuss other schools of thought which refer to Affect Trust, 
Strategic Trust, and System trust. I mainly look at how these forms of Trust are 
positioned concerning the earlier definitions of Competence, Contractual and Goodwill 
Trust between organizations. I inferred that Affect Trust is synonymous with both 
personal and Goodwill Trust. This is because some researchers for example Cheung et 
al. (2003), Smith & Rybowski (2012), and Wong et al. (2007) refer to Affect trust as 
personal trust since it is based on emotions and culture. Organizational trust, on the other 
hand, is based on knowledge and competence. It is sometimes called Cognitive or 
Strategic trust by these authors because it is influenced by the organizational strategies. 
For this reason, I equated Cognitive or Strategic Trust to Competence Trust. Wong et al. 
(2007) further discuss a third form of Trust which they called, System trust. It is based 
on organizational policy, communication, contracts, and documents.  Due to that, I 
equated System trust to Contractual Trust. Wong et al. (2007) also proposed a Trust 
framework which enabled measurement of Trust by tracking the partner behaviour due 
to the three types of Cognitive trust (Strategic Trust), System trust and Affect-based 
trust. They then used a structural equation model (SEM) which showed that Cognitive 
trust (Strategic trust) was the essential type of Trust among the three, followed by 
System Trust and lastly by Affect Trust.  I opine that this ranking seems superfluous 
because the three forms of Contractual, Competence and Goodwill as represented by 
Cognitive, System and Affect Trust respectively, themselves have blurred boundaries. 
After looking at the positioning of Cognitive, System and Affect Trust in the 
Trust spectrum, I concluded that the three headline forms of inter-organisational Trust 
are Contractual Trust, Competence Trust, and Goodwill Trust. These are the threefold 
forms of Trust that I examined in the rest of this research.  The other two forms of Trust 
called Intuitive Trust, and Integrity Trust were introduced by Hartman (2000). These 
two latter forms of Trust are related explicitly to Individual Trust and Goodwill Trust 
respectively. They are not considered separately further, because they are at a personal 
level, whereas the purpose of the research was to target inter-organisational Trust in 
Construction Projects. 
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2.6 Important Factors which Build or Harm Trust relations 
The extant literature shows that there are many potential factors which can be used to 
encourage the building of Trust in construction contracts. Swan et al. (2002) from the Centre 
for Construction Innovation University of Salford, UK, carried out a qualitative analysis 
using interviews and came up with several Trust building variables. These variables are 
discussed below, including works by other researchers. 
2.6.1 Project complexity and uncertainty  
Swan et al. (2002) found that it is easier to build Trust in smaller projects because of the 
lower number of personnel and short lines of communication. Thus according to them, the 
more complex and uncertain plans are, the more difficult it is to build Trust.  For example, 
Zaghloul and Hartman (2003) found that Contractors added between 8% and 20 % to prices 
to cover uncertainties in the contract. This supports proponents of structured and fully 
specified legal agreements who advocate for every contingency to be stated in the contract 
and costed. However, others such as Dyer & Chu (2003) suggest that in Trust-based 
Relational Contracts if Trust is invested for a long-term relationship with the Client, there is a 
reduction in the Contractor's markup and overall procurement cost. 
Jiang et al. (2013) researched the effect of Goodwill Trust and Competence Trust as 
mediating factors in preventing leakage of knowledge assets between partners. This is a 
crucial aspect of complex and uncertain projects which have a potential for innovation. They 
argued that the risk of knowledge leakage and opportunism increases with too little or too 
much Goodwill trust. Thus they found that Goodwill Trust has a "U" relationship with 
knowledge leakage. Opportunism and knowledge leakage is very high if there is too little 
Goodwill Trust. At an optimum level of Goodwill Trust, opportunism and knowledge leakage 
is very low but spikes up in the "U" relationship if there is too much Goodwill Trust. This 
upturn happens primarily when there are no protective measures in place to prevent 
knowledge leakage because the two parties completely trust each other. Competence Trust, 
on the other hand, is inversely related to knowledge asset leakage. Thus, if there is an 
increase in Competence Trust, knowledge leakage decreases. Fulmer and Gelfand (2012) also 
suggest that the disadvantage of excessive Trust is stunted innovation because firms feel 
comfortable with an existing status quo and they continue to invest in under-performing 
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processes. A strategic oversight of U-relationship between Trust and opportunism and 
knowledge leakage is critical because it can affect the progress of construction projects.   
In conclusion, the balance of inferred evidence from the extant literature seems to suggest 
that complexity and uncertainty increase the need for Trust, but at the same time these same 
factors make it challenging to create Trust between the Client, Consultant, and Contractor in 
construction projects. 
2.6.2 Temporary Transfer of project ownership to build Trust 
   According to many researchers, transferring ownership of a construction project from the 
Client to the Contractor, even for a limited tenure, makes Trust and creates incentives for the 
Contractor to perform.  For example, Liu, & Pradelli,  (2012) argue that in  PFI and PPP 
contracts, Government and the Private sector should go into an agreement and establish a 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) company which will own and run the affairs of the project on 
their behalf. The negotiations usually set a period after which ownership of the facility reverts 
to Government. In these Build Own Operate and Transfer (BOOT) contracts the tenure of 
temporary ownership transfer is called a concession period.  Some researchers for example 
Oyegoke et al., (2012), and Best & Valence (2002) have shown that Temporary transfer of 
ownership of the facility to the SPV during the concession period helps to build Trust. This is 
because project ownership also facilitates project fundraising, investor confidence and 
"risk/return negotiations."  Das & Teng (1998) added that project ownership promotes 
control, which will have a regulatory role to achieve mutual interests and objectives. I noted 
that in the Traditional standard contracts in use in Southern Africa there is a clause where the 
Project site is handed over to the Contractor in a temporary transfer of ownership to facilitate 
control. Complete Site handover in these contracts is to be encouraged because it influences 
performance by the Contractor. 
2.6.3 Removal of punitive Clauses in the contract. 
Faems et al. (2008) also looked at Contracts from both the standard Traditional 
structured and the Trust-based Relational perspective. The Structured perspective contracts 
are the traditional ones based on Transaction Cost Economics theory and contain many 
clauses which elaborate on how a partner in a joint venture or alliance must behave to fulfill 
the project objectives. These limitations enforce participant obligations, but they are also 
punitive.  On the other hand, according to Faems et al. (2008), the Relational perspective of 
contracts is grounded in Social Exchange theory, on the premise of Trust. They argued that 
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Trust relationships are based on reciprocity, justice, and fairness. Thus, from the Social 
Exchange Theory, punitive clauses should be minimized in a contract relationship   
 Swan et al. (2000),  besides their first variable that project uncertainty encouraged 
Trust building, also came up with a  second Trust building variable of joint problem-solving. 
Most construction projects come across problems during implementation and thus solving 
those difficulties jointly to mutual satisfaction without invoking the Indemnity clauses, or 
blame passing contributes to Trust building. The third variable according to Swan et al. 
(2000) which encourages building of Trust is shared goals. They state that goals are better 
shared if one builds a Trust team. Thus, it is contingent that a Trust team has a special 
relationship of mutual acceptability and confidence in each other‟s capability.  
2.6.4 Inter-organizational network relationships 
Shaz (2014) researched the Trust building impact of Network ties or Simmelian ties. 
These are triadic ties suggested by Simmel (1950).According to Shaz (2014), network ties 
encourage Trust building and knowledge transfer. The network's research by some authors 
for example Rahman, Kumaraswamy & Ling(2005),and Swan et al.(2002) seems to support 
that the more complex and uncertain a project is, the more dependent it is on Relational 
Contracting and Trust within a network.  In a similar research, Lahdenpera (2012) focused on 
multi-party relational project delivery arrangements (RPDA). He studied Project Partnering 
(PP), Project Alliance (PA) and Integrated Project Delivery (IPD). He also found that these 
arrangements were different from Traditional short-term and discrete economic transactions 
of structured Contracts in that they focused on long-term Trust-based Relational Trust 
investment.  What comes out from the above researchers is that commonality of project 
objectives builds Trust in Contracts. Macneil (1974) stated that in Trust-based Relational 
Contracting some Clauses are not written, and contract behaviour is based on social 
guidelines for fairness and trust. From a legal point of view Mouzas & Blois (2013) called 
these Relational contracts as "Framework Contracts or Incomplete Contracts"  because of 
their lack of finality and leaving the door open for change, if circumstances should so 
demand. Ring & Van de Ven (1994) had earlier proposed that for continued cooperation 
between two organizations, there must be both formal and informal relational processes. They 
argued that transfer of resources leads to disputes when enforcing legal clauses start 
conflicting with managerial processes. In their model, they argued that Trust relationships are 
"cyclical and not sequential" Thus, trust relationships in a team or network develop, reach a 
peak, and then they start to deteriorate. Hence, Ring & Van de Ven (1994) continued to argue 
and concluded that the only way to retain Trust relations equilibrium was to balance formal 
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and informal processes in the network. This conclusion is important in a Project construction 
team, because the Trust relationship has to endure to the Project completion, at least.  
2.6.5 A history of previously working together 
 Faems et al. (2008) researched Contractual control and Contractual coordination by the 
organizations‟ history of previous collaboration. They observed that for new acquaintances 
because Trust was low, the new acquaintances failed to exchange information for fear of 
expropriation of commercial secrets. This corroborated Garcia-Canal et.al (2003), who had 
researched Trust relationship using 80 Spanish joint ventures where there were multiple 
partner alliances but no previous history of working together. They had found that new 
partnerships should be encouraged, because they helped to build inter-organisation Trust 
through sharing of the resources and risks. This aspect of the positive effect of a history of 
working together was confirmed by other researchers for example, Dayan et al. (2007), and 
Swan et al. (2000) who found that history of working together and close continuous contact 
encouraged inter-personal trust building and knowledge transfer. I felt that this needed to be 
confirmed in my projects, particularly since some of the Projects have Government as the 
Client and they go through a competitive cost based selection procedure with the State 
Procurement Board. Could this competitive bidding keep Government, Consultant or 
Contractor relationship at arm‟s length? 
2.6.6 Information asymmetry and presumptive trust 
 Information asymmetry between partners may compel them to have to Trust each other. 
This was brought out in the Akerlof (1970) seminal research on quality uncertainty and the 
market for second-hand cars (lemons). He argued that it is the seller of a second-hand vehicle 
who knows more about its performance than the buyer who has to depend on Trust. 
According to Brewer (1981), the less informed party must have presumptive Trust in the 
more informed partner to consummate the contract. Presumptive Trust may also just be given 
for mere membership to a professional group. For Example, Clients put the condition in their 
request for Bids that Engineers must be members of the Institution of Engineers or that 
construction Contractors must be registered with the National Construction Industry 
Confederation. Being a member of these professional groups bestows upon them presumptive 
Trust that they can do the work   
2.6.7 Hybrid Arrangements and Trust 
The literature shows that a hybrid of written and unwritten clauses can also be used as a 
strategy for building Trust. Vincent-Jones (2012) found that some managers would instead 
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substitute Trust with elemental Contract Clauses and leave room for future negotiations and 
re-writing the contract if issues arise.  Another school of thought convincingly investigated 
by Ring & Van de Ven (1994) proposes that for both standard Traditional and trust -based 
Relational contracts, there has to be a balance between intangible Trust, which is not written 
down and tangible Trust in the form of written-down enforceable Contractual Clauses. This is 
a flexible hybrid approach which was based on Macneil‟s (1974), concept of Trust-based 
Relational Contracts. Ring & Van de Ven (1994) argue that the Contract Clauses give 
guidelines on expectations and foster cooperation in a win-win philosophy, thus suppressing 
opportunism and self-maximization. The hybrid arrangements on Trust appear to suit 
Construction Contracts because tri-partite members can always have nominal enforceable 
clauses to fall back on in case of fundamental performance default by the other party.  
2.6.8 Reciprocity          
Swan et al. (2000) also studied how reciprocity could build Trust. They argued that one 
partner could go out of his way to protect the rights of the other in the expectation that the 
partner would do the same for him. The argument is that reasonable and non-confrontational 
behaviour also builds Trust. Many other researchers, including Caldwell & Karri (2005) 
linked the role of governance in building trust to reciprocity. They argued that traditional 
agency and stakeholder theories which are based on teleological and utilitarian focus alone 
were not adequate to create Trust. Further, they state that even incentives and the most 
explicit control mechanisms cannot build Trust. They argued that only stewardship theory 
contract governance based on a "Covenantal relationship" and ethics would enhance Trust 
building in an organization. This ethics pledge can later be cascaded to inter-organizational 
Trust. Thus, organisations must trust each other to act in both their best interest without 
resorting to opportunism.  
2.6.9 The Cost of Trust 
Although I did not find clear empirical evidence in the extant literature showing cost 
savings from a long-term Trust relationship, a qualitative study by Fukuyama (1995) showed 
that the cost of construction variations could be significantly reduced if there is Trust between 
the construction tripartite. This saving is more evident in a trust-based relational contract than 
in a structured traditional contract. In a somewhat related study, Schepker et al. (2014) argued 
that due to contract incompleteness, managers should invest in the development of inter-
organisational Trust to deal with the construction variations and uncertainty. Variations and 
change orders in the scope of works can increase costs due to moral hazard, self- 
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maximization, and opportunism. In earlier research, Ring & Van de Ven (1994) had also 
concluded that to enjoy the cost savings from a Trust relationship, participants need to make 
their expectations of future business exchanges clear to each other, not necessarily in a 
written commitment, but even in informal verbal communication. However, the shortcoming 
of the Ring & Van de Ven (1994) argument is that it assumed that Risk and Trust are 
separable. In my later Findings Chapter I explain that Trust mediates Risk and I could not 
separate the two. It becomes clear from the empirical evidence, that where there is Risk, there 
has to be Trust for any contract to be consummated. The research by Schepker et al. (2014) 
however vindicated an earlier conclusion by Dyer & Chu (2003), that the procurement and 
transaction costs from an untrusted supplier were as much as five times higher than from a 
trusted supplier in the Motor Spares supply industry. Risk attracted a premium.  Besides cost 
savings, Schepker et al. (2014) also concur with Lumineau & Oxley (2012) that expectation 
of future repeat work can keep costly and time-consuming litigations at bay.  Unfortunately, 
as observed and quoted from Dyer & Chu (2003), the extant literature had only anecdotal 
case study evidence of cost savings. It showed no direct empirical research on how Trust 
resulted in procurement and transaction costs savings. Dyer & Chu (2003) attributed this lack 
of significant empirical research to the difficulty of measuring and operationalizing "Trust" 
and "Transaction Costs."  This lack of empirical research evidence influenced my study and 
made me search for possible cost savings that could be credited to Trust relations in 
Construction Contracts. 
2.6.10  Performance of Contract participants 
  Zaheer & Harris (2006) in their "Four Theme Staged Trust Model" studied the nature of 
Trust, how it is developed, nurtured, its role and outcomes. However, I appreciated that even 
this view of Trust from a general alliance management perspective informs on an 
organization's behaviour and how performance can influence the building of Trust. Swan et 
al. (2002) also did some case studies to measure Trust and how it could be related to project 
performance. Their conclusion on performance and building Trust was not an event but a 
process which entails building the Trust over the entire horizon of the project and sometimes 
over many projects. Further, they proposed the building of "Trusting Teams" at different 
levels of the organisation to improve project performance. Though an innovative proposal, 
the weakness seems to be in that these Trusting teams are temporary and the organisation has 
to keep rebuilding them for each project as opposed to Trust being a core organisational value 
on which strategic plans can be made.  
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2.6.11 Reliability and dependability in Construction Projects 
                The purpose of building inter-organisation Trust in Construction contracts is to have 
reliability and dependability among fellow project participants. Jaskowski (2015) researched 
reliability in construction contracts but unfortunately limited it to project scheduling only. 
Therefore the link between reliability and Trust still requires further research. Yiu and Lai 
(2009) also researched reliability, but their study was limited in that they looked at reliability 
in the mediation of construction disputes, but not at reliability in building Trust.  
 An analysis of the three salient forms of Trust, that is, Contractual trust, Competence trust 
and Goodwill trust shows they all contribute to Partner reliability and dependability. The 
three, however, have some inherent differences on how they contribute to the contract control 
and governance.  Firstly, the standard documents such as the New Engineering Contract, 
Architects Contract and FIDIC Contract anchor Trust in clearly stated, deliberate and formal 
documentation. These are the enforceable contract clauses that govern the behaviour of the 
temporary multi-party construction project team. They enforce intangible contractual Trust 
through actual control and governance of partner behaviour through obligation, indemnity or 
exculpatory clauses, as researched by Zaghloul & Hartman (1999). Secondly, Competence 
Trust, on the other hand, requires evaluation of the partners' capability to do the work. For 
Competence Trust to exist between organisations there must be inter-organisational 
behaviour predictability and dependability of skills.  Finally, I perceived that of the three 
forms of Trust in the literature, Goodwill Trust was the only form that remained intangible. It 
requires either party to act with benevolence and integrity on behalf of the trustor. Though 
invisible, Goodwill Trust has a distinct longitudinal timeline and is an investment in expected 
future good behaviour from a current acquaintance. 
2.6.12 Summary of Important Factors which Build or Harm Trust relations in 
Construction Contracts 
In Sections 2.6.1 to Section 2.6.11 above, I have shown from the extant literature, the 
critical factors that encourage the building of Trust relations. In this Section, I now 
summarize what the literature has said about building trust and how it might apply to sub-
Sahara countries like Zimbabwe and Malawi. I discuss the questions that the literature raises 
and possible ideas and effects on the construction tripartite of Client, Consultant, and 
Contractor. The first significant factor in trust relations is project complexity and uncertainty. 
Since at inception a project is just a proposal which is not visible and exists only in the minds 
of the Client and Consultant, it forces the implementers to trust each other. Secondly, some 
researchers, for example English & Baxter (2010) and Vincent-Jones (2012) have shown that 
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transferring the project ownership to the Contractor, be it for a temporary period, builds trust. 
This transfer of ownership is essential in the Sub-Sahara context because in these countries 
one has to borrow project finance. Clients often have to use the temporary transfer of their 
property Title Deed as a loan guarantee. 
A third vital factor to build trust relations in construction projects was the effect of 
Indemnity Clauses in the contracts. There was no detailed discussion in the literature on the 
impact of these Indemnity Clauses on Trust relations, and yet these Indemnity Clauses 
seemed to completely exonerate the Client and Consultant from any responsibility on 
emergent construction problems. In Sub-Sahara Africa, numerous construction problems are 
brought about by the lack of Funds, Equipment, and Skills. I questioned the shirking away 
from this inherent Risk by Clients and Consultants and how it was left entirely to the 
Contractor. The fourth factor which could build trust but which the literature lacked detailed 
research on was the positive effect of frequently working together. Instead, some researchers 
cautioned on the possibility of collusion in long-term networks, for example Cummings et 
al. (2009), Fischer (2011), Shazi (2014), Vincent-Jones (2012), and Zaheer & Harris (2012). 
In addition Swan et al. (200) only briefly mentioned that frequently working together 
encouraged interpersonal trust building. This left unanswered questions on whether 
frequently working together could actually build inter-organisational Trust relations which 
could help to enhance Contractor capacity through resource sharing and skills transfer. Some 
researchers including Rousseau et al. (1998), Schepker et al. (2014), Zaheer & Harris 
(2012), and Jaskowski (2015) discussed a fifth factor of reliability and dependability of 
trusted partners.  As a sixth factor, what if trusted partners failed to perform or failed to meet 
expected future behaviour? Partner competence and performance are important because the 
potential for error in construction projects is significant. These errors have in most cases a 
considerable cost implication. Is some benevolence required from senior partners in a joint 
venture?  This brought to the fore a seventh factor of the Cost of trust. There was no detailed 
empirical research in the literature of how cost could be a factor in building Trust. These 
questions occupied my mind as I proceed to do the research.  Reciprocity was an eighth 
factor in Trust building which was considered by Swan et al. (2000), and Caldwell & Karri 
(2005). However, there was no detailed research and they only based their argument on 
covenantal relationship and personal ethics pledge. The literature revealed a ninth factor of 
information symmetry which compelled the less informed partner to trust the other partner 
as elaborated in the Akerlof(1970) research on the market for second hand cars. Finally, the 
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literature as shown by Macneil (1974) and Ring& Van de Ven discusses how a hybrid of 
written and unwritten Clauses could be used to build Trust, because it allowed for future 
negotiations. 
2.7 Evaluating  Trust 
This section briefly discusses the difficulty of measuring Trust in construction 
contracts. Many Authors have given suggestions for measuring or assessing Trust, these 
include McEvily &Tortoiello (2011), Paine (2003), Yeung et al. (2012), and Zaheer & 
Harris (2006). To understand the impact of Trust on relations in construction projects, one 
needs to know how Trust is evaluated. In the extant literature, there is no universal 
agreement on how Trust in construction projects should be assessed. I noted many schools 
of thought on how to make this assessment. The methods suggested by the above authors are 
contextual. They vary from measuring Trust as Excellent, Good, Average and Poor, to even 
using the number of weeks it takes to agree on how to solve a new problem as a 
measurement of Trust. This lack of a universal index for evaluating Trust can be attributed 
to the fact that Trust is intangible, dynamic and multidimensional.  What is important is to 
agree on the evaluation criteria for Trust at the beginning of the project and that any 
contractual behaviour was being influenced by the presence or absence of Trust.  
2.8 Trust and Transaction Costs Economics 
As stated above, I had found no clear empirical evidence in the literature of how Trust 
could save costs. I only saw anecdotal evidence. To narrow the search, I decided to limit the 
area to just that of transaction costs. In this Section, I discuss what the literature is saying 
about Trust in Transaction Economics. Zaghloul and Hartman (2007) surveyed the Canadian 
construction industry, to identify opportunities for risk allocation based on Trust 
relationships. I figured out that risk influenced construction cost. Zaghloul and Hartman 
(2007) found that Clients try to allocate as much risk as possible to Contractors using 
Disclaimer clauses. These risks include risks on the uncertainty of work conditions, delaying 
events, liquidated delay damages, guarantees and incomplete contract documents.  They also 
found that on the same risk exposure, the use of disclaimer clauses encouraged Contractors 
and Consultants to increase their Bid prices. Based on their survey they assessed that the 
premium placed on a bidder's price due to risks and disclaimer clauses is 8- 20%. Thus, 
Trust and appropriate risk sharing are critical to the final contract cost. 
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 This is because Contractors and Consultants will include in their price, 
insurance or a contingency to deal with risks.  Here it is crucial to discuss Risks in the same 
vein as Trust because the two are inseparable. In theory, it is not necessary to generate Trust 
where there is no Risk. I questioned and concurred with Zaghloul and Hartman (2007) that 
the use of disclaimer clauses must be investigated.   Later in the study, I suggest that at 
worst, these exonerating disclaimer clauses should only be used as performance guidelines 
and not as penalty clauses. Zaghloul and Hartman (2007) found that the disclaimer clauses 
were used in as much as 75% of the construction contracts.  They concluded that a full 
understanding of the risks to be borne by each team member leads to project cost reduction 
through an appropriate risk- sharing and risk-reward plan. This far in the study, I had only 
found anecdotal evidence which showed that for possible reduced costs and enhanced 
performance, Risk should be allocated to the team member who is best suited to deal with it. 
The question that arose was whether a trusting relationship reduces the number of disclaimer 
clauses and the final cost of the project. 
Rahman, Kumaraswamy & Ling (2005) studied factors that facilitated or 
deterred Trust-based contracting in Singapore. In the subsequent Factor Analysis, they 
ranked „Mutual trust" as the most important factor out of a possible 24 that facilitated Trust-
based Contracting.  They further discussed Trust and Trustworthiness.  If a partner is 
trustworthy, he resists opportunism they argued. Among the mutual trust factors, they 
stressed communication, coordination and a win-win philosophy. In the same research, 
Rahman, Kumaraswamy & Ling (2005) also found that lack of Trust was the highest 
deterrent to Relational contracting. This was out of the 24 deterrent factors which included 
erosion of trust, lack of top management support, client bureaucracy, cultural barrier, the 
absence of contractor and consultant risk-reward plans, poor differences resolution 
mechanism, poor risk-reward allocation and reliance on price based selection.  Thus, 
Rahman, Kumaraswamy & Ling (2005) concurred in principle with the Zaghloul and 
Hartman (2007) study but showed no clear empirical evidence that Trust was at the center of 
risk allocation and dispute resolution. 
Rahman, Kumaraswamy & Ling (2005) further carried out an analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) to determine whether the factors that enhanced Trust-based relations in 
construction contracts had equal importance to the tripartite members. 
The Client, Consultant, and Contractor all agreed on the relative importance of inter-entity 
Trust to both standard traditional and trust-based construction contracts.The above studies 
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by Rahman, Kumaraswamy & Ling (2005)   vindicated the award-winning article by Dyer & 
Chu (2003) who had found that Transaction or procurement costs were five times higher for 
a less trusted buyer. However, it was not clear whether Trust also improved governance 
issues in contracts and reduced opportunistic behaviour. Never-the- less the study by Dyer & 
Chu (2003) although in the Car Manufacturing sector validated that Trust lowers transaction 
costs. Their arguments can also be applied to the Construction industry because the 
procedural framework of a Client procuring the services of a Consultant and Contractor is 
the same. In a follow up to the readings on Trust and Transaction Cost Economics, I again 
noted the lack of attention on the Trust payoff. This is in spite of the costs centrality to most 
contracts in construction projects. Zaheer et al. (1998) noted that although there is some 
theoretical evidence of the economic pay off of Trust, it is difficult to measure this financial 
compensation off.  I, however, argue that the Trust pay off can simply be measured by 
adding productivity and performance payoffs, reduced project time cost savings, Client 
satisfaction and repeated business. Thus, suggesting that the difficulty of measuring the 
economic payoff is a weak excuse for not computing the cost savings emanating from Trust 
in a construction contract. The Transaction cost saving can be investigated and calculated as 
the sum of the cost of Site instructions, variations, idle time, and interest payments for late 
payment and liquidated delay damages.  
2.9 Trust and Top Management Support 
 As I continued with the Literature review, it became evident to me that Company 
policy influenced the Trust orientation of the Client, Consultant, and Contractor. Rahman, 
Kumaraswamy & Ling (2005) found that Companies where top management support intra-
organizational associations build Trust easier. This is because senior management is 
responsible for formulating strategies and making business decisions. Those Companies that 
have an excellent financial standing also tend to act justly and put an effort in protecting 
their subcontractors from being exploited by Clients. Such companies price their bids 
reasonably. On the other hand, Companies in financial difficulties are usually desperate to 
win Bids. I think they, therefore, bid very low to win the job, but later try to make a profit 
from spurious claims as the contract progresses. This behaviour then builds mistrust and 
damages the trust relationships between the Client, Consultant, Contractor, and Sub-
contractors. Pinto (2009) et al. moved a step back in their investigation of Trust. They found 
that the Client (who is the project owner) and Contractor must first build private trust 
between corresponding persons at department levels. This personal Trust at department level 
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must then be supported by the top management to develop inter-organisation Trust. They 
assumed that the support started at the bottom. This is where it can be argued that it is 
necessary to have company policy and strategy which encourages or supports inter-
organisation Trust between the two entities. 
2.10 The Risk and Trust Link 
As I progressed in my study, the issue of the Trust Risk link became critical, and I had 
to review the Literature. Chan et al. (2012),   Doloi (2009), and Jin & Ling, (n.d.) also 
researched the connection between Trust, Risk, and Relationships in the Chinese 
Construction industry. They aimed to come up with a model that could be used to foster 
Trust and build Relationships. First, they noted that Trust was the dominant mechanism for 
building relationships when doing business in China. An exciting feature of their research is 
that they subdivided a construction project into four stages as, pre-bidding, bidding, 
construction and post-construction. At each step, they identified the risks and the trust tools 
that one could use to mitigate the risk. For example, at construction stage, there are 
construction risks which include poor quality work, time delays, and disputes. The tools to 
reduce these risks included assigning experienced staff, with excellent technical and 
interpersonal skills.  The limitation of their findings was that the bulks of their respondents 
were from State-owned enterprises and based in the very developed City of Shanghai. 
However, the significance of their study was that the allocation of Risks and the impact of 
Trust at each project implementation stage was an enduring link.   
In Hong Kong, Chan et al. (2012) researched how risk could be mitigated in two types of 
Contracts, namely Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP) and Targeted Cost Contract (TCC). 
The emphasis of each of these two types of contracts is self-explanatory in their names.  
Chan et al. (2012) came up with seven consolidated factors which could be used to 
mitigate Risk. These factors included: relational contracting and trust, the well-defined 
scope of works, Contractor involvement in decision making, a well-selected project team, 
independent project design check, standard contract clauses and fair treatment of the 
Contractor. The limitation of this research was that the types of Contracts they studied were 
specialist and very positional, with a strong risk allocation culture. They interviewed141 
construction professionals, and as much as 33% had no hands-on experience in GMP and 
TCC contracts, and they had to return the survey forms uncompleted. This perhaps indicates 
that the researchers' selection of the type of contracts to study risk mitigation was not 
suitable.  Their use of GMP and TCC contracts procurement to explore risk and trust was 
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therefore not appropriate. In these types of contracts, first there is a permanent presence of 
the threat of punishment if there is over expenditure. And secondly, there is the incentive of 
a reward if a cost saving is achieved and this can be shared by the participants. These two 
factors wholly changed contract Risk and Trust behaviour as the contractors were only 
concerned with how to avoid punishment and how to maximize profits. The overall project 
goals, in my opinion, were forgotten. 
The literature reading on Risk allocation and its alleviation using indemnity clauses 
made me question and argue that risk is unfairly allocated to Contractors particularly in 
Traditional standard contracts, like FIDIC, NEC, JCT and Architect's Contract. 
2.11  Trust and Repeat Business  
In this section, I discuss how Trust influences repeat business and repeat 
partnerships. This is important since the literature earlier asserted that Goodwill trust is an 
essential factor in Trust-based relational contracts.  The question is, should one invest in 
Goodwill Trust in expectation of future repeat business? Schepker et al. (2014) 
acknowledged that Trust between organizations generates repeat business due to exchange 
satisfaction. They argued that prospects of repeat business "outweigh gains from self- 
interest behaviour”. This incentive to perform because of possible repeat business may also 
be just an expectation and not necessarily written in the contract, but even then, this gives 
Goodwill Trust a long-term perspective. In a case study by Swan et al. (2002), a Client kept 
giving projects to the same Contractors and Consultants as a way of developing common 
goals and tripartite understanding of the project objectives. The participant Contractors 
were obliged to give a "fair price" to continue getting the repeat business.  This study shows 
that price discounting is one possible benefit of investing in Goodwill Trust. 
In another reading, Kometa et al. (1996) found that repeat business was good for all, the 
Clients, Consultants, and Contractors. However, when the Client started having financial 
problems which lead to him closing down, the Consultants and Contractors were also 
negatively affected, and this led to their collapse. This suggests that while repeat business 
is a positive Goodwill Trust investment outcome, caution should be exercised and a 
valuable lesson is that a diversity of Clients ensures longevity of Consultants and 
Construction Contractors. 
 I sought literature on the role of Trust creation on the Public Sector contracts. Ning & 
Ling (2013) found 21 drivers for building Trust, among them the expectation that a future 
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mutually beneficial relationship could facilitate the building of Trust for repeat business.  
Their focus was on Public Sector project outcomes. The five results considered 
significant by Ning & Ling (2013) were Cost, Time, Performance, Quality and Client 
Satisfaction. Although they did not focus on Trust, they drew upon the Relational contract 
theory and Network embeddedness theory to show that Trust-based contracts improved 
these five outcomes in Public projects. In spite of the need to keep "arms-length" 
relationship in Public Projects and the competitive public tendering system, they 
concluded that good Trust-based relationships benefit Public Sector projects. It is, 
however, worth acknowledging that the competitive system of project procurement in the 
Public sector and bureaucracy does not guarantee future work and tends to reduce the 
positive repeat business effects of Goodwill Trust relationships.  Fischer (2011) also 
researched a case on how Trust and Networking led to collusion in Chile.  He found that 
repeat business was fraught with fraud and in his study it led to the dismissal of the 
relevant Minister and the Public Private Partnership Department.  
 The effects of repeat partnerships in the U.K. were researched by  Siemiatycki (2011)   
He found that stable repeat partnerships also have a significant positive effect on the Ning 
& Ling (2013) parameters of cost, time, quality, performance and client satisfaction. 
While concurring with the potential for collusion due to repeat partnerships, I also 
questioned whether these repeat partnerships do not reduce competition and innovation. 
Siemiatycki (2011) argued that repeat partnerships also had cultural and social root 
influences from their geographic and strategic origins.  For this reason repeat partnerships 
in spite of any presumptive Trust that they may have, do not automatically multiply 
across international boundaries. In support of my question on competition and innovation, 
I found that Siemiatycki (2011) had further recommended research on the effect of repeat 
partnerships on performance. His findings are intriguing in developing countries where 
local partners need the alliance with well-established international partners to enhance 
technology transfer and to build capacity. I discuss this a little later in my investigation 
and findings chapter. The immediate question is whether Performance continues to 
improve with multiple repeat contracts between Clients and Contractors or repeated 
partnerships. It may be argued that performance deteriorates when there is excessive 
Trust and that participants may take each other for granted. This is vindicated by the U 
relationship between trust, knowledge leakage and opportunism as researched by Jiang et 
al. (2013), which I discussed earlier in Section 2.6.1 
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Swan et al. (2002) carried out a somewhat related research on repeat business as 
opposed to repeating partnerships. He concluded that to get repeat business; there has to 
be reliance on the partner's performance. He argued that the Consultant and Contractor 
will consistently have to perform and deliver.  In the same way that Ning & Ling (2013) 
researched repeat partnerships with the five parameters above, they suggested that future 
research should look at the effect of repeat partnerships on Trust, with special emphasis 
on construction project cost, quality, and program. Anecdotal evidence seems to indicate 
that Cost, Quality, and Program are positively related to repeat business which is 
generated by Goodwill Trust. 
2.12  The effect of Trust on contract governance and performance 
Poppo, Zhou, and Zenger (2008) carried out research which showed that Trust is 
relevant to contract governance. They argued that Trust is positively related to asset 
specificity, exchange tenure or contract length. In a trust-based relationship, parties learn 
from each other and engage in a collaborative and information sharing behaviour on the 
assumption of a long and repeated relationship. As inferred above, Trust has a 
coordinating role in contract relationships when parties act for mutual benefit. 
   There is however insufficient literature on how trust contributes to governance and 
contractual collaborations. Strathorn et al. (2015) carried out a phenomenological 
research to get insight into the influence of Trust in managing Traditional standard 
contracts. They came up with a thematic model of trust with four themes; the first theme 
was on Human variables which included "Relationships, trust and project environment." 
The second theme was Attribution variables which included "benevolence, competence, 
integrity, and communication." The third theme was based on Contextual variables 
which included "risk, vulnerability, uncertainty and team environment." The fourth 
theme was Trust Failure which included "trust breakdown, trust repair, competence and 
integrity violations." In spite of their very detailed factor analysis in their thematic model 
of trust, and the potential of Trust in project management, they found little evidence of 
deliberate procedures to build, maintain and sustain Trust in the governance and 
performance of traditional construction contracts. This influenced me to seek insight into 
how Trust could be used to control and govern construction contracts.  
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2.13 Breakdown of Trust 
After examining the extant literature on the creation of Trust relationships in projects, I 
then investigated the effects of loss of Trust in contracts. Some Researchers for example, 
English & Baxter ( 2010), Macneil( 1974), Schepker et al.( 2014), and Vincent-Jones 
(2012) show that Clients, Consultants, and Contractors view trust-based Traditional and 
Relational contracts as the future of construction projects.  Ariño & Torre (1998) found 
that positive feedback loops on procedural dispute resolution issues helped to build and 
reinforce mutual Trust. They traced a Joint Venture of two partners in a Skin Care 
division. They found that divergence in focus of the two partners, inability to read the 
external business environment, incapacity to renegotiate a new equity arrangement and 
failure to learn from failures resulted in mistrust between the Joint Venture members.  
This led to the Joint Venture being eventually dissolved.  On a similar research on 
Partnerships, Swan et al. (2002) state that the leading causes of breakdown of Trust 
include poor communication, blame culture, mistakes, and circumstances beyond the 
control of the partners.  Besides, failure to perform, adversarial attitude and excessive 
use of contractual power affect Trust negatively. A blame culture encourages 
opportunism and taking advantage of other tripartite members' weaknesses. Swan et al. 
al (2002) continued to argue that for good Trust-based contracts the partners must move 
from a blame culture to a culture of problem-solving. This is the processual interplay 
between trust and risk sharing that could lead to a collaborative way of construction 
project implementation in sub-Sahara Africa that I sought in my research. 
 In Construction contracts, the tendency to pass-on-blame is very high because any 
mistakes made also have a very high-cost implication.  It was on this basis that while 
researching Client and Contractor collaboration on capital projects in the Netherlands, 
Suprapto et al. (2014) ranked "No- Blame-culture" in the top 4 factors that enhance Trust 
relationships in projects. The "No- Blame-Culture" was positioned among other factors 
which included, open and honest communication, shared objectives and personal 
affective trust. 
2.14 Summary of Literature Review 
In this section, I summarize the important ideas that shaped my research after reading the 
existing Literature.   I also reiterate the questions that the Literature raised for me. Could 
the Client get better value for money if there was a paradigm shift in managing Contracts 
 
 
47 
 
through collaborative relationships as opposed to mere Contractual Clauses? For the 
Consulting Engineers or Architects, could they manage the contracts better using Trust? 
And for the Contractor could he meet the cost, time and quality objectives of the project 
more efficiently through Trust relationships?   
As seen above, some authors for example Dyer & Chu (2003), Fulmer & Gelfand(2012), 
Hartman (1999), Laan(2008), McEvily & Perrone (1998), Swan et al. (2002), Wong et 
al.(2007), and Zaheer & Harris (2006) defined Trust as acceptance of vulnerability and 
interdependence on each other. Three important forms of Trust stood out and were 
relevant in construction contracts. Firstly there was Contractual Trust, which is based on 
clearly defined contract clauses. Secondly, there was Competence Trust, which is based 
on the ability to do the work. Thirdly there was Goodwill Trust which is based on 
frequently working together, expected repeat contracts and acceptable future contract 
behaviour. The evidence from these previous researchers showed that these three forms 
of Trust were equally important in traditional standard contracts (for example FIDIC, 
NEC, and JCT) and Relational Contracts (for example PPP, PFI, PA, and JV)    
The other question that arose was, how could these three forms of Trust be built and 
what was their effect on the key construction project success factors of Cost, Program, 
and Quality? 
    In summary, many researchers including Rahman, Kumaraswamy & Ling (2005), 
Swan et al.(2002), Faem et al.(2008), Zaghloul and Hartman(2007),and Ring & Van De 
Ven (1994) showed interest in how contract transaction costs could be reduced by 
building inter-entity Trust. But there has been no empirical study to research this role of 
Trust in economic cost reduction in a construction project. This point became important 
in the context of my study of trust- based Contracts in Southern Africa because many 
projects do not get completed due to Financial and Skills constraints. Thus both Standard 
Traditional Contracts and Relational Contracts contained many disclaimer clauses that 
according to Zaghloul and Hartman (2007) and other researchers caused Contractors to 
over-price by 8-20%, therefore defeating the objective of reducing transaction costs.   
I found no literature on building inter-organisational Trust in Construction 
Projects in the developing Southern African countries. In their research, Zinyama & 
Nhema (2015) found that for these countries, the Private Sector and Public Sector cannot 
meet the infrastructure construction mandate. Zimbabwe and Malawi, therefore, have a 
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particular interest in how Trust can unveil Private and Donor funding for infrastructure 
construction and maintenance. As I went through the literature, I saw the need to 
research how the Client, Consultant and Contractor inter-organisational Trust impacts on 
both the Traditional standard contracts and the newer Relational construction contract 
projects in these developing economies. There was a need for Action Research on Trust 
relationships which could lead to insight and practical solutions to enhance Performance 
reduce Cost and improve Quality of Construction projects in these same developing 
countries. This is because of the many infrastructure projects in these countries which 
have performed poorly, resulting in Cost and Time over 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH AND DESIGN METHOD 
3.1 Research design and method 
In the previous Chapter, I carried out a literature review. I discussed definitions and the 
primary forms of Trust in Construction projects and how Trust could theoretically be built to 
improve project Cost, Quality and Time. The literature review, however, left many questions 
unanswered on why there are so few Trust-based Relational Contracts in Zimbabwe and 
Malawi and why in general there was poor Cost, Quality and Time control and governance on 
these projects. The literature review also left me with questions about how I could contribute 
to the building of Trust in particular projects on which I was involved. As a Consultant and 
participant researcher, I wondered whether the creation of such Trust would have an impact 
on the performance of these projects. 
 In this chapter, I describe the phenomenological qualitative method I followed as an 
immersed participant. I was an Action Researcher in an Engineering Consultancy Firm which 
was involved in 5 Construction projects. I took guidance from other phenomenology experts 
for example Moustakas (1994), and Creswell (2013). Thus, I "exhaustively" used my 
immersed position to describe the various phenomena that were impacting on the 
construction projects I was supervising. I was looking for inductive and deductive knowledge 
and meanings of statements by the Client, fellow Consultants, and Contractors in the five 
projects.  In the following Sections, I explain the methods that I used to collect the data, the 
limitations I had and what action I took to mitigate these constraints.   
3.2  Methodological Approach 
The objective of this research was to have insight into collaborative practices which could 
lead to Trust creation in construction projects. I followed an Action Research approach. This 
is applied research used to solve practical problems through deliberate cycles of action, 
reflection, and learning. The outcomes of Action Research produced useful and actionable 
knowledge. Creswell (2013) describes five qualitative research methods. These include 
Narrative, Phenomenology, Grounded Theory, Ethnography and Case Study.  I followed an 
interpretive phenomenological approach using lived experiences as a Consulting Engineer in 
construction projects. 
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3.3  The selection of sample projects 
 Initially, I selected three construction projects that I was working on, to carry out my Action 
Research.  As I proceeded, my focus changed from just researching Relational Contracts to a 
broader spectrum of the role of building Trust in both Standard Traditional Contracts and 
Trust-based Relational contracts. I then increased the number of Projects to 5. Two projects 
were in Zimbabwe, while three were in Malawi. The selected five Projects were what I could 
manage in this productive inquiry.  As suggested by Nonaka (1994), quoted by Cook and 
Brown (1999), I was seeking to reveal tacit knowledge in my projects. This way I could 
produce practical solutions to construction project management problems. Besides, the 5 
Projects were at different stages of implementation and allowed observation at these various 
stages of construction. The project procurement types and contracts were also different.  Two 
of the Projects were procured through Traditional standard competitive bidding process based 
on short-term transaction cost economics theory. These two were the 3000 Low-cost Housing 
(LCH) project and the JPC 102 kilometers long Road Construction project. The other three 
projects were based on Trust-based Public-Private partnership or Joint venture partnership. 
These were the construction of a U$D 22million University Library (UL), the construction of 
the 120 Kilometer road in Linia (LR) and the construction of an International Bus 
Terminal(MBT). My primary interest was to use tacit knowledge to identify collaborative 
practices and create Trust between the Client, Consultant, and Contractor in these 
construction projects. I wanted to know how the participants related to each other and what 
could enhance their inter-entity trust and project construction progress. The Five study 
projects primary data is given in Table 2 below: 
TABLE 2: Projects Data Summary 
Item Project Identity Contract 
 Type 
Value(U$D 
Million) 
   Scope Tenure 
(Months) 
1 Low-Cost Housing Traditional 70 Housing 24 
2 University Library Relational 22 Building 24 
3 JPC 102 km Road Traditional 22 Road 22 
4 Linia120 km Road Relational 120 Road 36 
5 Moni Bus Terminal Relational 35 Roads& Buildings 18 
  
 
 
51 
 
The extant literature had shown me that Trust could be at the individual or personal level 
or it can be at corporate or inter-organization level. My primary interest was inter-
organisation Trust. I wanted to find out if Trust was critical in both standard Traditional and 
Relational construction contracts? The literature review had helped me to define inter-
organisational Trust in construction projects as threefold, being Contractual Trust, 
Competence Trust, and Goodwill Trust. The question was what could be done to build these 
three forms of Trust in my projects and would they enhance the construction, project Cost, 
Program, and Quality? To decide on what deliberate action I should take to build Trust on 
each project, I carried out ethnographic research using contract documents, carrying out 
observations at meetings between the Client, Consultant, and Contractor. I also had informal 
conversations in my day to day project management duties as a Consulting Engineer. In 
addition I carried out formal interviews using semi-structured questions. My narrative style of 
inquiry on the project stakeholders encouraged a more honest response. In particular, it 
permitted the Clients, Consultants, and Contractors to appreciate my investigation and to 
answer freely. I examined project artifacts, such as contract documents, correspondence and 
minutes of management and site meetings. I used qualitative research to get insight into 
concepts and knowledge on construction project management. I focused on making sense of 
the phenomenon and lived experiences as the construction projects progressed and met 
various constraints to fulfilling the key success factors of Cost, Program and Quality.   
 From an immersed Participant Action Researcher position, I synthesized the problems on 
each project. After synthesis and analysis, I took deliberate action to find practical solutions 
to the live project management problems using some strategies that I wanted to test in 
building inter-organisation Trust. I found that some of the project management problems 
were common and therefore some of the strategies of dealing with these specific issues that I 
had learned in one project could be applied in whole or in part to another of the five projects. 
The similarity of the problems presented an opportunity for learning from a lived experience 
for me. 
3.4  Methodology 
It was important to initially bracket some pre-knowledge of contracts to allow solutions to 
emerge from the discussions, and interviews with the contract tripartite of Client, Consultant 
and Contractor. Fortunately in three of the projects I was a team leader responsible for 
coordinating the Consultant teams. For example in the Housing project I had six discrete 
consultants under me. These consisted of the Architect, Civil Engineer, Electrical Engineer, 
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Quantity Surveyor, Clerk of Works and Cadastral surveyor. This position allowed me to carry 
out interviews and gather data as a semi-detached researcher. The partial and total project 
immersion permitted an analytical approach before taking deliberate action to seek practical 
solutions to the problems facing the projects. In the Linia road project, I was a detached 
researcher. The data from that project was useful to benchmark data from other projects 
where I was immersed   However, as a participant researcher in one's organization, I had the 
distinct advantage of being an indigenous researcher in real practical organizational 
problems. Thus, as an insider, I had access and background familiarity with the politics, 
culture and working environment of the construction projects I chose to research. 
Nevertheless, being an insider researcher also had its problems. These included the tension of 
emotional involvement and possible conflict of interest while obtaining primary data. I strove 
to resolve this by bracketing issues that I felt would compromise my synthesis and analysis of 
the Contracts that I was studying. In some cases, I had to recuse myself from meetings, for 
fear of conflict of interest. I, however, obtained secondary data from the post meeting 
minutes, transcripts and other artifacts.  
  After it emerged from the extant literature that Trust was also a salient standard Traditional 
Contract behaviour in spite of all the clauses that encouraged short-term transactions, I 
focused my research on how to build Trust between the Client, Consultant, and Contractor in 
the Traditional standard contracts and the Relational Construction Contracts that I had 
chosen. I started looking for collaborative processes that could enhance the interplay between 
Trust and sharing of risk amongst the construction tripartite.  
I made ethnographic participant observations of meetings, used contract documents and 
conducted informal conversations during my day to day duties while managing contracts on 
behalf of Clients. The formal interviews I described above were part of my primary data 
collection. These were narrative interviews with unstructured dialogue that allowed my 
respondents to use their own words to tell their stories of not only the projects that I was 
researching, but also other projects that might have influenced their contract behaviour. This 
Narrative style of data collection and analysis allowed me to reveal embedded knowledge in 
construction personnel from their lived experiences. I selected some interviewees that 
included Clients, Consultants and Contractors in Zimbabwe and Malawi. I later decided to 
add project Financiers because early data that I had gathered indicated that they influenced 
the success of the projects significantly in these two developing countries. For example, 
while trying to solve the problem of delays on one project it emerged that work had stopped 
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because the Borrower or Client had not received a letter of "no objection" from the Financier 
on the proposed downstream contract between the Client and the Contractor. I will discuss 
this particular case in greater depth in the findings Chapter. 
 The economic fragility of these two countries and the shortage of domestic loan funds for 
construction projects mean that most plans depend on external loan funding.  My field data 
also contained memos and Field Notes.  In some cases I used 3- column analysis to assist me 
in making decisions on what action I should take in an iterative process of action research. 
The next stage was to analyse my Field notes, memos and the interviews by coding and 
grouping the similar patterns and then to link them to the artifacts for the five projects in 
which I was a participant. As a Participant Action Researcher, I took deliberate action, 
evaluated it and further investigated my findings. Some of my conclusions failed under 
investigation, and I had to get more information in an iterative cycle of inquiry.  For 
example, when I was investigating the University Library, the Contractor suddenly stopped 
work on the project. This work stoppage was confusing because I thought that perhaps he 
had run out of Funds. Further interviews with him, however, revealed that he had stopped 
work because he had Trust issues with the Client.  From this type of iterative cycle of 
inquiry, I observed how collaborative and Trust relations developed in the particular five 
projects that constituted my research.    
3.5  Procedure for Data collection 
 I collected data from a purposeful sample of Clients, Consultants and Contractors on the 
five projects that I was engaged as an Engineering Consultant in Zimbabwe and Malawi. As 
stated above, my data collection design is based on a narrative style inquiry. The premise 
was that narratives and organizational stories have embedded knowledge which is revealed 
when carefully analysed and can be transferred to solve current problems. Again as stated 
above, the 5 Projects were selected because they were at different stages of construction 
and they also represented both the Traditional standard contracts and trust-based Relational 
contracts.  I used semi-structured interviews to learn from the Clients, Consultants, and 
Contractors their stories of working on these projects (See Appendix 3).  Table 3 below, 
shows the categories of respondents in my five projects. 
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Table 3: List of Respondents Interviewed 
Project Clients 
Interviewed 
Consultants 
Interviewed 
Contractors 
Interviewed 
Low-Cost Housing 4 10 10 
 Library 3 5 4 
JPC Road 3 4 4 
Moni Bus terminal 2 3 0 
Linia Road 4 2 3 
Respondents not in 
the above projects 
10 20 10 
TOTAL 26 44 29 
 
  In addition to the above 99 interviews, I also carried out additional post recommendation 
interviews including 15 new ones which included representatives of Funding agencies and 
other Construction stakeholders making a total of 114 Interviews. In these interviews, I was 
trying to learn relational aspects and events which impacted on contract behaviour and could 
influence the management construction projects. The Moni international bus terminal had 
not reached the stage of construction. A Contractor, therefore, had not yet been appointed, 
and this explains the figure zero shown in Table 3 above. 
3.6   Data collection  
         I carried out a qualitative research to get insight into concepts and knowledge on 
construction project management. I focused on making sense of the phenomenon and lived 
experiences as the construction projects progressed. I chose to use interviews of the 
stakeholders, in particular Clients, Consultants, Contractors and Financiers to collect data. I 
sifted through the minutes of meetings, contract documents and other artifacts trying to find 
practical solutions and concepts on how collaboration, building Trust and risk sharing could 
be used to manage construction projects.  After collecting the data, making sense out of it 
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through analysis and clustering themes, I took deliberate iterative action and reflection to 
find practical solutions to construction problems 
       Being an Engineering Consultant on these five projects, I was able to interview the 
Clients, Consultants and the Contractors involved in them.  It was easier to talk to high-level 
Client and Contractor's representatives than to the lower level. The higher level of both 
Client's representatives and the Contractor's representatives appreciated the purpose of my 
research and the potential benefits. 
       In spite of my assurances of the academic nature of my inquiry, the lower level or Site staff 
was a bit apprehensive and wondered whether I was taking the Client's side or the 
Contractor's side depending on who they were. I had to assure and make them relax first 
before deep questioning. As a Consultant, I was supposed to be an independent mediator in 
the projects, but sometimes the research action forced me to act with a bias towards the Client 
or the Contractor. For example in one project a Contractor went on unpaid for over ten 
months, it was difficult not to feel for him. I found that collection of data from the 
Consultants and Contractors was easier compared to collecting it from the Clients. I believe 
that one of the limitations of insider Action research is that one cannot remain anonymous. 
The research cycle has to influence the project that one is investigating. Respondents may, 
therefore, be reluctant to be completely open. It is for this reason that I had to bracket my pre-
understanding of the pre-research issues and consistently use 3-column analysis to help make 
decisions on what action to take. First, I developed an interview protocol Form to help me 
focus.  The protocol was preceded by a Participant Information Sheet (Appendix 1) and a 
Consent Form.  These two forms were compliant with the University of Liverpool Ethics 
Committee for research involving Human participants and human material. They were 
designed to cause minimum discomfort or harm beyond the participants' daily organizational 
life. As shown in the Participant Information Sheet (Appendix 1), Respondents fully 
understood the nature of the research. It was necessary to explain, particularly to the 
Contractors that I was supervising, that the interviews were wholly voluntary. I did not want 
to take advantage of the positional power I had over them. I assured all the participants of 
anonymity and confidentiality during and after the research. 
3.7  Interview Questions and analysis methods 
As stated above, I used the stories from the interviewees to get embedded knowledge on the 
role of Trust in construction projects from practicing Consultants, Contractors, and Clients. 
The interviews involved me balancing my desire for the participants to be able to use their 
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own words to tell their story, but at the same time having every interviewee responding in a 
way that would enable me to compare accounts across similar questions. I settled on a 
compromise of semi-structured interviews with a set of general questions and prompts. I thus 
made sense of the similarities of the strategies used to build Trust by the participants and 
collaboration strategies in the construction projects. I audio-taped most of the interviews and 
transcribed them within two days after the meeting. In some cases, it was not possible to 
audiotape the interviews. Thus, meetings where I felt the audiotape would intimidate or 
induce measured and incorrect answers for fear of loss of confidentiality, I had to hand write 
the interview in loco or immediately after the meeting. In this qualitative research, I then 
carried out memoing, analysis and coding of significant statements from key informant 
interviews, minutes of meetings, correspondence contract documents, and other artifacts. My 
semi-structured questions were designed to try to get the embedded knowledge from the lived 
experience of the respondent. After the interviews and collecting the data, I analysed and 
reflected on the interview. The typical 3-Column Analysis not only helped me to make 
decisions on what action to take, but it also showed the logic of my theme findings. Primarily 
I noted the significant themes in the interviews and other artifacts. I gave these ideas a theme 
code. Initially, I had 54 respondent focused thematic codes. The full list of these starter codes 
is given in Appendix 3.  
I further re-categorized the themes in an iterative process and came up with four critical 
respondent focused codes. I finally reduced these four to two theme codes which contained 
some concepts and strategies for building collaborative practices through trust and risk 
sharing. These final two themes highlighted Financial issues and Technical capacity. The 
theme clustering was based on the Gioia et al. (2013) methodology as shown in Appendix 5. 
Shah & Corley (2006) stated that one of the weaknesses of qualitative analysis is 
reliability and validity of data. However, in my case, the simultaneous investigation of the 
five projects allowed me to triangulate significant respondent statements from the data. In 
the Appendix 4, I show how I used the Gioia methodology for qualitative rigor, Gioia, 
Corley and Hamilton (2013)   
3.8  Study implications  
The data collection poised a few challenges. As stated above it was not possible to be in all 
the meetings which could impact on Trust building or lack of effort in building Trust. The 
Client and Contractor held individual meetings in my absence as the Supervising Engineer. 
 
 
57 
 
Some of my absence was just that I could not be in two places at the same time as I had to 
attend to other meetings of the five projects. At the same time, it was necessary to pursue 
this minimal number of 5 projects to make sense of the tripartite relationships during 
analysis. Even with all the commitment, I could not attend some meetings as there would be 
a conflict of interest, for example on the Library project I was also on the Client's side as a 
non-executive Board member. I had to recuse myself from some of the Library Contract 
meetings because a firm I had interest in was  the Consulting Engineer, while at the same 
time I was also on the Client's Board. Thus in that meeting, I would have been both the 
Client and the Consultant, this was unacceptable. However, after recusing myself from these 
meetings, I would collect the minutes of the meetings for research analysis purposes only. 
The Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) claims that 20% of construction 
Projects fail. I questioned, what the contextual cause of this failure in developing countries 
was because most of the infrastructure construction projects are Donor or Loan funded?    
The study focused on answering these questions and on ways to increase the body of 
knowledge on building Trust in construction projects.  I questioned whether the absence of 
Trust could cause both standard Traditional and Trust-based Relational construction projects 
to fail? I wanted insight on how the interplay between Trust and risk sharing could be used 
to create collaborative practices in construction projects and thus govern or control project 
performance and success. I sought some understanding on the excessive use of Disclaimer 
and Indemnity clauses which seemed to exonerate the Client from any risk entirely and 
passed it wholesale to the Contractor. I wanted to know if both standard Traditional and 
Trust-based Relational contracting should be risk sharing and not risk allocation. I 
questioned if the current practice of Risk allocation in these contracts could be constraining 
project progress? 
 I asked if Client, Consultant and Contractor tripartite relationships could have 
anything to do with the project failures. There are many independent variables to project 
success.  I presumed that the project management “iron triangle" of Time, Budget and 
Quality was the significant criteria for evaluating Project success. I wondered if there was a 
platform of trust and risk sharing which could be created to contribute to collaboration and 
Projects success. The aim of the research was then to answer some of the above questions.     
By the end of this thesis the five projects I selected had progressed as follows: 
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Firstly, the Low-Cost Housing project based on a Traditional contract had proceeded to 
completion. Secondly, the Library project which was a Relational (Turnkey) contract got 
terminated. Thirdly, the JPC road project, a Traditional standard contract was still in Progress. 
Fourthly, the Linia road project which had started off as a Relational contract was terminated 
and restarted as a Traditional project. It was again discontinued for financial reasons and 
restarted as a Relational Contract. It was in progress as a Relational Contract. 
 Finally, the Moni International Bus Terminal project based on Relational contract (Joint 
Venture) was still at feasibility document stage. 
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CHAPTER 4  
INVESTIGATION, ANALYSIS, AND FINDINGS 
4.1 Investigation   
In the previous chapter, I explained how I selected my sample of projects to investigate 
and the methods I used to collect my research data. 
 In this coming Chapter, I explain my investigation and how I created theme codes based on 
highlighted respondent statements and artifacts of the projects.  
When I started the research, I aimed to come up primarily with practical solutions to 
motivating Public-Private Partnerships and other Relational Contracts in the Construction of 
infrastructure. I soon learned that there was no panacea for stimulating PPPs and other 
Relational contracts. I thus started creating Trust in the temporary multiparty construction 
organisations whose members were the Client, Consultant, and Contractor. At this stage I found 
out that even my three trust-based Relational Contracts were fraught with management 
problems due to lack of inter-entity trust.  My literature review had revealed that various 
researchers had carried out studies on inter-entity Trust, but not specifically on construction 
projects in developing countries. Some of these researchers included Vincent –Jones (2012) in 
the United Kingdom, English & Baxter (2010) in Australia, Rahman, Kumaraswamy & Ling 
(2005) in Asia and Fischer (2011), in South America among a few examples. They were 
excited with innovative but incomplete trust-based Relational contracts whose norms had been 
stated by McNeil (1974). However, there was no research on Trust building and Risk 
mitigation in Relational or Traditional construction projects in Africa. 
From my early research Project work and the literature review, I found no simple and 
common cause of project failure. I, however, realized that although there was a whole spectrum 
of possible reasons that I needed to investigate, inter-entity Trust and risk sharing were some of 
the critical factors required to complete projects  In later Chapters, I will also show how Risk 
sharing and its management were interwoven in every Project which I studied.  In the following 
section, I show the attempts I made to build Trust in my five specific projects. 
4.2 The Full list of Thematic Codes. 
    The full list of the respondent themes is given in Appendix 3. The number of times I 
observed the theme statement or artifact as evidence is also shown in the last column. I used 
a starter list method. I bracketed and did not force my pre-conceived knowledge and 
solutions of construction problems. In this technique, I highlighted what I thought was 
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initially important based on my expertise, relevance to my topic of inquiry and comparison 
with the existing literature.  From Section 4.3 to Section 4.4 I will show how I chose the data 
collection method, collected data and finally proceeded after the thematic starter code list. 
4.3 Thematic Coding and Analysis  
  As the research proceeded, I used memoing and three- column analysis to assist me 
to make sense of the concepts and make decisions on what action to take. When I reflected 
on the formal and informal data I had collected, respondent outstanding themes began to 
emerge. Initially I had 54 starter theme codes. I re-looked at these starter theme codes and 
decided to cluster them.  My initial clustering was based on my sense making and 
rationalisation of the respondent themes. However, I further searched the literature and 
decided to rationalize my theme clustering using established practices such as the Gioia 
methodology for “seeking qualitative rigor in inductive research”, Gioia, Corley and 
Hamilton (2013). In this method, one starts with themes obtained from the data. In my case 
it was data from the interviews, site minutes and other artifacts. Thus from these interviews, 
54 informant or respondent themes emerged. These were too numerous and the sense was 
scattered. Appendix 4 shows the full list of the respondent focused themes. In Appendix 3, I 
started to make sense out of the 54 themes in a further analysis, which the Gioia 
methodology calls 1st Order Analysis. At this stage I came out with four themes.  Finally 
after further reflection and what the Gioia methodology calls 2nd Order Analysis I found 
that I could aggregate and categorise the four themes to just two overarching concepts and 
practical Themes. I have shown the three stages analysis that I carried out based on the 
Gioia Methodology in Appendix 3 and Appendix 4. 
  I went through all my evidence looking for significant theme statements and 
artifacts. I spent many hours with the evidence, trying to get some logic, sometimes going 
back to the participants and further listening to them. I highlighted themes of Trust and 
Contractual Obligations. During the data collection, I had started memoing, and 3-column 
analysis which facilitated the decision making and action I took to find solutions. Through a 
process of reading and re-reading the data, the codes became more precise and more 
transparent. In the 3-Column analysis, in the first column I gathered all the available 
information and significant statements from interviews, minutes or other artifacts. In the 
second column I then analyse this information or data trying to understand and formulate 
what it means. In the third column I arrange meetings and follow up on the issues. The 
arrows show how I kept in touch with the problem and the direction of my intervention. In 
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some cases after the initial analysis, I would arrange a meeting with the Client, Consultant 
and Contractor participants to get logic. I repeated this several times till I reached a 
definitive solution or lack of it in the identified problem. I found that collaboration and inter-
entity Trust was repeatedly coming up in the evidence as a possible factor to improve project 
progress. There were, however, some threats to this Trust as I will show in later chapters.  
4.4 Initial Reduction of Starter Themes Codes to four. 
I read and re-read my codes. In this process, I refined them or combined them in an iterative 
process. From the 54 starter theme codes, I reduced these to just four overarching themes 
which I considered to be exciting and original. I did this in an inductive process. In the 
Gioia, Corley and Hamilton (2013) analytical method I followed, I will show how I further 
summarized these four arguments into just two themes. However, in the following section, I 
list the four themes and show the evidence and analysis that led met to that categorization. 
The four overarching themes based on the 1
st
 order analysis are as follows: 
1. The theme on Good Performance and Competence. 
2. The theme on Working Capital Advance and Timely payments to the Contractor. 
3. Theme on Joint Ventures, improved skills transfer and capacity building in the 
Contractor 
4. The theme on the history of previous and frequently working together. 
 
The 2nd order analysis and clustering led me to the two final themes and concepts which I 
would apply to my practice.    
Theme 1 on Performance and theme 2 on Working Capital were clustered as Financial issues. 
Theme 3 on Joint Ventures and theme 4 on history of frequently working together could be 
clustered to one theme of Technical Capacity. 
I proceeded to seek reference to Trust and what practices were building it in the 
interviews and artifacts. Where I found reference to Trust, I evaluated it as being: Excellent, 
Good, Average and Poor. I continued to consider the forms of Trust as being three-fold, 
that is Contractual, Competence and Goodwill Trust.  The threefold split was referred to in 
researches by Hartman (1999), Zaghloul & Hartman (2002), and Swan et al. (2002). From 
the extant literature, I found that Trust was a phenomenon which comprised, hope, faith, 
and confidence in the future behaviour of the acquaintances. In this case trusting someone 
meant accepting vulnerability from the actions of the Client, Consultant, and Contractors on 
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a construction project. In this section, I briefly explain how the evidence helped me to 
identify the significance of these four central themes.   
 4.4.1 Theme of Good Performance and Competence. 
As listed above, the first theme that came out was that of performance by the Client, the 
Consultant, and the Contractor. Each party had different roles and. These determined the 
expected return. The drafting of my construction contracts was done such that the 
obligations and risk allocation was given to the party best suited to deal with them. The 
Client, the performance meant paying the Consultant and Contractor; this was stated in the 
Contract documents which I had as evidence. For the Consultant, the performance 
involved designing, specifying and supervising the construction of the works. The Client–
Consultant contract documents for all my projects stated this explicitly. For the Contractor, 
the performance meant marshaling the workforce, equipment, materials, time and 
monetary resources to complete the construction works on time, within budget and with 
good quality workmanship. All 5 Contracts demanded this from the Contractor. The client 
obligations were not stated, except for a clause in the standard contracts which said that 
the Contractor could claim interest payment on overdue invoices. I therefore, decided to 
investigate Client performance and competence to implement the project deeper. I started 
by analysing the meetings and artifacts, I had on the JPC road construction Contract. 
Again using 3column analysis, I kept in touch with what was happening. The arrows 
indicate my direction of intervention and how I came up with the findings.     
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3 COLUMN ANALYSIS: Performance of Contractual obligations and Competence to pay by Client   
Information Analysis Meetings 
 In the JPC project, the 
Contractor protested in 
a site meeting, "We 
have been working on 
this project for ten 
months without 
payment. We are 
suspending and 
reducing work till we 
have been paid".   
The Client contractual 
obligation was to pay the 
Contractor and Consultant. 
He was not performing. 
The Contractor and 
Consultant could also not 
perform 
 At a site meeting, I advised the 
Client to pay the Contractor, 
because he had moved to site 
Trusting that the Client would 
pay. 
  Client appeared not to 
have had his finances 
ready  for disbursement to 
the Contractor and 
Consultant 
  
The Client sought 
immediate release of 
funds from the 
Financier, who accused 
the Client / Borrower of 
failing to get" no 
objection" to the 
construction contract 
from the Financier 
  I realized that in spite of 
the funds being a loan, the 
Financier was getting 
involved in the particular 
usage of the loan funds.  
Thus, the Client failure to 
perform was causing 
project stoppage. 
 I advised the Client to submit 
the contract to the Financier 
and to seek his "No objection." 
The receipt of the no objection 
from the Financier created the 
Client's ability or competence 
to pay  
 
Thus, I found from the various observations and conversations including the above discussion 
that performance and meeting of Contract obligations by each tripartite member was an 
outstanding statement from the Contractors.  
  In the JPC project, the Contractor protested in a site meeting, that the Client was not 
meeting his obligation to pay for work done and therefore he was not performing.  He had 
lost Trust in the Client performing the contractual obligation.    In contrast to the Low-Cost 
Housing Project, the Client was fulfilling his obligations and paying the Contractors monthly. 
The Contractors appreciated this, and in a site meeting one Contractor said: "We wish to 
thank the Client for paying us on a monthly basis and even paying for some of the materials 
directly to the suppliers". The Contractor clearly trusted the Client. Both the above 
conversations show that it was important for the Client to perform his obligations by paying 
the Consultants and the Contractor if work was to proceed. 
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  For the Consultant, performance means he had to do a proper design, specification of 
the works and site supervision. To commence the project, the Client had to give presumptive 
Trust to the Consultant.  
 In all the five projects under study, the Consultant started preparing designs and Bid 
documents to procure a Contractor for the construction of the works. It was necessary for the 
Consultant to perform his obligations. Otherwise, the Projects would not have commenced. 
"Engineer please issue works commencement orders" demanded the Client in one meeting.  
 For the third tripartite member, the Contractor, performance of contractual obligations 
meant actual construction progress on site. He measured his performance by his ability to 
keep to a pre-determined program. The performance was enforced using performance Bonds 
and these pre-determined construction Programs. At the commencement of both the JPC and 
Low-Cost Housing Project, for example, the Clients did not take the competence of the 
Contractor for granted.  They demanded Performance Bonds for up to 10% of the Contract 
price. The contract documents requested a „Performance Bond within 28 days of signing the 
contract”, as a way of guaranteeing Competence and that the Contractor could be trusted to 
perform.These Bonds had to be issued by a Bank, Insurance Company or other financial 
institution. They guaranteed that the Contractor would act as per contract. Intangible 
Competence Trust alone was not adequate for the construction to start. If the Contractor 
failed to perform, the Performance Bond Clause in the agreement would allow the Client to 
seek recourse by encashing the Performance Bond and engaging another Contractor to 
complete the works. 
  No payment could be made by the Client to the Contractor before submission of this 
Performance Bond. I was surprised to read in the Contract documents that not even the 
Working Capital advance could be paid before the production of a Performance Bond, in 
spite of it having a separate irrevocable Bank guarantee. I made a memo to argue that in 
future contracts, I would advise my clients to pay the Working Capital Advance, even before 
submission of the Performance Bond, because it was separately guaranteed. 
  In another example before the JPC contract, I was instructed to "issue a notice to 
terminate the contract due to non-performance." The agreement was indeed terminated, and 
the Client was compensated by cashing in a Performance Bond.  At this stage, I found out 
that the Performance Bond could be used in the Standard Traditional Contracts as a tool for 
control and governance of the contracts. I then questioned that if the Contractor's 
performance could be monitored and evaluated so directly, how was the Client's performance 
to be also monitored and evaluated. 
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In the Library Contract, I soon found that the performance of the Client was tacitly 
measured by the Contractor and Consultant in terms of his ability to pay promptly. Six 
months in the Library Project contract, the Contractor demanded monthly payments instead 
of Turnkey payments at the end of the project. He approached me as the Consultant one 
evening, very distressed. "Engineer I need to be paid on a monthly basis." 
I replied that "But your contract is a Turnkey contract, and you can only be paid at the 
end of the construction." He responded that he had submitted a contract amendment for him 
to be paid on a monthly basis. "I am now afraid that if I wait until the end of the project, there 
may be no funds to pay me," he alleged. "The Client has been purchasing a fleet of cars for 
his staff, and he is starting other new construction projects where he is making monthly 
payments. So why can he not pay me on a monthly basis also” He said emotionally. Clearly, 
the Contractor had lost Goodwill trust in the Client and doubted the Client's ability to perform 
in the future. In response to the Client's failure to pay, the Contractor moved off-site. 
Contract amendment negotiations between the Contractor and the Client started. 
The above conversations led me to come up with the first Theme of the importance of 
good Performance from the Client, Consultant, and Contractor in building Trust. All three 
participants had to be competent to meet their obligations to each other. 
4.4.2 Theme on Working Capital Advance and Timely payments.  
In this section, I show how I found the second thematic code on the role of Working 
Capital Advance Payment and Timely payment in building Trust in Contacts. The evidence 
showed that Working Capital advance payment (WCA) was necessary for Traditional 
standard contracts. There was a problem of 7 small Contractors in the Low-Cost Housing 
project who were failing to raise "pay- on- demand Bank guarantees" which would enable 
them to access Working Capital from the Client. This issue was also stressing me as the 
Consultant and contract supervisor because there could be no progress on the site works 
without the Advance payment. The following 3-Column analysis shows the evidence and 
how I learnt and solved the problem of Working Capital Advance payment. 
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 3 COLUMN ANALYSIS: Low-Cost Housing Project, Working Capital Advance, and timely 
payment Problem 
Information Analysis Meetings 
 Seven small Low-Cost 
Housing construction 
Contractors were failing 
to raise "pay- on- 
demand Bank 
guarantees." So there 
was no Working 
Capital 
 No work could start 
because of high Bank 
collateral demand and lack 
of Working Capital 
Advance payment. 
 I spoke to the client, suggested 
that he buys free-to-issue 
materials for the Contractors. 
These Materials were to be 
incorporated into the 
permanent works. This 
innovative pre-purchase 
scheme was less risky for the 
Client, but he was skeptical  
 I was working with  the  
Client for the first time, 
and I was not sure how he 
would take my advice to 
pre-purchase materials 
  
Three days later, the  
Client agreed to buy the 
construction materials 
 The need for a Bank 
guarantee for Working 
Capital was obviated, and 
work was able to start.  
 
 
"Without an advance payment it's difficult for us to commence works," one of the 7    
Contractors said. In developing countries, Contractors do not have easy access to bridging 
finance from the Banks. The Banks demanded strict collateral conditions. The number of 
projects that a Contractor could, therefore, work on simultaneously was limited by WCA 
payment guarantees required.  To get an irrevocable Bank guarantee, the Bank the demanded 
collateral in the form of a fixed cash account or immovable property Title Deed cession. 
 The small to medium-sized Contractors moaned "the bank is demanding that we put 
some money in fixed cash accounts which we should not use. They will only give us a 
guarantee to get WCA from the Client on this basis". Thus, the seven small to medium 
Contractors on the Low-Cost Housing project had problems in getting Bank guarantees. I had 
to find another way they could access the Working Capital Advance payment to commence 
the works. The remaining two bigger Contractors, however, had collateral and good 
relationships with the Banks and could get loan funds. This relationship with the banks was to 
them a competitive advantage in kick-starting the projects. "We guard this Trust relationship 
with the Banks intensely because it unlocks interest-free capital from the Client" one 
prominent Contractor disclosed. 
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  In my meeting with the Client, I advised that. “Sir, we are not making any progress 
because the Contractors have no bridging funds to enable them to commence the works and 
raise the first Invoice for work done. They are also failing to raise Bank guarantees for you to 
release the WCA without risking losing it". Although it was my first time to work with that 
particular Client, I hoped that the Client would trust the Contractors and me. "I am 
recommending an innovative scheme which I feel will be less risky to you as the Client. I am 
requesting you to free- issue some pre-purchased materials for incorporation into the 
permanent works."  The Client looked at me skeptically but advised me that he would discuss 
it with his colleagues. He reverted to me after three days. "We have considered your 
recommendation and accepted this option of the pre-purchase of materials for permanent 
incorporation in the project."  This decision was inspiring for both the Contractors and 
Consultants because it was going to enable the work to start.  I felt relieved because it 
obviated the need for the WCA bank guarantees.  In the 3-Column Analysis above, I show 
how the small Contractors did not need to struggle with bridging funds anymore.  They could 
start building with the free-issued materials. The Client also felt secure with direct payment 
to suppliers of the construction Materials. However, it was a clear indication that the Client 
had not trusted the Contractors to advance them actual money to commence the works 
without an irrevocable Bank guarantee. 
Further, in following up trust relationships, I found many references in the data I 
collected that showed that Contractors built Trust in the Client if they were paid on time. 
"Previous financial constraints and payment delays have led to Government not being trusted 
to meet its financial obligations," said one of the Contractors about a Contract where 
Government was the Client. On the other hand, in the Low-Cost Housing contract where 
there was a Private sector client, the Contractors were being paid mostly on time. This was an 
outstanding statement from the Contractor interviews. The Contractors noticeably built Trust 
in the Client. As the project proceeded, the Contractors would submit payment applications 
on a monthly basis. “We are grateful to the Client for paying us regularly on a monthly basis 
because this is enabling us to work continuously." 
 In both the JPC road Project and the Low-cost housing Project, the Working Capital 
Advance (WCA) payment date was significant. I examined my other standard Traditional 
contracts and found that in all of them "the contract start date was the date of the signing of 
the contract and that works must start within 28 days of the date of signing of the Contract". 
The actual situation on the ground from both the JPC Contract and the Low-Cost Housing 
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Contract was that, even after signing, the Contractors were unable to start work until they 
were paid Working Capital Advance (WCA). 
 Contractors were issued with works commencement orders and were instructed to begin 
work, but they could not start until they received Working Capital Advance payment. 
Apparently, they had no bridging finance. As Consultant, I found that this clause that the 
Contractors should begin work before Advance payment as an unfair attempt by the Client to 
get the Contractors to capitalize the initial tasks. Why should the Contractor capitalize the 
works when he is not the ultimate beneficiary of the project?  In a conversation with the 
Contractor, it became clear that this Clause was obstructing the start of the projects.  For this 
reason, I then asked the Client for the Low-Cost Housing project to show Trust in the 
Contractor and proposed a Client pre-purchase of materials facility, as shown in the 3-
Column analysis above.  The Client was uncomfortable with this request, but he eventually 
accepted it. I also followed the same intervention instead of WCA on other projects and the 
Contractors were able to commence without WCA, as I will show later in my argument.   
The WCA payment situation in Relational contracts, such as Private Finance Initiatives, was 
different. The Contractor was responsible for sourcing Finances, so the WCA and start date 
depended on the Contractor and not the Client. Thus, unlike Traditional Contracts, in 
Relational Contracts, WCA was not used to build Trust. 
In the Moni International Bus Terminal project, I decided to use a different way of 
collaborating and creating Trust for the project construction to begin. I did this using "Sweat 
Equity" from the Consultant. I did this by preparing Feasibility reports and detailed 
Documents. To kick-start the project, I provided these initial services free and came up with a 
bankable feasibility study document. I invested my expertise in the expectation that when the 
project commenced, I would then be paid or convert the cost of the earlier work into equity.  
The Sweat equity was a low-cost input strategy to begin the project. As Consultant, I trusted 
the Client and took the risk of project startup cost, expecting some positive future 
developments on the project. 
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4.4.3 Theme on Joint Ventures (JVs), improved skills transfer and capacity building. 
3 COLUMN ANALYSIS: Joint Ventures for skills transfer, capacity building and Competence Trust 
in the Contractor 
Information Analysis Meetings 
 Local Contractors lack 
skills and experience. 
There is a statutory 
instrument which gives 
them 10% domestic 
preference from Govt.  
 Local Contractor could 
not construct large 
Projects.  
 The Tender adjudication     
committee meeting found a bid 
where a local Contractor had 
gone into a Joint Venture with 
a sizeable foreign Contractor 
 The Local and Foreign 
Contractor Joint venture 
was given a 10% domestic 
preference 
  
 The Client awarded the 
Joint venture the 
contract  
  The relationship resulted 
in a skills transfer and 
capacity building of the 
Local contractor. 
Construction progress was 
good because the 
scheduling improved.  
In a site meeting, the 
Client insisted on Joint 
decision making between Local 
and Foreign Contractor 
 
 I found the above and third thematic code from some meetings with both Clients and 
Consultants in the JPC project. There was an open request for Bids to construct a 100 km 
road. Responses came from both local and foreign bidders. One particular bid consisted of a 
Joint venture of a domestic and international contractor. Analysis showed that the local 
contractor lacked capacity while the international contractor had good experience and skilled 
staff. The bid was not the lowest on price. The lowest was a Contractor registered in 
Portugal.  However, the client, who was Government, used the Malawi Public Procurement 
Regulation 2004: 82 which stated explicitly that domestic and local contractor should be 
given preference. This preference is meant to empower and capacitate local Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs).Thus; the price of the Joint venture was discounted by 10%. 
The discount allowed the joint venture to win the contract.   In an interview, the Government 
Client representative told me that the deliberate action to give domestic preference to the 
Bidder who was part foreign and part local was taken to build capacity in local Consultants 
and Contractors.  "We encourage collaboration through Joint Ventures (JVs) between small 
local Companies and large foreign Companies as an effort to mitigate lack of skills, 
experience, and resources in our country," he said.  After the project commenced, the Client 
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was so keen on skills transfer that he told the smaller local company "We want to see your 
JV partner from overseas, on site. You must have joint decision making?"   The Client had 
thus encouraged such JVs to the extent of classifying the JV between the foreign Contractor 
and a local Contractor as a domestic Contractor even though it was not entirely local. In 
another earlier interview, a World Bank Project Advisor had advised me that in the two 
developing countries of Zimbabwe and Malawi, projects often came to a standstill even 
when financial resources are available because of lack of knowledge of the project “road 
map” by local Contractors. This vindicated the Government Client representative's earlier 
concern and his encouragement of collaboration practices through JVs between domestic 
and foreign Contractors. He argued that if the two legal organizations worked together, 
making joint decisions, then they would jointly own the product and the skills transfer would 
justify the Trust he had in the JV. 
4.4.4. The theme of the history of previous and frequently working together.  
The fourth thematic code that emerged was based on presumptive Goodwill Trust from 
any history of the Client, Consultant, and Contractor having worked together before. In the 
University Library project, the Contractor had previously built two Hostel blocks for the 
Client. He was now required to build a Library on a Turnkey basis. These meant constructing 
the Library using his resources and only expect payment after two years from a levy on 
Student Fees. 
3 COLUMN ANALYSIS: Presumptive Goodwill Trust created from previously working together 
Information Analysis Meetings 
 Two Bidders in a 
University Library 
construction Project 
submitted technically 
and financially very 
close bids.  
  A breakpoint was required to 
decide the winner. 
  At a Tender adjudication 
meeting, the committee 
was having difficulty to 
award the Contract 
  The experience of both 
contractors was re-assessed.   
  
  The committee found 
that one of the 
Contractor had a history 
of previously working 
with the Client 
    This created presumptive 
Goodwill Trust and the 
Contractor  with a history of 
previous work with the Client 
was awarded the contract  
  
 
In the first round of negotiation which I attended, there were three contractors whose 
prices were very similar. The lead Consultant was an Architect. He agreed with the State 
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Public Procurement Board to debrief the three Contractors and assess who of the three 
Contractors could be more responsive. Debriefing is a process where the Contractors are 
given more information on the project and granted an opportunity to adjust their bid prices.  
In the second round of negotiating with the contractors, one was dropped out because his 
price was higher than the other two. The remaining two again had very similar rates. The 
tension was high in the adjudicating committee until the committee Chairman brought up the 
issue that the proposed contractor had a history of previously working with the Client. This 
history of having prior worked together with the Client motivated the adjudicating committee 
to award the contract to the Contractor. 
As it turned out later, however, this Contractor wanted to change this contract to a 
monthly payment contract based on work done for that month. The agreement amendment 
was unacceptable to the Client, and the contract was terminated. "The history of having 
worked together before could have compromised our investigation of due diligence on the 
Contractor" declared the Client's Director of Works after losing Trust in the Contractor. 
The evidence from the Low-Cost Housing project also showed that the effect of 
Goodwill Trust from previous acquaintance was that the Client set up a list of approved 
suppliers of construction services. "We have trust and want to continue working with you and 
promote indigenous contractors," said the Client's Manager. The shortlisted Consultants and 
Contractors are now maintained on the Client suppliers list. They are called to bid for work 
from time to time. "The shortlist saves us the cost of open Tenders and the uncertainty of 
contracting with a new party whose capacity is unknown each time," said the Client.  I further 
had a conversation with the Director in the Ministry of Public Construction and the 
Secretariat of the Zimbabwe National Construction Industry Federation. They told me that 
they also use the history of previous work and assessments from Clients to categorize 
Contractors and rank their capacity. 
Thus from the above conversations, I created the fourth overarching Theme on how 
previous and frequently working together resulted presumptive Goodwill Trust. 
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Chapter 5 
BUILDING A PRACTICE FROM THE RESEARCH 
 
In this chapter, I show that after identifying the problems for each project, I reduced my 
four thematic codes from four to just two. I explain how I combined the codes and how Trust 
in project financial issues and Contractor technical capacity could be used to share and reduce 
Risk.  I go into details of each project and show how I intervened and used these two theme 
collaborative practices to build Goodwill Trust, Contractual Trust and Competence Trust. I 
required these two main codes, one on capital and the other on technical capacity, to manage 
my projects in future. I visualized the two main codes as energy quanta or cells managing the 
link between Trust and Risk. However, this very Trust was under threat, and I had to find a 
solution. 
5.1  Project Problem Identification 
I identified the main problems and synthesized them for each project. The projects had 
different problem emphasis, but some of the issues were common. In each problem, I looked 
to see if there was any link with Trust. In other words, if the problem could be tackled 
differently if there was collaboration and a trust relationship. When I reflected, I in fact was 
using the Gioia et.al (2013) methodology for theme clustering as illustrated in Chapter 4 
above. From the scattered 54 Starter themes I did the 1st order analysis and four respondent 
themes surfaced. These themes were on Competence, payments, skills and history of working 
together. I took each theme and sifted it through each project and indeed, I could see where it 
was referenced in every project. This comparison is shown in Table 4 below. These four 
themes guided my deliberate action to find collaborative practices that I could use in my 
practice to balance Trust and Risk in construction project management.    For example, the 
problem emphasis for the Low-Cost Housing project was on Working Capital Advance 
guarantee. In the Library project, the problem arose when the Contractor wanted to amend the 
Contract from a Relational Turnkey contract to a Traditional monthly payment contract; this 
led to a loss of Trust by the Client. The main problems in the JPC road contract were again 
Working Capital Advance payment and Site staff experience. In the fourth Project, Linia, the 
problem was that the Client kept changing the form of contract, first from a Public Private 
Partnership project contract to a Traditional Contract and back to a Public Private Partnership 
project contract. Questioning the Client again revealed that the dithering was a result of lack 
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of capital to start the project.  In the Moni international Bus Terminal project, the initial 
capital issue had been provided by the Consultant who gave Sweat equity. However, there 
was another problem of bringing in more formal contract clauses to a semi-formal Joint 
Venture and a Trust-based relational contract. The clauses were viewed as self-maximization 
by the other partners. In the following Table 4, I summarise the evidence of all the four 
thematic problems and their commonality in each project. 
 Table 4: Identification of Problem Themes for each Project. 
 
      Theme 
                                    Theme evidence identified 
 Housing 
project 
Library 
Project 
JPC Road 
project 
Linia Road 
project 
Moni Bus 
Terminal  
1 Performance/ 
competence 
 A laggard 
Contractor 
had his 
workload 
reduced. 
Contractor 
abandoned 
site 
Contractor 
reduced 
work due to 
non-payment 
Contractor 
moved to site 
before 
contract 
signing 
Engineer‟s 
competence 
trusted and 
he gave 
sweat equity 
2 WCA and 
timely 
payments 
Contractors 
appreciated 
timely 
payments 
  Client 
could not 
make 
monthly 
payments 
Contract 
WCA 
reduced to 
10% 
Contract 
changed to 
PPP, to get 
Capital 
Sweat 
equity used 
as capital 
raising 
strategy 
3 Skills 
transfer/ 
capacity 
building 
Contractors 
Joint 
Venture    (9 
No,) 
Trust in  
contractor 
capacity 
was lost 
JV formed 
with large 
International 
Company 
The Client 
Trusted a 
competent 
Contractor 
Engineer‟s 
competence 
trusted, by 
Client 
4 History of  
working 
together 
Presumptive 
Goodwill 
Trust led to 
contract 
signing 
Contract 
award 
based on   
past work 
history 
 Previous 
work  
Contractor 
on site with 
no WCA 
Contract 
awarded 
partly on 
prior work 
history 
Engineer  
selected on 
previous 
work 
history 
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Using the above comparison matrix of theme against evidence exhibited in each project, I 
came up with a major analytical step which justified the initial clustering to four themes. 
5.2 The Final two main theme Codes 
The initial combination of similar respondent statements gave me four themes. These were on 
Competence Performance, Working Capital, Technical Capacity and frequently working 
together. These are the themes I have discussed above. 
 Iterative cycles of action and reflection focusing on these four themes in my projects lead me 
to a further clustering to just two practical concepts.            
1. The first final practical concept theme was on Financial matters; 
This combined Working Capital Advance and timely payments and how they created 
collaboration and built Contractual Trust between the Client and Contractor. 
2. The second final practical concept theme was on Technical Capacity; 
This combined Joint ventures and frequently working together. These strategic 
actions were desired collaborative practices that generated tripartite Competence, 
Contractual and Goodwill trust. 
 The above two practical action themes were arrived at after sense making and reflecting in 
what could be called the the equivalent of 2
nd
 order analysis in well-established clustering 
practices such as the Gioia et.al (2013) methodology. 
 In the following Section, I briefly explain how these themes were evident in each project.   
5.2.1  Final Theme on Financial matters.  
   The release of Working Capital Advance (WCA) and the timely payment of Invoices 
motivated the Contractor to continue working on the JPC and Low-Cost Housing projects. As 
explained before, in all the contracts the Contractors struggled to get Working Capital 
Advance from the Client. In my many interviews, most contractors echoed that "We are not 
able to find loan funding because of the very onerous collateral requirements from the local 
Banks. We need the Working Capital advance Payment from the Client to commence the 
work". On the other hand, the Client demanded a pay-on-demand Bank guarantee before 
releasing the Advance payment. Also, late payments to the Contractors were resulting in the 
work stoppage.  In the JPC contract, the Contractor threatened to move off-site and wrote to 
the Consultant saying that "We are giving 21 days' Notice of reduced work productivity and 
moving off-site because of non-payment". The Contractor had lost Trust in the Client's 
capacity to pay him. The loss of Trust due to non-payment was similarly demonstrated in the 
Library project, where in spite of having agreed to a Turnkey arrangement, the Contractor 
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lost Trust in the Client and demanded monthly payments. When the monthly payments 
demand by the Contractor was not availed, he stopped work. 
 In the analysis and subsequent iterative action cycles I combined all the statements on 
Working Capital and timely payments into just one super theme of financial issues. These 
were affecting inter-party Competence, Contractual and Goodwill Trust on construction sites 
and thwarting collaboration to meet the project construction objectives.  
 
5.2.2  Final Theme on Technical Capacity. 
The second final overarching theme code was on Contractor technical capacity. It emerged by 
combining the statements on local and foreign Company Joint Ventures, lack of skills and 
experience of contractor staff, brain-drain for greener pastures by local Engineers and 
Architects.  In the JPC Contract, the Client insisted on an apparent Joint Venture effort 
between the local contractor and a well-established international contractor. The Request for 
bids stated that "Bidders are encouraged to form Joint Ventures to increase their Capacity." 
The Client did not have confidence and therefore Competence Trust that a local Contractor 
could perform on his own satisfactorily. He felt that the local contractor's capacity needed to 
be enhanced through Joint Venture arrangements with a well-established international 
Contractor. The international and local Contractor responded that "We are in the process of 
coming up with a dedicated Joint Venture set-up to run the project." Indeed the resulting Joint 
Venture that was formed increased the skills and construction capacity on the project. The 
Client and Consultant trusted the competence of this Joint Venture. 
The other way in which Trust hedged capacity risk was the Client's insistence on having very 
highly experienced Contractor's Site staff. However, employing highly experienced site staff 
proved to be a problem because of the prevalent brain-drain of professionals and skilled staff 
in these developing countries. Such competent staff was attracted to developed countries. 
This is because the salaries and working environments were better there compared to 
developing countries where site staff is often based in rural bush setting. When I discussed 
the problem of inexperienced site staff with the Client for the JPC project, we resolved that 
the Joint Venture partner and very experienced Consultant staff would compensate for the 
lack of Contractor's staff experience. The Consultant collaborated and had to attach more 
experienced Site Engineers to supervise the relatively less qualified Contractor's site staff. 
 After synthesizing each problem, I took some deliberate action to solve it.   As I took these 
actions based on the surfaced themes, it began to arise to me that these collaborative 
practices were creating Trust which was facilitating palatable risk sharing. The Contractor 
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for example, was burdened with most of the construction Risk. Some ways of creating Trust 
and sharing the Risk required the tripartite to mutually engage in collaborative practices of 
Working Capital Advance payment and technical capacity building. The Consultant was also 
allocated Risk, and he built the three forms of Trust for example by deploying very 
experienced site Engineers as a collaborative measure, because the Contractor did not have 
such experienced staff.  
However, one Financier declared "the Engineering Procurement and Construction contract 
should provide for risk mitigation instruments such as Performance Bonds; Liquidated 
damage Bonds; Materials, Workmanship and Equipment warranties;  the benefit of these 
Bonds will go to the Bank." These Bonds in favour of the Client showed that both the Client 
and the Financier were shirking from Risk and allocating it to the Contractor. The demand 
for the various Bonds seemed to me to be impinging on Trust and trying to make intangible 
Trust tangible. In the next Chapter, I will discuss how I interpreted the themes on financial 
concerns and technical capacity as strategic and collaborative measures that could be used to 
create Trust and therefore practically result in more equitable risk sharing in construction 
projects. What I had seen was the asymmetric risk allocation by the Financier and Client to 
the Consultant and Contractors.  At the finalization of my theme codification, I started to 
visualize ideal Contract behaviour as a hexagonal cluster of Trust relationships. These 
relationships were originating from presumptive Goodwill, culminating in Contractual Trust 
and Competence Trust. 
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I show this cell visualization in Figure 1 below.  At engagement, the tripartite top 
management had to have presumptive Goodwill and then create Contractual and Competence 
Trust to manage the relationship. 
 
 
Figure 1: The creation of Competence and Contractual Trust from 
presumptive Goodwill Trust. 
  Thus, I visualized Trust as a set of an all-encompassing honeycomb of cells. These cells 
are quantum of issues which started from limited resources which management mitigated 
with fair risk allocation and incentives such as the promise of future work. The yield from 
these cells was that the Goodwill Trust created Competence and Contractual Trust which was 
then used for collaborative teamwork. The Competence and Contractual Trust so created 
enabled the projects to be completed on time, within budget and with high-quality 
workmanship. This was the perfect relationship, but the tripartite relations in my projects 
were never ideal. I show later in the analysis some evidence of how this Trust relationship 
had to be created using an intervention of a materials purchase facility and a reduction in 
Claims for extra payment by the Contractors.   
5.3  Threats to Trust 
 In Section 2.6 of my literature review, some researchers, for example, Swan et al. 
(2002), English & Baxter (2010), and Vincent-Jones (2012) had noted some threats to Trust.  
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These threats included project complexity and uncertainty, collusion, lack of project 
ownership and failure to meet contractual obligations by tripartite members. After my cell 
visualization of Trust and in particular how it was built in the Low-Cost housing project, it 
began to emerge to me that in fact, the essence of Trust building was not just relational, but   
to control and govern the Project through managing Risk. The faith and confidence generated 
by Trust were consequently reducing the premium on Risk and uncertainty. Thus, in all these 
themes I noticed that there was a theme of Risk sharing that wove through them. The risk was 
being alleviated through Trust. If there was Trust, then none of the tripartite members talked 
about Risk. And yet the risks were there and almost 40 are listed by Cook and Brown (1999). 
The prominent ones are: change in scope, incomplete designs, and omissions in Bid 
documents, cost escalations, ground conditions and lack of labour and construction materials. 
All these could be categorized as construction project Cost Risks, Program risks and Quality 
Risks.  In some of my projects, the Contractors were going about fulfilling their project 
obligations without asking for monetary compensation. I saw this as a collaborative action on 
part of the Contractor. There was evidence that each tripartite member wanted the 
construction project completed, but at minimum or no risk to them.  The Clients were using 
the indemnity clauses to minimize risk to them. Consultants and Contractors were accepting 
this vulnerably. I thus wanted to use my themes to reduce exposure to this risk by creating 
Trust. But this very Trust was under threat. Some events that were happening on some of the 
Contracts threatened to banish Trust and bring these projects to a halt. I now faced a problem 
of learning ways of minimizing these threats and maintaining the collaborative efforts that 
would ensure that there was mutual Trust which would give rise to fair Risk sharing. 
In the next Sections, I show the threats to Trust and the emergence of asymmetric Risk 
sharing which eventually stopped some project. As I explain these possible threats to Trust, I 
bear in mind the vague threats to Trust that I earlier had discussed in Section 2.6 of the 
literature review. These were stated at the beginning of that section as project complexity and 
uncertainty, lack of project ownership, information asymmetry and punitive clauses in the 
contracts.  
5.3.1 Low-Cost Housing Project 
 In the Low-Cost housing Project, there was evidence on how necessary Contractor 
competence was in the tripartite relationship. Lack of performance by one of the laggard 
Contractors was threatening Competence Trust. 
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 This Contractor was failing to perform, and in the following 3-Column Analysis, I 
show how this practical problem was analysed and solved.  
3 COLUMN ANALYSES:  Contractor Performance and Competence, its Role in Building 
Competence Trust.   
Information Analysis Meetings 
  In the Low-Cost 
housing project, the 
Senior Site Engineer 
showed concern with 
the lack of progress by 
a Contractor.   
 Adherence to a 
predetermined program is 
a Contractor performance 
measurement indicator.  
  Senior Site Engineer wrote to 
me as the Project Manager. "I 
am concerned with the Civil 
Contractor's lack of progress."  
  I analysed the 
Contractor‟s performance 
capacity  
  
 The analysis showed 
me that the Contractor 
had both skills and 
financial capacity 
limitations 
   I proposed that one way 
to manage the progress 
was to take away part of 
the work from him and 
allocate it to another 
Contractor.  
 I called the laggard Contractor 
and explained to him that 
reducing his workload was for 
his benefit so that he could 
perform and complete the work 
on a program. Begrudgingly he 
concurred with this.  
 
The above analysis shows how I arrived at decisions in taking intervention measures that 
could result in collaborative practices in Construction management. I had lost Competence 
Trust in the Contractor. I reasoned that, in a way, by reducing the laggard Contractor‟s scope 
of works it could improve his capacity to perform.  
5.3.2  Library Project 
The Library Building project had one Client, a three-member Consultants' team, and one 
Contractor. The goal of the project was to build a University library. The Contractor was 
to construct the Library over a two year period and after handing over the keys he would 
be paid over 24 months. From this point of view, the Contract was a trust-based 
Relational contract with a Turnkey arrangement.  Work commenced within two weeks. 
This speed of site establishment and work commencement was very pleasing to both the 
Client and the Consultant. However, six months later, in December 2015, the Contractor 
moved off-site citing that he had lost Trust in the future capacity of the Client to pay him 
after completion of the work.  This was after seeing the Client extraneously purchasing a 
fleet of cars. The course of events is shown in the 3-column analysis below: 
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3-COLUMN ANALYSIS: Emergence of Risk and how Presumptive Goodwill Trust and Contractual 
Trust were lost in the Library Construction project.  
Information Analysis Meetings 
The contractor had a 
two-year Turnkey 
contract with the client. 
  Work started and 
progressed well for first 
six months. Trust existed 
here.  
 Monthly site meetings were 
held to monitor and evaluate 
project progress   
The client started 
other monthly paid 
projects. The client 
bought a fleet of cars 
which were not part of 
the project. 
  The Contractor started 
feeling uneasy with the 
Client‟s ability to pay him 
in future. Trust was under 
threat.  
 Contractor requests a meeting 
with Client and Consultant to 
discuss frequency of payment 
 The contractor wants 
the contract to be 
amended for monthly 
payments instead of 
payment at the end of 
Turnkey project. He 
abandons site  
  At the start of Contract, 
the Contractor showed 
healthy Bank Balances. 
Therefore Contractor's 
decision to leave site could 
only be due to loss of Trust 
in the Client's future 
payments.     
 A Contract amendment 
meeting was held by the 
tripartite. The Contractor 
wanted monthly payments for 
work done.     
 Client terminates Contract  
 
 
For the Contractor, non-payment risk emerged from under the veil of Trust because he 
had observed that the Client was constructing other buildings on Traditional contracts and 
paying other Contractors on a monthly basis. In addition he observed that the Client was 
purchasing a fleet of new vehicles for his Staff. The Contractor was now demanding that he 
also be paid for work done on a monthly basis. This proposed significant change of the 
Contract payment terms distressed the Client. He saw the Contractor as now being 
calculative. Thus, the Contractor‟s demand damaged the Trust that the Client had in him and 
he immediately gave the notice to determine this contract. He argued that the demand for 
monthly payments by the Contractor was a fundamental contract breach. The Client had gone 
into this trust-based Relational agreement because he had no immediate availability of 
financial resources and he wanted to manage his cash-flows. The contract was such that the 
Client would fulfill his Public mandate to build a Library, while the Contractor would expect 
payment from the Client from future cash-flows from student fees. The Contractor's demand 
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for monthly payment as work progressed was therefore not attainable, and it was a significant 
Contract default and breach of Trust as far as the Client was concerned.   
Analysis of the Library project showed that the three forms of Trust which I had 
encouraged in my earlier project work and which were defined by Hartman (1999) and 
Broadbent et al., (2003) as Contractual Trust, Competence Trust, and Goodwill Trust existed 
before the Contract termination. The Contractor was proficient and therefore had Competence 
trust, and he had a history of working with the Client and consequently had Goodwill Trust, 
but he failed to sustain Contractual faith when he saw the Client engaging other Contractors 
on standard Traditional Contracts where they were being paid on a monthly basis. During the 
tenure of the contract, the Contractor wanted to make significant changes and to be paid on a 
monthly basis, instead of being paid after completion of construction as agreed in the 
contract. The significant finding on this project is that for a Relational contract based on 
Trust, all the three forms of Trust must exist concurrently for the contract to sustain. In the 
case of a first-time acquaintance of Client and a Contractor, Goodwill trust can be assumed to 
exist as benevolence trust. This type of Trust is the Trust which motivates either party to act 
for the other. Benevolence trust was suggested in a research by Strathorn et al. (2015), but it 
is considered as part of Goodwill trust in this study. Another finding was that mid-tenure 
Contract amendments were a significant threat to Trust. The changes were viewed as being 
calculative on the part of the Contractor.  
5.3.3 The JPC Road Construction Project 
The JPC project was a Traditional standard contract based on FIDIC conditions of a 
contract. There was a tripartite of Client, Consultant, and Contractor.  The Financiers were 
Government of the Republic of Malawi, Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development 
(KFAED), and Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) and OPEC Fund 
for International Development (OFID). I realised that the Financier's influence was emerging 
in all my major construction projects because in most cases the Client lacked the financial 
liquidity to make frequent and timely payments as the project progressed. 
The JPC project endured a slow start. Realizing that the Trust which had existed at the 
contract signing ceremony was now waning, I made three recommendations to the Client. 
The course of events and the actions taken are analysed in the 3-column analysis below: 
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3-COLUMN ANALYSIS:  Threat to Competence Trust due to late Payment of Working Capital 
Advance. 
Information Analysis Meetings 
 Contractor was having 
difficulty in raising 
Bank Guarantee for 
25% of Contract  
Working Capital 
Advance (WCA) 
   With no WCA, work 
could not commence. 
Consultant recommends 
ordinary insurance for 
WCA, but Client rejects 
this as too risky  
 Meeting with Client and 
Contractor, A reduction of 
WCA to 10% approved    
 Financiers reduce 
WCA to 10%.  
              The Contractor 
was able to get a Bank 
guarantee for WCA. He is 
eventually paid, and work 
progresses  
   
 
The first recommendation was to reduce the stringent requirements of a 25% Bank 
guaranteed Working Capital Advance payment. The Bank's collateral requirements were 
making it difficult for the Contractor to get start-up Working Capital Advance. I, therefore, 
requested, through the Client, that the Financiers agree to the Contractor getting usual 
insurance cover to the WCA. This was rejected by the Financier and Client as being too risky. 
I then recommended a smaller amount of Working Advance Capital, for which he could 
afford the required collateral. The funding Agency gave no objection to reducing the 
Working Capital advance payment from 25% to 10% of the Bid price.  This was a paradigm 
shift because the usual percentage for WCA is 25 %, but this was proving unattainable for the 
Contractor. After these negotiations and signing of the contract, I issued the Contractor with 
works commencement orders. However, he could still not commence the works because he 
had no bridging Finance. He needed the WCA to be paid to be able to begin work. Despite 
having agreed to a smaller Working Capital Advance, the Financiers were taking time to 
release the Working Capital Advance. It was now evident that the Contractor could only be 
able to commence substantial works after receipt of the Working Capital Advance. This was 
a significant threat to the tripartite contractual Trust. 
The delay in significant works commencement until the Contractor was paid made me 
realise that there was a problem in the structuring of the Contract start date. In standard 
Contracts, the start date of the contract is the date of signing of the contract. This meant that 
the Contractor, even at start date was behind the program because of the time it took between 
signing and receipt of the Working Capital Advance payment. 
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 I, therefore, recommended the shifting of the start date of the contract to the date of 
Advance money payment. The Client reluctantly accepted my recommendation and increased 
the Contract period by two months. 
Thirdly the Contract required the Contractor to have Site staff with 20 years' 
experience. The Contractor could not get such staff locally, and engaging expatriates was too 
expensive. This lack of technical staff started threatening Competence Trust. 
 
3-COLUMN ANALYSIS:  Threat to Competence Trust due to lack of Contractor experienced staff. 
Information Analysis Meetings 
The contractor could 
not get local Engineers 
with 20 years 
experience 
  Work started. Supervising 
Consultant concerned with 
the workmanship. 
Competence Trust under 
threat  
  In a Monthly site meeting, I 
raised the issue of failure to 
employ experienced contract 
site staff      
 
The Consultant had 
Engineers with the 
required experience. On 
this basis, the Client 
agreed to reduce 20-
year experience for  
some Contractor staff 
  The Contractor capacity 
increased through higher 
supervision overview and a 
JV formed by the 
Contractor. Competence 
Trust which had been 
under Threat was restored.  
 Client requests regular 
technical site meetings during 
the tenure of the project as a 
collaborative practice.  
 
As shown in the analysis above, after synthesizing the Contractor's problem, I 
recommended that the staff experience requirement be reduced to 10 years. As a collaborative 
practice, the Consultant also covered for the Contractor‟s experience shortfall by assigning 
Supervising engineers with over 20 years site experience. It was observed in site meeting 
statements that this increased the Client‟s competence trust in the project team 
In both the Low-Cost Housing Project and the JPC road project, the Client made all the 
payments to the Main Contractor, who would then pass on due payments to the sub-
contractors. This was presenting a problem because the Main Contractor was taking time 
between receipts of payment and disbursing it to the sub-contractors. The Contractor, Sub-
Contractor trust relationship which was discernably strained was restored by this decision. In 
the 3-Column analysis below, I show my experimental intervention and how I found a 
solution. 
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3-COLUMN ANALYSIS:  Threat to Trust due to Sub-contractor Payment. 
Information Analysis Meetings 
The Contractor was 
paying sub-contractors 
and equipment 
suppliers late after 
receiving payment from 
Client. 
 The main Contractor was 
using the subcontractor's 
payment for own use on 
the project.  He argued he 
could do this since they 
were domestic, as opposed 
nominated subcontractors. 
Inter-entity Trust was 
under threat.  
   We held sub-contractors 
meeting to discuss this delayed 
transmission of sub-contractors 
payments.    
 
 
 
Discussed the option of 
making direct payments 
to sub- contractors and 
equipment suppliers.  
Sub-contractors were paid 
directly, and they worked 
more efficiently and were 
directly responsible for 
keeping to their part of the 
work program. 
Competence Trust restored 
  .  
 
 
Thus, I recommended that subcontractors and equipment suppliers be paid directly, 
instead of being paid through their main Contractor. This reduced conflicts due to delays in 
passing on payments from the Client. 
  The Goodwill, Competence and Contractual Trust created by resolving the problems of 
WCA, Start date and Site staff experience enabled the JPC Project to progress well. The 
original Completion date was not going to be met, but the product quality was satisfactory, 
and the project was within Cost and Budget.  
5.3.4 The Linia road project 
In 2014, ME (Pvt) Ltd. Contractors went into a Public Private Partnership with the 
Government to construct 120 km long road in the northern region of the country. The 
Consultant was then contracted by ME (Pvt) Ltd Contractors to carry out the technical 
design. There was a groundbreaking ceremony in September 2015. Soon after the 
groundbreaking ceremony, however, the Client, who was Government, suddenly changed its 
mind and now wished to construct the road on a Traditional standard contract. They wanted a 
Bill of Quantities (B.O.Q) and monthly measured works. The question was whether by this 
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sudden change, Government had lost Trust in the Contractor. Did Government think that the 
Contractor was making super profits on the project and wanted specific payments on the basis 
of a priced BOQ? The other possibility was that Government suddenly got the financial 
resources to pay the Contractor on a monthly basis and thus meet its mandate to provide this 
public road.  I could not get a satisfactory answer from the Government officials I 
interviewed and therefore reasoned that the decision to move from a trust-based Relational 
Contract to a standard Traditional and transactional Contract was political. Perhaps 
Government wanted to be seen to have sponsored the project by the electorate. While 
following up to answer these questions, Government again changed its mind on how it 
wanted the project to be implemented. It reverted to the trust-based Relational Public-Private 
Partnership approach. It now wanted a Relational Contract where the private Contractor 
would use his resources and construct the road. The Contractor would be paid from future 
income flows over a concession period of 30 years. This was now a trust-based relational 
contract. It can be inferred that the Contractor and Government had Goodwill Trust because 
they had previous work contracts together. All their previous engagements had however been 
based on Traditional standard forms of contracts. These were short-term transactional 
Engineering procurement and construction types of contracts. I inferred that, on discovering 
that it had limited resources to meet its mandate to provide Public infrastructure, Government 
resorted to a Private Public Partnership contract. This transferred the Government's 
responsibility, financial risk and construction risk to the Contractor. The Contractor accepted 
this high Risk and vulnerability, and he commenced the project construction. I inferred that 
his decision was based on existing Goodwill Trust of previously working together with this 
Client.  The prospects of higher profit margins that come with high-Risk projects have been 
suggested by many researchers including Chan & Yeung (2010). "The Government owes us a 
lot of money, but we trust we will be paid in due course," responded the Contractor's Chief 
Operating Officer when I questioned him why his company was entering into such a risky 
and uncertain contract. Trust was used as a Contractor procurement tool.  At closure of this 
research, the Contractor was working on site in a Trust-based contract with the Client. 
5.3.5  The Moni Bus Terminal Project  
This project comprised of the construction of an international bus Terminal in the 
Capital city. The project originator went into an informal alliance agreement with the 
Consultant and several other bus companies. Many contract issues were left unsaid, and 
everybody trusted the future behaviour of the others. Indeed with no guarantees of next 
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payment, as the Consultant, I decided to start preliminary feasibility work. This is called 
Sweat Equity. I did this because I knew that by providing technical designs it would assist in 
the negotiations for land allocation from Government. This was a demonstration of Goodwill 
Trust on my part. However, the contract signing and closure by all the other consortium 
members was not happening. The Project was not taking off, and I began to think that the 
other consortium members had not fully committed to the project. They seemed not to trust 
each other. From the pre-feasibility study, it was such a promising project. It had a super 
profits potential, and it would also improve trans-border transportation for Central Africa. In 
general, it would uplift the living standards of the local community by providing small 
business incubators and employment. I wondered what was threatening Trust?.  Things came 
to a head one afternoon after the project originator called a meeting. It started off as a 
reasonably relaxed meeting, and I was looking forward to triumphantly presenting the 
feasibility documents that I had prepared so that the project could start off. 
3 COLUMN ANALYSIS:  How Sweat Equity was used to build Trust in the International Bus Terminal . 
Information Analysis Meetings 
 Patent holder Client 
wanted to build a Bus 
Terminal but had no 
Funding.  
 Bankable Feasibility 
Documents required by 
possible Financiers.  
 Client meets Consultant to 
discuss the way forward.   
   The client gives 
presumptive competence 
Trust to Consultant to 
produce documents to 
source for Funding.       
   
 Consultant, accepted to 
work at deferred 
invoices to be paid later 
or converted to Sweat 
Equity at project 
started.  
 Consultant commences 
Feasibility study work. 
Mutual Trust generated 
between Client and 
Consultant. Some issues 
left unsaid and informal. 
Client calls a meeting. He 
unilaterally tries to get other 
equity holders onto the Project. 
This shows an absence of joint 
decision making and lack of 
transparency. 
 Some existing consortium 
members walk out of the 
meeting. As the 
Consultant, I saw the 
Client action as being 
calculative. I lost Trust in 
the Client and stopped 
work. The lack of 
transparency resulted in 
the project termination  
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  The Client displayed Competence Trust in the capacity of the Consultant. "I have been 
working on this project for many years, and I know that you are a well- established 
Consultant, and I would like to work with you on this project," he told me in a meeting at my 
office.  My reaction was to trust the Client, and I decided to provide Sweat Equity. Thus, I 
carried out the preliminary design and provided feasibility study documents for the project 
for no immediate payment. Some contractual issues such as the decision-making process and 
percentage equity that would later become due to the Consultant were left unsaid.  
The Client held a meeting with lawyers and other potential equity holders without the 
Consultant and existing consortium member's knowledge. It later transpired that he wanted 
to craft a legal document. The legal document showed that he would still retain control of 
the project. Decision making would remain in his hands, and it appeared like he alone could 
terminate other project participants if he felt so. Due to this lack of joint decision making 
and transparency, I decided to opt out of the project, because I thought I could not Trust the 
future behaviour of the Client. Some of the consortium members he had brought also lost 
Trust in him and decided to leave. This surprised the Client who wanted to have control and 
significant decision-making rights. He argued that decision making was his entitlement since 
he was the project originator. I analysed this relationship breakdown and felt that it was due 
to the absence of Contractual Trust between the participants. There was only Competence 
and Goodwill Trust between the Client and the Consultant. Reflection on the turnout of this 
project suggested that all the three forms of Trust which are, Competence, Contractual, 
Goodwill Trust need to exist simultaneously for a trust-based relational project to succeed.  
The terminal project tripartite relationship lacked Contractual Trust. This finding agreed 
with the results of the Library project, where all the three forms of Trust were vitiated, and 
again the contract was terminated. At the closure of this research, it was not possible to 
assess the critical project success factors like the cost, program and output quality of the 
project, because it was still at feasibility and fund sourcing stage. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 CREATING TRUST AND SHARING RISK IN CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS 
6.1 Emergent Risk Theme 
In the previous Chapter, I discussed my investigation, analysis, and findings on each of 
the five projects.  The investigation revealed that the problems on these projects could be 
categorized into two, firstly into Financial issues and secondly into Technical capacity problems. 
The financial difficulties included Working Capital Advance and timely payment of the 
Contractor. The technical capacity problems required the Contractor to have experienced Site 
staff and frequently working together with the Client or Consultant. In this Chapter I show how 
by taking action I created collaborative practices that created Trust and facilitated equitable risk 
sharing. 
  As my analysis progressed, I found that Trust was under threat.  The whole purpose of 
generating Competence, Contractual and Goodwill Trust was not just to get a good feeling, but 
indeed, it was to hedge against construction Cost, Quality, and Program Risk.   In one interview 
the Financier's voice boomed "we don't know anything about Construction Risk, it is you, the 
Consultant and the Contractor, who must deal with the construction Risk." This statement was 
significant because it implied that all the construction risks on the Cost, Program and Product 
Quality were now being allocated to the Contractor and a lesser extent to the Consultant. In 
coming up with the theme codes, I had noted in the voice of the JPC Contractor that the issue of 
collaboration, trust and risk mitigation was a significant statement. "The risk to set out the works 
is with us, and you must trust that we will do it correctly, and then you can come and check 
later," he said. He merely wanted to be trusted to do his work and mitigate the risks as best as he 
could. The demoralized acceptance of the possibility of his works getting demolished for poor 
quality as implied in the Contractor's above statement was evidence revealing that to develop 
collaboration it was necessary to manage Risk through initiating and possibly enhancing Trust  
in construction Projects. This was necessary where ever there was uncertainty.  
Another example of risk acceptance was when the JPC Contractor moved to the 
construction site before he was paid the Working Capital Advance (WCA). This meant that he 
had to endure start-up working capital Risk. For ten months he was not paid the WCA but was 
contractually forced to remain on Site and carry out some construction works. He had to find the 
bridging finance. The Contractor thus, trusted that the Client would pay for work done in the 
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near future. He had to make difficult business decisions to withstand the start-up financing 
hardship. "We have been funding this project for over ten months without receiving Working 
Capital Advance payment or any other payment for that matter," said the JPC Contractor 
irritably. I inferred that the Contractor was feeling the financial strain due to this non-payment 
but was continuing to endure because of apparent Contractual and Goodwill Trust that the Client 
would eventually meet his contractual obligations. He remained on site doing some nominal 
work. 
   A study of the standard Contracts signed by the Contractor showed that there were 
numerous Disclaimer clauses.  The risk was transferred from the Client and allocated to the 
Contractor using these Disclaimer Clauses.  For example in both the standard FIDIC and 
Architect's Contract documents which were signed by the Contractors, in the Low-cost 
Housing Project and the JPC Project, there was an indemnifying Clause regarding 
construction accidents. The Clause stated that "The Contractor shall indemnify and keep 
indemnified the Employer against all accident damages and compensation." This was 
evidence that the Risk was being transferred wholesale to the Contractor. And yet in the very 
definition of Trust by Rousseau et al. (1998), Hart (1999), and Strathorn et al. (2015), Trust is 
about accepting vulnerability by the action of others and sharing risk as opposed to risk 
allocation. In the Library project, when the Client attempted to transfer all the financial risk 
to the Contractor in a Turnkey contract, there was a stalemate because the Contractor wanted 
the Client to also accept some financial risk by changing from a post-construction payment 
scheme in the Turnkey contract to a monthly payment scheme. 
My earlier empirical work and some research by English and Baxter (2010) have 
suggested that Project implementation has moved towards trust-based Relational PPs, PFIs, 
and JVs due to project complexity and uncertainty. This is specially to manage risk by 
restructuring incentives and payment mechanisms. I observed that there was lip service on 
collaboration and intention to blur the strict boundaries of responsibilities between the 
tripartite members, in some of my projects. In the first JPC contract site meeting, the Client 
declared that "we are a team, jointly responsible for the success of the Project," and yet it 
took ten months to give the Contractor his first payment. The Financier was supposed to 
bring, financial control and monitoring in the example above. He, however, also requested 
some Risk hedging measures such as stringent Bank guarantees for Working Capital 
Advance, bidding Bonds, and Performance Bonds.   
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  Laryea (2008), after detailed research, concluded that Risk management is more 
developed in the financial sector and there are many mathematical models of risk 
computation used in Economics and Insurance. However, I am argued that the Financier and 
Client, even without these models in the construction sector, must also accept project 
construction Risks which emerge from contingencies. Typically on this contract, some of the 
construction risks included lack of Construction materials or equipment, the difficulty that the 
Contractor had in obtaining guarantees for Working Capital Advance payment, the scarcity of 
skills and capacity in a developing country. The risk aversion by the Clients and subsequent 
asymmetric Risk allocation to the Contractor and Consultant was delaying the project.  
 In an effort to spread start-up risk and ease the Contractor's difficulty to obtain Bank 
guarantees for Working Capital Advance, I intervened in iterative cycles of action and 
reflection to come up with an actionable solution. My final action was to propose that the 
Client pre-purchases the construction Materials. After I gave a lengthy explanation of the 
advantages, the pre-purchase facility was eventually accepted by the Client as less risky 
because these Materials were free-issued for permanent incorporation into the works. This 
enabled the Contractors in two of my projects to commence work and to issue their first 
Invoices for regular jobs done. I was still however really perturbed by the issue of irrevocable 
Bank guarantees that were required to release Working Capital; my projects were just failing 
to take off. I decided to tackle the issue head-on and proposed a paradigm shift in this 
practice of financing projects to start off.  I first requested all my Clients to share the 
construction start-up Risk by accepting standard insurance cover instead of the onerous Bank 
guarantees for the Advance money to be paid to the Contractor. Sadly the Financiers and my 
Clients on the Low-Cost Housing Project and the JPC Project did not accept this 
recommendation, "we cannot accept this Risk of losing our money to Contractors who may 
misuse the Advance payment. We are playing our part, by making this interest free Advance 
payment available, but it can only be accessed using an irrevocable Bank guarantee." said the 
JPC Client.  I argued that the fact that the WCA was interest-free was not benevolence on the 
part of the Client because if there were any interest charges as in bridging finance, the 
Contractor would still pass on this cost to the Client by raising his unit rates. However, I was 
not able to convince them. The JPC Financier and Client were only prepared to reduce the 
quantum of Working Capital Advance to 10% so that the Contractor could afford the Bank 
Guarantee. The Low-Cost Housing Project Client was not willing to consider any other form 
of Guarantee as well, and I had to find another solution to get the work started. There was no 
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willingness to share this start-up Risk, and they insisted that the Contractor must find the 
bridging finance if he was unable to raise the irrevocable Bank Guarantee. 
6.2  Using Trust to reduce project start-up Risk 
In the last section, I showed how the theme of Risk arose and how it was being veiled under 
three-fold shrouds of Contractual, Competence and Goodwill Trust. In this Section I list the 
five risks that constitute cost, program and quality risks and analyze specific instances where 
Trust was used to alleviate start-up Risk. 
 In the JPC contract, the Contractor established his camp on site before the Financier had 
given his "no objection" to the structure of Contract. As soon as he was advised that he had 
won the contract, through a letter of acceptance by the Client, the Contractor started 
mobilizing and moved to Site trusting the Client. In any case, this is what the Contract 
demanded. In 14 days he was obliged to start establishing on site. However, when the 
contract was sent to the Financier basically for information only, it came back with some 
amendments. These amendments among other things included approval of the reduction of 
the Working Capital Advance payment from 25% of the Contract Price to just 10 %. This 
was good news because I had previously recommended this WCA reduction to the Client. It 
was on the premise that like most contracts in the country the collateral required for 
providing the irrevocable Bank guarantee could not easily be obtained by the Contractor. My 
intervention was to combine a lower Working Capital Advance payment and free-issue of 
construction materials so that the Contractor would manage to raise his first Invoice. Further, 
I had also recommended a minimum Invoice value of $300 000 of work to be done before a 
claim submission. The Client did not initially accept the recommendations, and the 
Contractor moved to the site. I felt that although the Client had virtually ignored my initial 
recommendations, the Financier decided to descend into the loan usage arena and flex his 
positional power. The Financier became a significant player in the construction project. The 
analysis shows that the Contractor was able to accept the Risk of establishing on Site before 
receiving the Working Capital Advance payment because he had developed Goodwill Trust 
from previous contracts with the same Client. "We have had many projects with this Client," 
he said.  
This event showed explicitly how collaboration and Goodwill Trust developed. It eventually 
shortened project start-up time. The contract was finally signed with these amendments after 
more than four months delay. 
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Although I had set forth to study Trust, I found that collaboration, Trust and Risk were 
inseparable. The emergence of the Risk sharing theme forced me to review the literature 
again. This was so that I could learn and understand the perception of Risk. As stated earlier 
there were numerous construction risks, Cook and Brown (1999) listed nearly forty. I 
reflected on my current and previous projects, and ranked the five most important risks for 
my study as follows: 
1. Materials Risk,  
2. Manpower or labour risk 
3. Machines or equipment Risk 
4. Money or cost escalation risk 
5. Minutes or program risk 
I called these the 5 M risks of construction. 
 I also found that many authors for example Chihuri & Pretorius (2010), Laryea (2008), 
and Xiang et al. (2012), had combined these risks as cost escalation, time overruns, financial 
and skills risks. Thus summarized the Construction Risk was of Cost, Program, and Quality 
of product. The above authors had attempted to study how these Risks could be managed in 
the construction industry. They found that Construction Risk management is more by 
intuition and "linguistics" as opposed to definite mathematical models. This quick review of 
the extant literature on construction Risk showed that indeed where there was Risk and multi-
organization interdependence, there had to be Trust. My project examples gave me evidence 
explaining the necessity of Trust and inter-dependence between the Financier, Client, 
Consultant, and Contractor to successfully implement project delivery. 
6.3 Asymmetric distribution of risk 
The present practice of managing construction uncertainty is by allocating the Risk 
using indemnity Clauses and not collaboratively sharing Risk. For example Chan et al. 
(2006), in their research concluded that clients in Targeted Cost Contracts (TCC) and 
Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP) contracts chose to accept documentation and project 
design risks only. All the other construction risks were transferred to the Contractor.  The 
only two accepted risks from a list of over 34 were just change of scope of works and Acts of 
God (Force Majeure).  
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In my earlier empirical work, I found that the asymmetric risk allocation was done by 
loading all the risk on the Contractor using disclaimer and indemnity clauses in the 
construction contracts. As an example, in the JPC contract the Client did not pay the 
Contractor on time and there was worker industrial action which delayed the project. The 
Client refused to accept that he was partly responsible. A paradigm shift was required to blur 
these responsibilities.  Another example was in my Library and Linia project. As the project 
became larger and more complex, broader consortia of Contractors with financial capacity 
were required for long-term contracts. The arrangements were for the Contractors to 
complete construction of the infrastructure and then recoup their investment and profit over 
some years using the income flow from the finished project. From my earlier work and also 
as suggested by Vincent-Jones (2012), Contractors felt overwhelmed with uncertainty due to 
project complexity and the amount of risk generated. They sought to redirect some of the 
construction risks to Funding agencies. This is also evidenced by case studies of some Private 
Funds Initiatives (PFI) in the United Kingdom and the conversation below. 
 "Why should we bear the burden of WCA through the huge costs of the Bank 
guarantees," The Contractors asked me. "We are not the ultimate beneficiary of the Project."  
In the following 3-column analysis, I examine the cause and effect of asymmetric risk 
allocation. This analysis assisted me to make decisions on what action to taken to solve the 
stalemate between the Client and the Contractor. 
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3-COLUMN ANALYSIS:  Asymmetric distribution of Risk. 
Information Analysis Meetings 
 Large construction 
projects have five-fold 
risks as construction  
Materials risk, labour 
risks, equipment risk, 
finance, cost escalation 
risks, program risks 
and output quality risks  
   Contractor asked to   
rework section or 
demolish works and 
indemnify Client. 
Financiers and Clients 
have high-risk aversion 
  Consultant calls for management 
meeting and shows concern for time 
overruns.   
 
 
 
 Contractor applies for 
Extension of time to 
complete the project.He  
cites, late payment of 
WCA, labour strike, 
shortage of cement and 
diesel  
 Client entirely rejects 
the application for 
extension of time.  He 
quotes indemnifying 
clauses in the Contract. 
This is an Asymmetric 
distribution of Risk to 
Contractor.  
Disappointed, Contractor calls for 
another meeting to discuss his 
application for extension of time due 
to late payment of working Capital 
Advance.  
Consultant 
adjudicates Claim by 
Contractor. It is 
appreciated that the Client 
was partly responsible for 
delays by paying the 
Contractor late, but he still 
rejects the claim on the 
basis that it was submitted 
60 days after the event and 
had therefore expired. I 
recommend Transactional 
reciprocity that the 
Contractor does not claim 
interest on late payment, 
while the Client does not 
levy liquidated delay 
damages. This is accepted 
by both parties, and the 
project proceeds to 
completion 
 
As the project Consultant I paused and relooked at the problems I was having in 
inequitable sharing of the construction risks between the tripartite. In the literature, I found 
that there had been an emphasis on more and more financial analysis and extensive pre-
knowledge of any forms of risk. Doloi (2009) and Barry (2005) suggested extensive financial 
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analysis and modeling as a way of anticipating probable project progress constraints. 
However, the benefits of higher financial analysis, scheduling and product quality risks 
identification were not followed by any more equitable risk sharing .The Contractors 
continued to state that they were "heaped with Risk."  Thus, as I proceeded with this action 
research, I gathered that the Contractors wanted Risk to be shared more fairly. It became 
evident that for more equitable Risk sharing, there had to be Trust that each project 
participant would carry out its obligations satisfactorily. The Trust creation had to be on the 
basis of two themes of Capital and Technical capacity that had emerged from my coding. 
Thus, the Financier and Client were obliged to fund the project, the Consultant to design it, 
specify it and supervise it and finally the Contractor to construct it with good quality, at 
optimum cost and minimum time overruns. Projects were stalling and I started seeing proper 
management of the two overarching themes on Finances and Technical capacity as the 
collaborative way of blurring the strict four party contract obligations and balancing Trust 
and Risk. 
   The Financier in the Linia project, for example, carried out detailed cost-benefit analysis 
and evaluated the various project risks.  This review was geared towards reducing Financier 
and Client Risks, but it shifted all the other construction Risks, like WCA, Skills, Time and 
quality of product to the Contractor.  This is corroborated by a Financier's statement that "we 
expect you to indemnify the Financier and the Client against all cost and time overruns." 
Apparently, there was a reluctance to share risk. Thus, I found in my above analysis that in a 
single stroke of refusing to approve the Contractor's application for extension of time in the 
JPC contract, the Client had shifted the time-related cost risk and the program overrun risk to 
the Contractor. As stated above, I intervened by recommending transactional reciprocity. I 
requested the Contractor not to claim late payment Interest, in return the Client would not 
charge the Contractor liquidated delay charges. I was seeking a practical solution to the 
problem.  
6.4  The potential of using Trust to manage construction Risk 
   An interesting phenomenon on how developing Trust could be used to lessen the risk 
aversion was however evident in all these five research projects. The Contractors and 
Consultants were keen to maintain post contract relationships and reputation. Thus, in all the 
Bid documents I studied, the Consultant and the Contractor were required to list previous 
projects of a similar nature. This brought presumptive Goodwill Trust which was then the 
basis upon which a Consultant or Contractor could be invited to submit an expression of 
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interest (EOI) in a project or shortlisted for bidding. However, I did not see where the 
credentials or previous similar works experience of the Client were required.  This was an 
evident lack of disclosure and due diligence of the Client. The Consultant and the Contractor 
were left to make their assessment and conclusions on whether the Client could be trusted or 
not. In my post research interviews with the Consultants and Contractors, there were 
proponents of the Client to establish a Letter of Credit to the Contractor before the start of 
the project. This can be seen as an attempt by the Contractors to verify that the Client could 
pay the Contractor and the Consultant. The Client became a risk in the project.  One well-
established Contractor proposed that "this should be a win-win situation where the Client 
gives an irrevocable letter of commitment to pay the Contractor". He felt very bitter because 
of some projects which he did and had problems in being paid. He proposed that in the same 
manner that as Contractor he submitted a Performance Bond to the Client, he must also be 
given a Payment Bond or guarantee by the Client. 
 I argued that Trust and Risk had an effect on the collaboration in Project implementation. In 
all large construction projects, wherever there is Risk, measures to build Trust had to be 
found.  Trust reduces the tension between the various forms of risk. It is created in three types 
as Competence Trust, Contractual Trust, and Goodwill Trust. The interplay between Trust 
and Risk has to be managed. For example, in a related study in Australia; Doloi (2009) used a 
Structural Equation Model to investigate the role of Joint Risk Management in Partnerships. 
He concluded that Trust and Joint Risk Management have a significant impact on the success 
of a business partnership. Osipova (2015) attributed Risk allocation to the type of the 
Construction contracts. Traditional standard Contracts are based on the principal-agency 
Theory relationship where the two parties have adverse and positional attitudes. In some 
cases the two even have different project objectives and they only worry about risks that 
affect their part of the project objective and not joint risk management. In my research the 
evidence shows that Joint Risk Management and Risk sharing helps to build Trust between 
the Client, Consultant, and Contractor. For example, in the Low-Cost Housing project, the 
Client, Consultant, and Contractor shared the construction Risks of the delayed sale of the 
houses to avoid Cost overruns. I argued that although the Financier, Client, Consultant, and 
Contractor are connected by distinct and different contracts, they should jointly share project 
uncertainty and Risks.  I visualised building Trust and sharing Risk on a project as a four-
point diamond shaped phenomenon which could lead to a collaborative inter-entity 
relationship. This process which is based on Trust building and Risk sharing is shown in 
Figure 2 below. 
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           SHARE RISK  
                     (2) Financier                   
                Funding Risk    Project Risk & Uncertainty 
Joint Trust & Risk Management by Client, 
Consultant, Contractor and Financier 
Figure 2: Practical Diamond Model of Collaborative, Trust and Risk Sharing 
 
In the diagram, at each point of the diamond there is a participant. If read clockwise; it starts 
with the Financier, then the Client, Consultant, and Contractor respectively. To the original 
tripartite I had added the relationship with a Financier because, in large projects, the Client 
lacked the capacity to self- finance. The emergence of a Financier as a significant stakeholder 
became evident in all these large construction projects. 
 I initially called this four-member relationship the "Diamond model" because of the hard 
positional stance and discrete project obligations for each of the four participants. On 
analysis, I realised that though discrete, the responsibilities and unbreakable rhombus of 
obligations could be used to share the project Risks by building inter-party Trust. This could 
be by using the collaborative practices that were emerging from my study as two themes on 
Financing and building Technical capacity.   
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The project cycle moves from left to right, and it shows its transition from inception to 
completion. As I analysed the relationship further, I realised that project risk and uncertainty 
could be reduced by the four stakeholders collaborating, trusting each other and accepting 
risk jointly. In the sample Contracts studied, however, the four were being positional, and 
most of the construction Risk was unfairly allocated to the Contractor.  In the Low-Cost 
Housing project for example, I made deliberate efforts to share and jointly manage Risk 
between the Financier, Client, Consultant and Contractor. There was phenomenal project 
progress. I distributed risk with the Client's approval by putting in place a construction 
Materials pre-purchase facility so that Contractors could start work. I also requested the 
Contractors to condone interest payments and accept Security costs for the completed houses. 
This was again my intervention of transactional reciprocity to build Trust. This prevented 
Cost overruns which could have come due to the failure to sell the completed houses quickly. 
In contrast, in the JPC contract, project delivery could have been done earlier if risks such as 
lack of Working Capital Advance payments, inexperienced Site staff and delayed start date 
had been more equitably shared.  The Contractor ended up applying for a substantial 256-day 
extension of time on a 365-day contract. This was a 70% extension of time application. 
Another event where Trust and Risk-sharing worked initially but was later vitiated by other 
extraneous circumstances was in the Moni Bus Terminal Project. The Client requested pre-
project assistance from the Consulting Engineer. This was to be by contributing Sweat Equity 
to the project. It meant that some project enabling work had to be done for no immediate 
payment. The Consultant was to be paid later in the form of equity if the project was 
successful. This arrangement could only be made if both the Consultant and the Contractor 
trusted each other because no payment would pass hands. Further, the Consultant had to have 
confidence that the proposed project was going to be successful and that the Client would not 
take advantage of him. On the JPC road project the Client, Government, sought Financiers to 
assist with funding so that the Client could fulfill its mandate to provide infrastructure to the 
Public. The Financier, wielded significant power on how the project should be implemented.  
 He had to be brought into the Trust equation and to manage financial risk. First, the 
Financier had to trust the Client to whom he was lending money for the project, and second, 
he had to trust the Consultant and the Contractor who were in the implementing team. In this 
arrangement it was much more challenging to build Trust compared to solely relying on the 
traditional tripartite Trust creation between the Client, Consultant, and Contractor in project 
implementation. Trust was still necessary, but it now involved four players, the Financier, 
Client, Consultant, and Contractor.   
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 What emerged was that the Contractor was being allocated most of the construction Risk. He 
accepted this vulnerability sometimes totally ignoring good business sense. 
In my diamond visualization of Trust and Risk mitigation in a collaborative relationship, the 
risks and referents were as follows: 
1. Funding Risk – Financier 
2. Project Inception Risk – Client 
3. Design and specification Risk - Consultant/Engineer  
4. Buildable and Function of the product Risk – Contractor 
5. Construction Risk - Contractor 
 Again as revealed in the Trust theme clustering above, these Risks could be combined into 
two as financing Risk and technical capacity Risk. Clearly collaboration and project delivery 
lay in the interplay between Trust and Risk.  In my analysis, the four participants formed a 
system which managed the project uncertainty and the main Risks above. Some of the 
construction Risks such as cost escalations, inclement weather, lack of skills and equipment 
breakdowns could not be adequately defined and documented. In the absence of this clarity, 
the Contractor responded that he was using "experience" and a contingency sum to hedge 
against the Risks. I argued that the other three members must appreciate the Contractor's risks 
and help to alleviate these risks‟ adverse effects. For inclement weather for example, when 
there was excessive rain which stopped work on the JPC project, the Client ridiculously 
required the Contractor to prove that for the past 20 years there have been no such similar 
rains. This clause was passing risk to the Contractor.  The financial, design, quality, utility 
and time Risks were ever present; for example, the Financier who admitted to not having 
detailed "knowledge of the project construction Risks," trusted that the team of Consultant 
and Contractor would deliver the project within the budget. In the Traditional standard 
contracts, there was a shirking of responsibility through disclaimer Clauses as shown in the 
FIDIC and Bank references above.  The above section has described and demonstrated how 
by nurturing collaboration, trust and risk was used to manage project uncertainty. The 
argument is continued in the following Section with an emphasis on the experimental 
intervention I carried out.  
6.5 Risk Management: Experimental Interventions in sharing the Contract Risks. 
In section 6.5.1 to 6.5.4 below, I elaborate how the life cycle of the construction 
projects exhibited that there is interplay between Trust and Risk sharing. This interplay is 
brought about by the uncertainty in the factors that influence the project. In all the projects, 
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the Client was responsible for the needs identification and coming up with a project concept. 
The Client then invited an Engineer to provide Designs, Specifications and Tender 
documents to procure a capable Contractor to carry out project construction.  The project 
progress was exercised by the Contractor who controlled the completion Time, Cost, 
Performance, and Quality of outputs. 
6.5.1  Experimental intervention to sharing Financial and Completion risk 
 An example of where intervention enabled Risk sharing was in the Low-Cost 
Housing project. The Client did not just stop with Project inception Risk but continued to 
share the emergent Risks at the construction stage of the Project. When the Contractors failed 
to get Bank guarantees for Working Capital Advance, I intervened and requested the Client to 
pre-purchase some construction material to enable the Contractors to commence work. In 
reciprocity, the Contractors did not charge the Client for extended security when the 
completed houses were failing to sell. 
Some of the Risks for large projects included the Client not having the capacity to fund 
the project, and a Financier had to be found as the fourth player to support the project. I found 
that the Financiers have a significant influence on the direction of the project. The 
observation and analysis of the artifacts showed that without the Financier‟s “no objection” 
and concurrence, a Client‟s needs and wishes could be ignored by the Consultant and 
Contractor.  In the Low-Cost Housing project, one Contractor declared that "We will not start 
work on site until we have received Working Capital Advance." In the two projects below, I 
explain how the project implementation proceeded because of collaboration and creation of 
Contractual Trust. "We have been running this project with our resources for almost ten 
months without financial input from the Client." said the JPC Contractor after the Consultant 
demanded more construction progress. Analysis of these significant statements shows that the 
Contractor was demanding more equitable sharing of the construction risks between the 
tripartite. It's as if he was saying, why should I capitalize the project? I am not the ultimate 
project beneficiary. In the JPC project, a renegotiated contract with reduced Advance 
Payment and regular monthly Invoices, smoothened cash flow spikes made construction 
progress sustainable. This action intervention result showed that while Trust can drive project 
progress, understanding the Risks and sometimes amending the controlling contractual 
clauses can enhance the Contractor's performance and project progress. After examining the 
standard contract Clauses, I found that there was disproportionate Risk sharing. This anomaly 
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forced the Contractor and the Consultant to create Contractual Trust and Goodwill Trust in 
the Client. They stoically invested in Goodwill Trust in the Client because they had no 
option. However this made them less efficient in providing services to the project. This is 
evident in the applications for extension of completion time they made and sometimes the 
fact that parts of work had to be demolished because of bad workmanship. For example in the 
JPC Road Project, the Low-Cost Housing Project and the Library project, the Client struggled 
to meet his funding obligations. Financial and completion risks became issues as shown in 
the 3-Column analysis below. 
3-COLUMN ANALYSIS:  Experimental intervention to sharing Financial and Completion risk 
Information Analysis Meetings 
 External  Loan funding 
available for only 75% 
of a 100km road 
project. 
25% was to be Funded 
by the Borrower who 
was Government.Due 
to an economic 
downturn, Govt did not 
have its portion of the 
funds. 
 
  Available funding could 
only complete 75% of the 
project. 
Project funding became a 
Risk. The road 
construction would end in 
the middle of nowhere and 
not link the intended towns 
which were economic 
centers. 
   Participants meet to tackle 
the completion problem and 
mitigate the Financial Risk. 
There was a possibility to get 
the balance of funding in the 
next Public Sector Investment 
budget in the following year. 
 
 
   Road link completion 
Risk. All participants 
asked to share the risk. 
Financiers accepted that 
their funding would be for 
a road not joining the 
intended initial two towns. 
Contractor accepted 
splitting contract into Lot1 
and Lot 2. Govt. /Client 
promised to put the rest of 
funding for Lot 2 on a 
future budget. The 
Consultant made designs 
for staged construction.  
  .  
  After negotiations, the Financiers accepted to fund a reduced portion of the project as part of 
the risk sharing.  He had not initially taken any of the new project completion risks. The 
contract was divided into Lot1 and Lot2, being respectively the first 75 km and subsequent 
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25km.Work commenced, but the project carried the risk of non-completion if Government 
failed to get funding to complete the unfunded 25% in the following budget year.  
On the same project, there was an unpredicted sudden shortage of material. On one occasion 
there was lack of diesel and cement in the country, but the Client expected the Contractor to 
continue preforming. He did not accept this risk which impacted on the cost and completion 
time. As Client, he asked to be indemnified by the Contractor in the Contract.  My 
intervention and persuasion failed to solve this problem because the Client refused to approve 
importation of the materials at a higher price. The Contractor had to absorb the extra cost 
until the materials became available locally. 
 On another occasion in this JPC contract, there was industrial action. There was a labor 
strike because of non-payment; again the Client did not accept responsibility.  This was in 
spite of the fact that the origin of this industrial action was that the Contractor was not 
receiving payment of the Working Capital Advance. The Financier and the Client again 
requested to be indemnified in the Contract for the industrial action. My intervention was to 
recommend an Extension of Time for the Contractor due to this Client-induced industrial 
action. I, however, failed to get the Extension of time, even though the Client was responsible 
for delaying payments. "We do not know anything about Construction risk," claimed the 
Financier and Client. I argued that logically the Client should at least accept and share part of 
this construction Risk because he was responsible for the industrial action by failing to pay 
the Contractor on time. He still wanted to be exonerated of the late payment consequences. 
As shown above, construction risks in the form of cost escalations, working capital advance, 
skills, quality of work and time overruns were unfairly transferred to the Contractor. I continued 
to develop my two overarching themes of managing Financing and Technical capacity as 
collaborative practices that could develop Competence Trust, Contractual Trust, and Goodwill 
Trust. In iterative action and reflection research cycles, I would intervene and this enabled the 
projects to proceed. In the next Section, I will explain some more intervention actions I took to 
manage the projects by balancing Trust and Risk sharing. 
6.5.2 Sharing Project Cost Risk 
 A significant cost risk is price escalation of materials and labour during construction. I found 
that in all the standard contracts there was a basic Materials and Labour cost list. The purpose of 
this list was that if prices went up, the Contractor could claim for the increase by showing the 
price variations compared to those at the start of the project. And the Client would pay. This was 
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the strategy for mutual Cost Risk sharing.  In the first research Project, cost was particularly 
significant because it was a Low-Cost Housing project, meant to benefit low earning 
beneficiaries. The first aspect was that the Contractors had been selected on a bidding basis 
which in itself was a hedge against project Cost risk. Further, Contractors were required to be 
registered with the Confederation of Construction Industries. This registration alone brought 
presumptive Competence Trust throughout the contract implementation because it was assumed 
that the Confederation had vetted the Contractor before registration. The second aspect was that 
the Contractors decided to build Goodwill trust because the Client promised them opportunities 
for future projects by placing them on their list of preferred Contractors. I encouraged and 
nurtured this Goodwill Trust because it reduced construction Costs risk.  The Contractors 
wanted Goodwill Trust; they sacrificed and condoned late payment interest claims and the cost 
of Site security after they had completed the Construction of the houses. They did this in 
expectation of future projects. In contrast in the following 3- Column analysis I show how loss 
of Goodwill Trust and Contractual Trust and failure to mitigate financial risks lead to the 
contract termination 
3- COLUMN ANALYSIS:  The role of Trust in a Project Cost Risk. 
Information Analysis Meetings 
  In the Library 
contract, it was a 
turnkey contract 
   Client  was to pay 
settlement after two years  
   Contractor demanded 
monthly payment contract 
The client started 
other projects in which 
he was paying on a 
monthly basis. Client 
bought a fleet of Cars 
  The Contractor was 
concerned that Client 
would be unable to pay 
after 2years wait. 
Relationship started to be 
positional 
  
 Contractor and 
Quantity Surveyor also  
started arguments on 
rates and quantities for 
compacted foundations  
     The Contractor was 
losing Trust in the Client. 
He felt that all the financial 
risk was being transferred 
to him.   
Contract termination meetings 
started. 
The contract could not proceed.   
 
In this Library project, the Contractor started arguing and showed lack of Trust when he claimed 
under-payment for compaction work done on the foundations. "The Quantity Surveyor has 
unfairly reduced my claim for volume of compacted foundations."  In addition, the Contractor 
was showing signs of losing Trust in future payments by the Client. This was mainly after the 
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Client purchased a fleet of cars for staff and engaged other Contractors on different projects 
where they were being paid on a monthly work done basis. He also wanted his Contract 
amended to a monthly payment Contract instead of a Turnkey contract. "How do I know that I 
will be paid at the end of the Contract if the Client is spending all the money buying a fleet of 
staff vehicles," he asked the Engineer. These arguments were some of the issues that came up 
and were evidence of loss of Trust. The Contract was eventually terminated. This showed that 
where there was no Trust between the Contractor and the Client; each took a defensive and self- 
maximizing position. There was no collaboration and the Client„s risk dumping could not be 
contained by the Contractor. 
In the third research Project, the JPC road project, a Trust relationship to mitigate construction 
start-up Cost risk appeared to be one sided.  First, the Contractor unwillingly accepted a reduced 
Working Capital Advance payment from the Client. Further, the payment took more than ten 
months to be given to the Contractor. Here, most of the financial and construction Risk was 
transferred to the Contractor and Consultant. It made them less productive. Again the contract 
clauses exonerated the Client from this dereliction of his obligations. However, transaction costs 
were saved by transferring the Risk to the Consultant and Contractor because they could not 
claim interest because of their wish to remain in the good books of the Client.  
6.5.3 Sharing Performance and Program Risk 
  One of the significant themes which I identified was competence or performance. This was 
Project performance regarding meeting the product Quality and Program. The performance was 
fundamental to achieving the Project's intended objectives. I found that the three forms of Trust, 
which are, Competence Trust, Contractual Trust and Goodwill Trust, were being used to reduce 
performance risk. To start with, in the JPC contract, for example, the Contractors continued to 
perform in spite of non-payment. In a way, he was carrying the performance Risk.  In the Low-
Cost Housing project, some 8 out of 9 contractors had performed well. I had to intervene and 
take away work from the non-performing Contractor and redistribute it to a better performing 
contractor. The Consultant and Client had lost Trust in the Contractor's Competence and ability 
to complete the project on time.  In the standard Traditional Contracts, the Client was 
compensated for time overruns using "a liquidated delay damage clause."  This Clause passes 
the time overrun Risk from the Client to the Contractor. In reflection, I think that this Clause 
should only be used as a completion time control tool and it should not be punitive. For this 
reason, I supported that its value be minimal in my contracts.  However, this was contrary to the 
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evidence obtained in an interview with the supervising Engineer for Linia Road project. He 
stated that, "I don‟t think the Contractors find liquidated delay damages deterrent enough. 
Perhaps the permitted maximum of 2.5 % liquidated damages payment by the Contractor is too 
low”.  He had found that Contractors were not perturbed by this penalty.  On the other hand, he 
said, the Client sometimes suffers more, from the project completion delays. This is “because 
the loss-of-use could be significant”.  After reflecting I used a different strategy to get the project 
completed on time in other Contracts. In the Low-Cost Housing project, for example, work was 
completed on time by intervening and taking part of it away from one of the slow Contractors 
and giving it to a more capable Contractor who could perform. In the second research project, 
the Library Construction project, the Contractor failed to perform, resulting in the Contract 
being terminated. When a Contract gets terminated, all the three forms of Trust will have been 
lost, and Trust will have failed to mitigate the project implementation Risk. This was shown in 
the Library project at termination because the Contractor moved off-site. There was no 
Contractual Trust as each party began seeking self- maximization and there was also no 
Goodwill Trust because neither side expected to work with the other on future projects. In the 
Library Project, to show lack of any intention by the Contractor to build the three forms of Trust, 
the Client wrote a letter to the State Procurement Board. He stated that "the Contractor did not 
bother to insure the works. He also did not assign qualified personnel to the project, nor did he 
respond to communication and instructions from the supervising team". Such behaviour can 
only be exhibited by someone who has lost all forms of Trust and is not prepared to accept any 
further risk from the project. In the third research project, the JPC road construction project, the 
Consultant, and the Contractor continued to perform despite non-payment. In this case, I 
wondered if it was Goodwill Trust being used to alleviate the financial risks or just that they had 
no alternative. This Risk was being borne entirely by the Consultant and the Contractor.  On 
enquiring from them, I found that they were both keen to retain the Client. It made me infer that 
it was an issue of investing in goodwill, because they worked with the client frequently. 
However it was clear that they were working less efficiently because the contractor applied for 
extension of time to complete the project.  In the site meetings the Client began to realize that 
the project would not be completed on time unless he paid the Contractor and the Consultant. 
Regular and timely payment of the Contractor and Consultant was one measure which could 
enhance construction progress. During the non-payment period it was evident that, the program 
Risk had been transferred from the Client to the Contractor.  In interplay of Trust and Risk 
sharing, the Client suddenly agreed to extend the project completion time.  I inferred that this 
was due to the development of Competence, Contractual and Goodwill Trust between the two.  
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One of the concerns of the Client on this project was that of the experience of the Contractor‟s 
Site staff. This was a case of a low level of Competence Trust and its effect on the Quality of 
work. The solution which was used to maintain the Client‟s confidence and Competence Trust 
was to hedge against product quality risk. This was done by moving this responsibility to the 
Consultant. I negotiated with the Client to reduce the site experience requirement. There was 
noticeable relief on the Contractor when his lack of experience staff risk was reduced by 
combining very experienced Consultant Site staff with the relatively less experienced 
Contractor‟s Site staff. Further the larger foreign company in the JV also contributed 
competence and experienced Site staff to the Joint Venture. This was a collaborative action 
which resulted in risk sharing due to the blurring of contract responsibilities. It can be argued 
that the more experienced the Contractor‟s Site staff were, the more Competence Trust he got 
from the Client and the better the product Quality, Programming and Risk alleviation. Again the 
standard contract clauses show that the Product quality and program risk was allocated to the 
Contractor. Through these iterative action and reflection cycles, Trust was used to alleviate and 
share Risk, resulting in better overall project governance and control.  In the Research project 4, 
the Linia road project, the Client, and Contractor first signed a Relational Public Private 
Partnership Contract. They changed it to a Traditional, standard Construction contract. The fact 
that the two moved to a new contract but did not terminate their engagement meant that they still 
had Competence and Goodwill Trust in each other and what they first thought lacked was 
Contractual Trust in their Relational Contract. They then made a more explicit Traditional 
Contract. However, due to resource constraints on the Client, the Contract was changed back to 
a Public Private Partnership Relational Contract. This is the Contract which was then finally 
used to implement the project. The analysis of the changes from Relational to Traditional and 
finally back to Relational Contract showed that the Client was again passing on Risk to the 
Contractor. He exonerated himself from any project risk and depended on the Trust he had of the 
Contractor.   
6.5.4 Sharing Product Quality Risk 
 Product Quality was an important parameter in all the projects. If the quality of works was right, 
it meant that the product satisfied its intended use and the Client got value for money. In many 
contracts, however, Contractors were asked to demolish poor quality work and reconstruct at 
their own cost.  In the JPC contract, to hedge against poor quality work the Client intervened and 
he demanded to have a full-time Resident Engineer on Site. The Resident Engineer ensured that 
the works were built according to the design and specifications.  However, to share the Quality 
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Risk, the Client demanded a Resident Engineer with more than 20 years' experience because the 
Contractor did not have adequately experienced staff. Also, the Consultant demanded that the 
Contractor should provide a list of all equipment he owned or leased and it had to be adequate. 
This was a pre-contract check of the Contractors' capacity for quality work. During the project 
implementation, the site minutes always had a page on which the Contractor listed his 
equipment and materials on site.  This seemed to be a measure to establish Competence Trust. 
From the balance of evidence, there appeared to be justification in allocating this equipment 
Risk to the Contractor as he knew more about the methods of construction and the equipment 
required. In fairness in my analysis, the materials availability risk should have been shared 
between the Client and the Contractor. A case in point is when there were national materials 
shortages such as the time the Contractor could not procure diesel and cement locally. The 
materials shortage risk was offloaded to the Contractor. Workmanship and Quality Risk which 
was also allocated to the Contractor was on action and reflection, reduced by regularly testing 
the construction materials and workmanship. The Consultant seemed not to carry any 
workmanship and quality Risk. He could ask the Contractor to demolish unsatisfactory work. 
This was in spite of him being present and the supervisor during construction. I argued that the 
product quality risk should have been shared between the Consultant and the Contractor, instead 
of wholly leaving this risk with the Contractor as was done in all the Contracts.   
6.5.5 Moving from Trust to Risk sharing 
In the last Section 6.5.4, I showed how the research revealed that the Cost, Quality, and Program 
of a project were collaboratively enhanced through a Trust relationship and Risk-sharing 
between the Client, Consultant, and Contractor.  In this Section, I show how my theme moved 
from just creating Trust to sharing Risk. Thus, I reflected that to overcome the issues that were 
stalling progress the two themes of Finance matters and Technical capacity required that I 
make changes within the Contract management practice itself. I had to create inter-entity 
Trust through collaborative practices first and then move from Trust to Risk sharing. I 
reflected on the initial research question which was: How do Trust Relationships affect the 
construction project management with respect to Cost, Program and Quality? 
       Plainly the research had answered that there are 3 forms of Trust, namely Competence 
Trust, Contractual Trust and Goodwill Trust which must be created through collaborative 
practices between the Client, Consultant and the Contractor for efficient construction project 
performance. In the first instance, these three forms of Trust were shown to practically affect 
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the three fundamental parameters of cost, time and quality in project management. Further 
the research emerged with collaborative practices that could create Trust and enhance 
efficient project implementation by sharing inherent and emergent Risk between the project 
participants. As the study proceeded, the evidence had shown that the purpose of creating 
Trust was not only to manage the projects with respect to cost, time and quality, but also to 
mitigate construction Risks. In the process and sometimes unfairly, Risk had been allocated 
to the Contractor and the Consultant by the Client in that order of magnitude.  I argued that 
construction Risk needs to be shared equitably by the four project participants, who now 
also included the Financier. I, therefore, found myself not just studying how Trust could be 
created, but how from a manager's position, Trust could be used to deal with issues of 
finance and technical capacity Risk.The literature review showed that there has been interest 
in detailed research in inter-entity Trust building. Most of it, however, has concentrated on the 
social aspect of Trust, particularly at a personal level.  In this study I scanned the literature for 
studies of Trust in construction contracts in Zimbabwe and Malawi. I found no literature or a 
research attempting to bring Trust relationships to the fore in construction projects. As stated 
before, the emphasis had been on transactional interactions. Due to this, the interplay between 
Trust and Risk sharing was understated. I studied the numerous clauses in the Standard and 
Relational Contracts. These clauses required each party, in particular, the Client to be 
indemnified from specific project occurrences. In the following Tables 5.1 to 5.3, I show the 
forms of Trust which were required by each referent and the evidence of the Risk mitigation by 
the Contractor, Consultant or Client.  Thus, after identifying the three types of Trust as 
Competence, Contractual and Goodwill Trust, I suddenly realised that project construction 
progress was determined by how the various construction Risks could be made palatable 
using these three forms of Trust. Further, I found that there was a deliberate effort by the 
Client to transfer most of the Construction Risk to the Contractor. I learnt that managing 
Working Capital Advance, timely payments, the experience of Site Staff and frequently or a 
history of previously working together were the collaborative practices that could be used to 
create Trust and alleviate Risk. My interviews, contract documents, meetings and artifacts 
provided the evidence in Tables 5.1 to 5.3 below. The tables show the Trust that was 
generated by collaborative practices centered on the two final themes. This is the Trust that 
was required to ease the underlying intrinsic Risk. In the last column, I show and clarify    
the action taken by the Financier, Client, Consultant or Contractor as evidence to mitigate 
Risk.  In latter sections I criticize some of the actions taken and I try to bring change, for 
example the requirement for irrevocable Bank guarantees for Advance payment. I attempted 
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to have this Guarantee requirement substituted with regular insurance cover. I was 
unsuccessful because this was rejected by the Clients.  I however came up with the idea of 
pre-purchasing some materials by the Client and this worked because the project work could 
commence.   
Table 5.1: Evidence of Competence Trust, Collaborative Practices and 
Risk mitigation 
Item Processual Building of 
Trust required 
Intrinsic 
Contract Risk  
   Current and proposed Risk 
Mitigating Processes 
1 Contractor Competence Competence 
Risk 
1. Submitted Performance Bond  
2. Submit List of previous works  
3. Long experience for Site Staff  
4. Listed Equipment owned or 
leased by the Contractor. 
5. Registration with 
Confederation of Construction 
Industry was required 
2  Consultant Competence Competence 
Risk 
1.  Due diligence of Consultant 
Qualification pursued. 
2. Registration with Professional 
body was required 
3. List of previous similar 
projects done was provided 
4. Many of years‟ Experience 
5. Professional indemnity cover 
6. Redistributed work from a 
non-performing Contractor 
3 Client Competence Competence 
Risk 
1. Contract Signature 
2. Letter of Credit to Contractor 
3. Disclosure of the Loan 
Arrangements with Financiers 
4. Previous project record 
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The above table shows some Practices that can be used by the Client, Consultant and 
Contractor to ensure competence for the project. For the Client, I proposed four discerning 
practices to enforce his competence. These were based on creating Trust in the Clients‟ 
ability to manage the financial issues. Importantly, I proposed use of a letter of credit to the 
Contractor to ensure payment. 
 
Table 5.2:  Evidence of Contractual Trust, Collaborative Practices and Risk 
mitigation 
Item  Processual Building 
of Trust required 
Intrinsic 
Contract Risk 
Current and proposed Risk 
Mitigating Processes  
1 Contractor Contractual 
Trust 
Contractual Risk 1. Reduce Indemnity Clauses.  
2.  Put Contingencies Sum in 
BOQ 
3.  Include Contract amendment 
Clauses 
4. Force Majeure Contract 
Clause to be included 
2  Consultant Contractual 
Trust 
Contractual Risk 1. Reduce Indemnity  Clauses 
2. To be Registered with 
professional body 
3 Client Contractual Trust Contractual Risk 1. Rectify late or non-payment  
2. Reduce Indemnity  Clauses 
3. Pay Working Capital 
Advance.  
 
 
The above Table 5.2 focuses on some collaborative and risk sharing Practices that I used to 
build the Client‟s, Consultant‟s and Contractor‟s contractual confidence and Trust. These 
practices emphasize a reduction of indemnity clauses that exonerate the Client from any risk, 
as a collaborative practice.  Financial issues and in particular Working Capital Advance 
Payment (WCA) surfaced as an overarching theme. There was significant project 
construction progress in the Low Cost Housing project and the JPC road project when WCA 
was made available. 
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Table 5.3: Evidence of Goodwill Trust, Collaborative Practices and Risk 
mitigation 
Item  Processual Building 
of Trust  required 
  Intrinsic 
Contract Risk 
 Current and proposed Risk Mitigating 
Processes 
1 Contractor Goodwill 
Trust 
Goodwill Risk 1. Reduced Transaction Costs 
2. No Claim for Contractor idle time 
3.  Client forgiven for reasonable 
late payment Interest 
4. Reduction of self- maximization 
and illegitimate claims. 
5.  Contractor and Consultant valued 
the history and frequency of 
working together with the Client  
2  Consultant Goodwill 
Trust 
Goodwill Risk 1. Condonation for reasonable late    
payment interest 
2. Registration on Client‟s list of 
approved Consultants. 
3 Client Goodwill Trust Goodwill Risk 1.  Liquidated delay damages were 
pardoned 
2. Materials Pre-purchase Facility 
3.  Put on approved Contractor or 
suppliers list 
 
The above Table 5.3 focuses on some collaborative and risk sharing Practices which I 
inferred as depending on intangible Goodwill trust. This Trust was making the Contractors in 
particular assume excessive levels of risk, for example the JPC road contract continued to 
work for 10 months without payment. He had an option to stop work, but expressed his 
confidence and Trust in the Client by saying that he trusted that the Client would eventually 
pay. He was indeed paid and the project rate of progress improved. The collaborative practice 
that I found above encouraged Goodwill trust. They brought to the fore the overarching 
themes of financial issues and technical capacity building. 
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6.6   Summary of findings 
In the above Section I have flagged my surprising results, how they agree or disagree with 
previous research and current practice.  More details are given later in Table 6 where I reflect on 
what I have learned in the study and how I should manage the interplay between trust and risk in 
construction projects.     
As stated earlier, this was the first Participant Action research which showed that inter-entity trust 
between the Client, Consultant and Contractor could be used to alleviate project construction 
risk in Malawi and Zimbabwe. 
  The study went through 3 cycles of enquiry. I started with a focus on motivating relational 
contracts because I had observed too many projects that were left incomplete. I also wished 
Zimbabwe and Malawi to benefit from infrastructure projects created through these relational 
contracts. I then shifted my focus to building Trust. I found ways of creating Trust which 
could improve construction project progress. These ways of building Trust are explained in 
thematic areas which were clustered to two overarching themes on financial issues and 
technical Capacity of the Contractors.  I summarise that from the evidence collected in my 
five projects, the two thematic constraints of financial issues and technical capacity impacted 
significantly on the project progress. The economic fragility of the two countries and lack of 
loan financing facilities encouraged the wholesale transfer of construction project risks from 
the Client to the Contractor. Finally in a third cycle of enquiry, I uncovered that the 
Contractors were accepting Working Capital Advance (WCA) payment risk, inexperienced 
Site staff risk and non-payment risk by investing heavily and voluntarily in Goodwill Trust in 
anticipation of future work from the same Clients. This benevolence was making the projects 
proceed, but on a less effective trajectory. Thus, although they were mitigating these Risks 
through Trust building, the WCA, Non-payment and inexperienced Site staff were a primary 
constraint to efficient project implementation.  In some cases it led to project failure in these 
countries. Hence my argument was for change in construction contract management practice by 
developing collaborative methods in WCA, regular payments, Technical capacity through 
frequently working together and thus creating Trust and sharing Risk equitably. 
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CHAPTER 7 
REFLECTIONS: MEMORIES, LEARNING, AND INTENTIONS 
In the previous chapter, I showed that suddenly during my study I found out that the whole 
purpose of creating Trust was to mitigate Risks in Project Cost, Program, and Quality. Most 
of this Risk was being unfairly allocated to the Contractor. Clients and Consultants were 
shirking away from their obligations. Osipova (2006), in a detailed study of the Swedish 
construction projects showed that risk sharing and risk management was superior in Design-
Build and Partnership projects. It was a problem in Traditional standard contracts because of 
the principal-agent and positional relationship. However there was no literature that sought 
to link trust and asymmetric risk allocation. I wanted to establish the importance of this link 
and how risk symmetry could be improved with Trust. First I proceeded to list the evidence 
that showed how Trust was mitigating Risk in my Projects. I then summarized my findings 
from the deliberate action I took. I reflected and recollected that there were two overarching 
themes from my clustering of themes. The first theme was on financial issues, comprising 
Working Capital advance and timely payments. The second theme was on Technical 
capacity issues, which included Site staff experience and the effect of frequently working 
together. A third theme had emerged on how to use collaborative practices to create trust and 
share Risk. In this final Chapter, I present what I learned and my recommendations on how 
to deal with these construction Risks using Trust. The Risk factors arose from project 
financial matters like non-payment or late payment of Working Capital Advance and the 
need for technical capacity. I also reflect on how I can work differently on construction 
projects with the new practices I developed. I examined the evidence I had from the 
interviews and other artifacts that Contractors were behaving in a collaborative manner 
because they wanted to complete the projects and be in the Clients‟ good books for future 
projects. The main practices that I developed meant that Contractors should be paid WCA 
before moving to site and subsequently be paid regularly as they progressed. This 
displayed the capacity of the Client to fulfill his contractual and performance obligations, 
in other words tangible solutions that depended less on benevolence and good will. In the 
LCH and JPC contractor I observed that after failure of the Contractors to get irrevocable 
bank guarantees that would release the WCA, the construction work could not commence. 
It‟s only after negotiations were carried out by the consultant that resulted in the Client 
pre-purchasing materials for permanent incorporation in the works that work commenced. 
Thus the pre-purchase facility comes out as a practical option to the WCA. By way of a 
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paradigm shift, it should be incorporated in contract documents and in some ways it will 
reduce dependence on Goodwill trust by the Contractor, which had led to him being 
punitively or less fairly treated. 
7.1 Risk Management and proposed change of current practice 
The risk parameters and the proposed change of current construction management 
methods are directed towards six aspects. Below, I list these parameters and the lessons 
learnt and risk management methods. I also show the actionable knowledge created and 
proposed change of practice that follows: 
1) The research showed that there should be Risk sharing as opposed to risk allocation 
between the Financier, Client, Consultant, and Contractor. The current tendency had 
been to transfer all construction risks to the Contractor. The first lesson learnt out of 
this research is to have collaborative practices that balance the inter-play between 
Trust and Risk. 
2) A financial paradigm shift is required, and this includes a reduction of the Working 
Capital Advance payment Guarantee requirements or acceptance of regular Insurance 
to cover advance money paid to the Contractor. Payment of the Working Capital 
Advance reduced tension; it created Trust and spread the Risk. The second lesson 
learnt is that the Client and the Contractor should share project start-up risk. The 
current practice was that the Contractor would bear the burden by seeking loan funds 
directly or through expensive irrevocable bank guarantees. 
3)  The research showed that a collaborative and risk sharing practice was to institute a 
pre-purchase of construction Materials by the Client at the start of the project. These 
materials would be free issued to the Contractor for permanent incorporation into the 
works. Issuing the Materials was a collaborative practice which generated Trust and 
reduced project capitalization and cost escalation Risk for the Contractor. 
4)  Another lesson learnt was that a good practice was to change the start date of 
construction contracts from the date of contract signing to the time of payment of the 
Advance in Traditional contracts. In the Relational contracts the start date of the 
Contract should be changed to the date of release of the first tranche of financing. 
Synchronisation of the construction start date and contract start date was a 
collaborative practice which created Trust and reduced the Risk of program overruns. 
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5)  A paradigm shift is also required by reducing the mandatory 20-year experience 
required for the Contractor's Site staff to only 5 to 10 ten years. This is because of the 
lack of skills locally and the brain-drain in developing countries.  The Product 
quality risk with trusted but less experienced Contractor site staff would be reduced 
if the Consultant collaboratively provided more experienced Resident Engineers. 
Consultants generally have more experienced staff than Contractors. 
6)   The sixth and final practice to be adopted was to have a direct payment 
system to sub–Contractors and Equipment suppliers. This practice reduced Main 
Contractor and Sub-Contractor conflicts. It created Trust and reduced Program time 
overrun risk.   .   
The study questioned the tripartite competence on financial issues and technical 
capacity to manage construction projects. Competence trust was defined as the 
confidence in the ability of the Client, Contractor and the Consultant to perform the 
construction contract obligations.  The competence of the Client and Financier to finance 
the Project has always been taken for granted. In this research, this position has been 
questioned. The Contractors demanded the Client to fully disclose his funding capacity 
and provide a funding guarantee in favour of the Contractor.  Goodwill trust was found 
to reduce transaction costs considerably and to avert litigation between the Contractor 
and the Client. However, the research also found that the Contractors in all the projects 
were sometimes being forced to punitively invest in Goodwill trust beyond good 
business sense. In some cases they were being taken advantage of and treated harshly. 
Thus the pre-purchase facility surfaced as a practical option to the WCA. By way of a 
paradigm shift some of the practices discussed above for example the WCA payment, 
regular payment arrangements and prepurchase of materials facility should be 
incorporated in the contract clauses in future Contracts. This will reduce dependence on 
goodwill which was leading to the contractors sometimes being treated punitively and 
performing their work less competently. The evidence is shown in the LCH and JPC 
Projects when the Contractors threatened to move off site.     . 
7.2 Construction Contract Management Trend 
The extant literature review showed that there is a movement towards collaboration and 
partnering between Clients, Consultants, Contractors, and Financiers. There have been 
many researchers after Macneil's' (1974) seminal presentation of the theory of Relational 
contract norms. Trust is at the core of Relational Contracting. The research disclosed that 
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the very process of detailed contractually enforceable indemnity Clauses destroys Trust. 
These indemnity or disclaimer clauses should be substituted with Trust, which is a 
voluntary acceptance of vulnerability in contracts. In the literature, I found no contextual 
study based on Action Research of construction project management constraints in sub-
Sahara African countries. This study thus gave insight into possible collaborative 
practices that can result if there is tripartite Trust in construction projects in Zimbabwe 
and Malawi. It emerged that emphasis should be on Risk sharing as opposed to Risk 
Allocation. The evidence showed that the Contractors were unfairly allocated most of 
the Risk. Further, there had been no study to show how creating of Trust can be a 
powerful tool to mitigate risk.  Contractors were giving informal Contractual, 
Competence and Goodwill Trust to the Client and accepting vulnerability beyond good 
business sense to achieve cost savings, program and quality control in the construction 
projects.   In principle, I argued that the four stakeholders consisting of the Financier, 
Client, Consultant, and Contractor must accept vulnerability due to the action of others 
and through the collaborative practices described above; they can manage the interplay 
between Trust and risk sharing. In this paradigm shift, there is no room for indemnity 
clauses.   
It emerged that Relational, PPP, contracting is based on Trust and expectation of 
decisive action from the trusted party. On the other hand, standard Traditional Contracts 
in the construction sector are based on short-term economic transactions guided by a Bill 
of Quantities. Blois (1990) argued that Networks theory requires that all the costs of 
contracting, construction and project coordination be captured and be paid in the short 
term. Analysis, however, showed that it was practically impossible to define and cost all 
the potential construction contingencies. These contingencies were the risks in the 
construction projects. 
 Trust was required to lessen the contingencies' negative impacts on progress. In 
the Low-Cost Housing project, the Contractors trusted and accepted that deferred 
payments would be paid later. Further, no interest claims were made on outstanding 
amounts by the Contractor. This was inferred as acceptance of vulnerability and 
contingent risk sharing on the part of the Contractor. This was an investment in 
Goodwill Trust because this cost-saving behaviour was in expectation of future repeat 
work. In a way, Trust was used as an informal cost control and contract governance tool. 
There is, however, formalized risk allocation and enforceable disclaimer clauses in 
Traditional standard contracts. The research showed that in cases where there are too 
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many exculpatory clauses these become unfair and punitive. They do not enhance 
performance.  
7.3 Practical Actionable Knowledge Contribution 
The research contributed practically by showing that construction contracts should be 
based on optimum Trust and Risk sharing relationships. The threefold Trust identified in 
the study can be used in a processual manner to manage project Risks. There is no option 
but to accept Risk and share it equitably through trust relationships. In an interview, a 
Client summed up the issue of risk sharing with the Contractor by stating that "As 
clients, we are prepared to pre-purchase materials for permanent incorporation into our 
project because there is less risk even if the Contractor is dismissed, we will retain our 
materials." This showed the need for a paradigm shift for the Clients to start Risk sharing 
instead of the current Risk allocation attitude. Both Relational and standard Traditional 
contracts often have some construction risk issues omitted or left unsaid in the Contracts 
because it is not possible to foresee all future risks and contingencies before project 
commencement. These omissions must be accepted as vulnerability. Attempts to 
document and formalize Trust based on mid-tenure contract amendments were not taken 
positively by participants in the Library and Moni projects. They were considered as 
calculative or enhancing self-interests and being positional. Even in the Traditional 
standard contracts, such amendments will have to be on a win-win philosophy.  
 In the two developing African countries that I studied, there is a brain- drain for greener 
pastures to developed countries. Thus it is challenging to find professional, skilled and 
experienced site staff such as Engineers, Architects, and Quantity Surveyors. This is the 
current burden of developing countries and to get both the Consultant and the Contractor 
to have local Site staff with over 20 years' experience was difficult. However, the 
practical solution was to balance the Consulting Engineer's Site staff experience with 
marginally experienced Contractor's Site Staff. This can be done for ten years until the 
local Construction industry has built experience and capacity. Also, as a practical 
contribution, local Contractors and Consultants were advised to go into  win-win Joint 
Ventures with well-established International Contractors and Consultants to boost their 
skills, experience and for technology transfer. Another recommendation out of this 
research was to start Retired Engineers Voluntary organisations.  Such Organisations are 
common in the first world but non-existent in the study countries. There are now 
threshold numbers of retired Engineers, Architects, and other professionals to establish 
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these volunteer organisations. The retired Engineers and Allied Professionals with many 
years' experience can then mentor going concerns of Contracting and Consulting firms 
for a nominal tax-free allowance. Their incentive would be to leave a legacy of 
professionalism in the industry. 
Another practical contribution was to include financial disclosure and a letter of credit 
in favour of the Contractor, in the Construction contract document. This will guarantee 
payment of the Contractor or Consultant by a Bank on terms, conditions and stages agreed 
before the Contract.  This is because it was noted that Clients, mainly Public Sector Clients 
do not settle both the Contractor's and Consultant's invoices on time.  As seen from the 
research, some Clients even accept the late payment interest charges but subsequently 
offset them by invoking the liquidated delay charges clause to the Contractor for late 
completion. This leads to the question, who should pay for an extension of completion 
time costs due to late payment by the Client? The current Standard Contracts state that the 
only remedy for late payment is for the Contractor to charge the Client interest costs. 
However, this does not compensate the Contractor for the cost of accelerating or getting 
additional human and equipment resources to complete the works on time. The standard 
Government of Malawi contracts do not even permit Contractors to slow down work due 
to non-payment. The only solution was to claim interest for late payment or to terminate 
the agreement. This again reflected the attitude of shifting all the capital and payment risks 
to the Contractor.  In this Chapter 7, Table 6 below, I link the generally accepted key 
success factors for construction projects with the risks. The key success factors constitute 
“the iron triangle” of Cost, Program and Quality. I collated all the risks which I had 
identified earlier in Chapter 6 to include WCA, timely payments, material shortages, 
equipment shortages, contract start or completion date, tripartite competence and staff 
experience. The collaborative risk management action taken is shown in the last Column. 
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Table 6: Project Key Success Factors showing the identified Risks and solution 
Item Key 
Success 
Factor 
Identified Risk Risk Management Action 
1 Cost Working Capital Advance 
payment risk 
Reduce  the WCA from 25% to 10% 
and the pay-on-demand criterion 
Regular/timely payment 
risk 
Timely payments to Consultant and 
Contractor. 
Paying  interest on 
delayed payments risk 
Contractor to condone reasonable 
interest payment to create Goodwill. 
The Client to reciprocate by placing 
the Contractor on his list of preferred 
service providers. 
Risk of the Client failing 
to pay the Contractor and 
Consultant. 
Client should disclose financial 
capacity and issue a letter of credit to 
the Contractor and Consultant  
guaranteeing payment 
Subcontractors‟ poor  
works progress and 
conflicts with Main 
Contractor 
 Subcontractors to be paid directly by 
Client to avoid conflicts with Main 
Contractor. 
2 Program  Contract Start date risk 
 
Contract  start should  be on the date of 
receipt of first payment and not date of  
contract signing 
Completion date risk and Client to share emergent delays, 
particularly those caused by delay in 
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overruns. payment to the Contractor 
Liquidated delay Damages 
risk 
Raise payable liquidated delay damage 
amount so that Contractors are forced 
to complete as per program. Enforce 
payment of idle time to Contractors so 
that Clients pay Contractors on time. 
3 Quality Consultant and Contractor 
Competence risks 
Consultant and Contractor to be 
registered with Board of Engineers, 
Architects‟ Council, National 
Construction Industry Confederation 
Site Staff  Experience risk Reduced Contractor experience to be 
compensated by more experienced 
Resident Site Engineers. Establish 
voluntary Retired Engineers, 
Architects, and other construction 
industry experts Organisation to 
mentor going concerns. 
Materials national 
shortage and importation 
cost escalation 
 Create Materials Basic Price list at 
start of project. Client to share 
emergent national materials shortages, 
delays and cost escalation due to 
importation. Engineer to ensure 
Quality, through testing. 
 
The table shows that processual collaborative practices based on the two overarching themes 
of finance and capacity can be used to manage construction projects so that they are 
completed at optimum cost, with good quality outputs and within program. 
7.4 Final Interviews 
I carried out some final round of interviews with some well- known and experienced Clients, 
Consultants, Contractors, and Financiers at the end of my thesis write-up.   These experts gave 
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their suggestions and opinions on my findings. The interviews lead me to refine and improve the 
quality of my proposed new collaborative practices to manage the interplay between Trust and 
construction risk. In an interview, a well-established Contractor said "Regarding construction 
risk, currently most of the risk is with us. For example, when the Client delays to pay, the 
Contractor is blamed for lack of project progress and all the time overruns". 
  I also found that the Contractors reluctantly accepted the Client's request for some Guarantees 
for Working Capital Advance, but demanded less onerous conditions. Further, they welcomed 
the free-issue of pre-purchased construction materials instead of Working Capital Advance. The 
Contractors also preferred regular insurance Bonds for WCA, Performance and Bidding because 
they are more affordable. They argued that the irrevocable Bank Guarantees were expensive, 
unattainable and unnecessarily increased the Cost of the project. In response to cases of non- 
payment Risk which they were carrying, the Contractors demanded full disclosure of the Clients' 
financial capacity and payment arrangements, such as a letter of credit in their favour as part of 
the contract clauses.  
7.5 Research Limitations 
There were four research limitations to the Study. 
The first limitation was that Action research can be emotive and in this study, some caution 
had to be exercised so that the investigation was not seen as supporting a particular 
participant's position. I was a participant researcher studying the inter-entity trust in projects I 
was working on. For example when I requested the Client to extend the start date until the 
Advance payment had been made; this was seen as concessionary and being supportive of the 
Contractor's capacity limitations. 
 The second research limitation was that the evaluation of the Trust continuum was difficult; 
its presence had to be inferred from the evidence and the relevant party‟s reaction to the 
deliberate action I took. For example by accepting punitive conditions such as irrevocable 
bank guarantees, was the contractor investing in goodwill or was it just that he had no option? 
The third research limitation was that, of the five research projects selected, some of them 
could not be taken to their full completion during the research tenure and some deductive 
conclusions had to be made. 
7.6 Suggestions of other Action Research Interventions 
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In this section, I give my research reflections. I mention the things that I wish I had 
done in the research and a possible direction for future analysis based on the weaknesses of 
my study. I also flag what I think still has to be learned on Financier, Client, Consultant and 
Contractor Trust relationships and Risk management in construction projects. 
This research was done from the Consultant's Action Research viewpoint. The first 
suggestion for future research is to have the Client as Participant Action Researcher. This is 
because as a significant project stakeholder, the Client can take more deliberate action after 
synthesizing the problems.  It was not easy for me as a Consultant Action researcher to take 
some steps which could impact on the Contracts without courting the Clients' resistance. I 
wish I could have been more aggressive in some of the deliberate action I took, but my hands 
were tied with the general conditions of the contract I had to administer. For example, the 
Client totally rejected my proposal to use ordinary insurance for the Contractor to access the 
Working Capital Advance.  Secondly, some Clients refused to align the contract start date 
with the date of receipt of the Working Capital Advance. These Clients insisted on the 
contract offer and acceptance letter signature date as the Contract effective date.   
Secondly, I wished I had literature on collaboration, trust and risk management 
carried out with the Contractor as the Participant Action Researcher. As observed in the 
study, the Contractor's progress was affected by late payments, competence and the need to 
build goodwill Trust. Insight on how these overarching themes affect Trust in the contract 
could have been appreciated if there was research with the Contractor as the Participant 
Action Researcher.  The Contractor made some concessions by condoning for example, late 
payments. One wonders what the business sense was in this. When I sought an answer the 
Contractor responded that it was a marketing strategy to get future repeat jobs. A Contractor 
Participant Action Researcher would have tried other alternatives, for example, a proviso 
committing the Client to definitely consider him for future work. 
  My third direction for future research comes from the fact that this study focused on two 
overarching themes as summarized below:  
a) Financial matters which included working capital advance, client pre-purchase of 
materials and timely payments. 
b) Building trust between parties and mitigating project risks in cost, quality, and 
performance using appropriate Site skills, experience and a history of frequently 
working together. 
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These two groups of themes are what could be triangulated from the five projects studied.  
However, they were by no means exhaustive and hence the suggestions that the Client or 
Contractor's viewpoint may yield more factors that have significant influence in building 
Trust in a construction project. 
Developing countries have a particular problem in trying to attract local Private Finance 
Initiatives. In spite of the mantra that “we can do it for ourselves”, most, if not all of the 
Private Investment in PPP projects in Zimbabwe and Malawi is Foreign Direct Investment. 
For this reason, my fourth suggestion for future research is a detailed contextual research 
focusing mainly on the role of Trust and how it can be used to attract Foreign Direct 
Investment and Private Finance Investment in construction projects in these two countries. 
The Financiers' inter-entity Trust with the tripartite in both Relational and standard 
Traditional contracts was looked at only superficially in this research. The emphasis was on 
effective collaborative practices to build Trust and share construction risk between the 
Client, Consultant and Contractor tripartite. However, the Financiers' influence on 
construction projects cannot be under-estimated. It is precisely due to lack of Trust that 
Financiers put stringent requirements on the procurement of the Consultant and the 
Contractor. The Financier carried out due diligence and wanted to have confidence and Trust 
not only in the Borrower, but in the Consultant and Contractor as well. The Client was 
acquiescent to the Financier and had to keep asking for the Financier‟s “no objection” on 
every step of the contract. Thus, a Participant Action Research by a Funding Agency is a 
fifth suggestion. The sixth suggestion is to research how Clients‟ commitments to paying the 
Contractor and Consultants can be more stringently incorporated in the general conditions of 
contract for the two countries. Evidence from interviews suggested letters of credit, but this 
needs to be researched further. Some Clients, particularly Public or semi-Public sector 
Clients start projects without adequate financial resources or arrangements, just to be seen to 
be fulfilling their Public mandate. This leads to Contractors and Consultants failing to get 
paid for work done and resorting to expensive and resource consuming litigation.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter I conclude and show the road map I followed till I got some actionable 
practices of project management using collaboration, trust and risk sharing.   
8. Concluding comments 
The initial research question was:  How do inter-organisational Trust 
relationships affect construction project management with respect to Cost, Time and 
Quality? 
In the previous Chapter, I discussed the recommendations and practical 
contributions to construction project management. I summarized the construction risks 
and how they could be mitigated. 
The chronological order of the research is that I first carried out a Literature 
Review. This literature review revealed the existing body of knowledge on the role of 
Trust in construction projects.  Details of my Research Design and Method are 
contained in Chapter 3. The Data Collection and Investigation is in Chapter 4. I 
purposively selected five projects to carry out the research as a participant action 
researcher. I collected data from interviews, contract documents, site meeting minutes 
and other artifacts. After this, I coded, analysed and re-analysed the data to come up 
with actionable problem solutions. In my Chapter 5, I show how I combined 54 
respondent- focused themes to just two, which centered on Project Capital and 
Contractor capacity. I used 3-column analysis and the Gioia methodology to cluster the 
themes. In Chapter 6, I explained how I developed collaborative practices to build and 
balance Trust with Risk sharing in construction projects. In Chapter 7, I reflected on 
what I had learnt and went into detail on lessons learnt in creating Trust and its use in 
Risk management. I came up with possible efficiency motivated changes of the current 
construction project management practice. In this final Chapter 8, I present my 
conclusions and how I can use these collaborative practices to manage construction 
projects better.  
In summary, the research investigated the processual development of collaborative 
practices that build Trust and share Risk in construction projects.  It defined the 
sources of Trust as coming from Competence, Contract documents, and Goodwill. The 
iterative action and reflection led to me intervening in the project management. I 
emphasized on Trust building and Risk-sharing between the Client, Consultant, and the 
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Contractor. In sub-Sahara Africa there was no previous study on building Trust to 
manage Risk. The research contributed to the body of knowledge by revealing how 
Trust can be built and used to alleviate Risks in construction projects. It examined the 
building of Trust through Working Capital advance payment, Timely payment, Site 
staff, contract Start dates, indemnity Clauses and equitable Risk sharing. These 
collaboration dynamics affected the key project success factors of Cost, Quality and 
Time. 
 The experimental interventions had positive results. For example the free-issue of 
construction materials pre-purchased by the Client obviated the need for the difficult to 
get Working Capital advance payment. The Materials free-issued to the Contractor 
enabled the project to commence.  The cost of the free-issued materials was later 
subtracted from the Contract price when the Contractor submitted Invoices for work 
done. The research showed that Trust could be used to manage construction Risk in 
these Contracts. Further, Risk sharing required that Clients should stop using punitive 
and risk exonerating indemnity clauses which unfairly burden the Consultant and 
Contractor.   
The Results from the interviews done at the end of the research came up with a 
proposal to establish some Engineers, Architects, and Allied Professionals Retired 
Volunteer Organisations.  Such an organisation can be used to mentor and build 
capacity in ongoing Client, Consultant and Contractor organisations. The Retired 
Volunteer Organizations do not exist in Zimbabwe and Malawi.  
 The learnt lessons from the research have positive and practical implications on 
how projects can be managed in developing countries. These are countries which have 
loan finance and technical capacity limitations. Another change in practice resulting from 
deliberate action taken during the JPC contract was to reduce the Working Capital 
Advance quantum from 25% to 10%. However, substitution of a pay-on-demand bank 
guarantee with regular insurance cover was rejected by the Clients. Nevertheless, Clients 
accepted a change in practice by agreeing to trust and share start-up risk by adopting a 
materials pre-purchase facility and making timely payments to the Contractor. Thirdly, 
the analysis showed that the demand for 20 year experienced Site staff is not justified and 
technical capacity of local Contractors can be increased using Joint Ventures. The Action 
Research results were not conclusive on the demand for extension of project completion 
time caused by Client delays in paying Working Capital Advance. Further, fixing the start 
date of the Contract to the date of the payment of the Advance was also not conclusively 
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agreed between the Client and the Contractor. The evidence was that interest payments 
were the only remedy for late payment of Contractor invoices and that the contract start 
date is the date of the acceptance letter from the Client. Finally, it emerged that Clients 
were shirking from Risk by failing to fulfil their contractual obligations. The Clients and 
Financiers were exonerating themselves from project construction risk using indemnity 
and disclaimer Clauses in the standard Contracts.  The research recommended a change in 
practice. This would be by building Trust relationships and sharing of the construction 
risks  
The above recommendations appear neat and logical, but I admit that the research 
continues to affect my practice. I will carry on the enquiry in practice and refining the 
positive outputs from the research by managing Financial and Technical issues in 
construction. My action research interventions for example, to remove Bank 
guarantees for Advance payment and use normal project insurance failed to give 
positive results. I remain excited with finding other ways of reducing unfair risk 
allocation to the Contractor and Consultant, and dropping some of the Client risk 
exonerating clauses. The focus on future research should be to find more collaborative 
practices that improve construction contract management through equitable sharing of 
risk. 
 
    END 
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APPENDIX 1 
 PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
1. Title of Study 
  Building Trust and managing Risk between the Client, Consultant and Contractor in 
Traditional and Relational Construction Projects 
2. Invitation Paragraph 
My name is Caleb Makwiranzou, a Doctoral Candidate at the University of Liverpool.  
I am carrying out a research on Client- Consultant- Contractor relations and Construction 
project management. 
This is purely an academic exercise for my Doctoral Thesis. My Thesis supervisor is Dr. 
Caroline Ramsey of the University of Liverpool.  Her contact e-mail is 
caroline.ramsey@liverpool.ac.uk 
My research will focus on Client, Consultant and Contractor relationship issues in 
construction projects. 
 I am seeking participants to engage in this research, and I would like to ask you to be 
involved in this project.  
I undertake to make all participants anonymous. 
I will appreciate it if you can take 5- 10 minutes of your time to read this Participant 
Information Sheet. 
If you would like to participate, I have also attached a Consent Form. You can sign the 
Consent Form with the full knowledge that any potential professional and commercial 
risks or discomforts associated with this Study will be minimal.  
3.  Are there any risks in taking part? 
Potential risks in this study could be confidentiality, professional or commercial 
relationships. These have been addressed as follows: 
 To protect participant confidentiality, I will provide anonymity to participants‟ 
responses. You will not be identified by name or company in the research thesis. 
 To minimize professional risk, no assessment will be made or published on whether 
professional colleagues are right or wrong. This research will not be evaluative in 
any way. 
  To reduce commercial risk, all observations and responses that I get from you will be 
in the strictest confidence and I will not divulge any information of commercial 
value. 
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 To minimize embarrassment or discomfort, I will protect your identity. I will 
personally and individually seek your comments on my analysis of what we will 
have discussed. 
 To minimize the risk of potential souring of current Client, Consultant and Contractor 
relations, I will avoid discussion on personal conflicts and antagonism on any of your 
Projects. Our discussion should be open but respectful. 
4. What is the purpose of the study? 
a) The purpose of the study is to discover the important relational issues between a 
Client, a Consultant and a Contractor (tripartite) in a typical infrastructure 
Construction Project. The research will be carried out in Zimbabwe and Malawi. 
b) Action Research will be used to determine how relational issues can enhance project 
success or mitigate contractual gridlock. 
c) The outcome of the research can give insight on how to align project participants‟ 
relations to ensure good project quality and its timeous completion within budget. 
d) The overall  aim of the research is to contribute to the body of knowledge on the role  
of tripartite  relations in  Construction projects  
5. Why have I been chosen to take part? 
 You have been chosen to take part in this research because of your knowledge of the 
relational issues in the projects that you have undertaken as a Client, a Consultant or a 
Contractor. The participants have been purposively sampled from over 20 Client, Consultant 
and Contractor companies in Zimbabwe and Malawi that the researcher knows. 
To protect your confidentiality and anonymity, I will password protect and code all 
participant details so that they are known only to me as the researcher. 
6. Do I have to take part? 
Your participation in this research is voluntary and your inability or wish not to take part 
will be respected.  Whatever you decide, it will not affect our professional relationship 
because this is purely an academic exercise intended to contribute to the body of knowledge 
on the role of tripartite relations to construction project failure or contractual gridlock. 
Should you accept, you will be kept anonymous and there will be complete 
confidentiality? 
I would request 30 minutes of your free time to have an interview with you. I will be asking 
questions about any relational issues you have experienced on construction projects. 
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Before the research is presented in the public domain, I will debrief you, and your comments 
will be taken into consideration, particularly to protect your confidentiality and anonymity. 
7. What will happen if I take part? 
If you decide to take part, you will be participant in the research. I will need 30 minutes 
of your free time at your convenience for an interview. From your responses to my semi-
structured questions I will codify the significant statements. I will then analyze them and 
generalize them to come up with tripartite relationships issues that cause project failure or 
success. The assumption is that relationships are among the 5 most important factors that 
contribute to construction project failure or success.   
As I indicated previously, your identity and confidentiality will be protected by 
immediately anonymizing your details and responses to my questions. 
• what the methods are: 
The method of research will be qualitative case study of particular projects. 
I will research Client, Consultant and Contractor relationships while implementing 
Construction projects. In addition to a formal interview, research data for case studies 
will include informal conversations, readings of correspondence, minutes and other 
documents. The outcome will be generalized practical and actionable solutions to 
improve the management of Construction projects. 
• who are the researchers    
My name is Caleb Makwiranzou I have been a Consulting Engineer for most of my 
career. 
I am now a Doctoral Research candidate with the University of Liverpool since 2012. 
My research thesis is about Client- Consultant- Contractor relations in Construction 
projects. This is purely an academic exercise for my Doctoral Thesis. 
My Thesis supervisor is Dr. Caroline Ramsey of the University of Liverpool.  Her 
contact e-mail is caroline.ramsey@liverpool.ac.uk 
I will use the interviews, informal conversations, meetings and empirical materials 
for my research. The results of my thesis will be generalized as my contribution to better 
Construction Project Management, on the basis of my over 25 years‟ experience in this 
profession. 
8. Expenses and / or payments 
 My research will not involve you having to travel and incur costs; it will be carried out 
in the comfort of your office, home or any place of your choice. The interview will take about 
30 minutes of your free time. 
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 There is no payment or compensatory gifts for taking part in this research. 
9. Are there any benefits in taking part? 
Some Construction projects have failed or been delayed because of poor Client, 
Consultant and Contractor relationships. The research will provide insight into good or poor 
relations that affect Construction project management.  Results of the research could improve 
the quality, cost, and implementation time of Construction Projects. This will benefit Clients, 
Consultants and Contractors. 
10. What if I am unhappy or if there is a problem? 
The research supervisor at the University of Liverpool is Dr. Caroline Ramsey. If you 
have any issue on the research that you are not happy with, you can contact her using the 
following email address: caroline.ramsey@liverpool.ac.uk. You may also contact the 
University Participant Advocate, on number 001-612-312-1210 or email address 
liverpoolethics@ohecampus.com 
11. Will my participation be kept confidential? 
You can take part in this research in the assurance that your responses will be kept 
confidential and anonymous. 
Your personal or company details will be password protected and coded so that they are 
not directly attributed to you or your company. In addition you will individually be debriefed 
on the research analysis so that any information which you think compromises your 
confidentiality will be deleted or rearranged in the final thesis. Your comments and 
confidentiality will be strictly respected. 
12. What will happen to the results of the study? 
 A summary of the research results will be made available to Participants. If there are any 
issues which the participants feel are sensitive or embarrassing, the research will be placed in 
an embargo for 5 years. During this period, it will not be available in the public domain. Only 
the research supervisors and evaluators at the University of Liverpool will have sight of it. 
13. What will happen if I want to stop taking part? 
  You can withdraw as a participant at any time during the Research and any data from 
you will be deleted and removed from the research thesis. 
14. Who can I contact if I have further questions? 
  If you have any questions, you can contact me 
caleb.makwiranzou@online.liverpool.ac.uk  or Phone: +263 712 400 523. 
You can also contact the research supervisor at the University of Liverpool, Dr. Caroline 
Ramsey on e-mail address caroline.ramsey@liverpool.ac.uk 
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APPENDIX 2 
   
 PRIMARY INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
  
Introduction: I am carrying out a research to try and understand what happened on your          
construction projects. I will appreciate your perspectives by answering a few questions. 
1. In your construction project what relational aspects do you think went well and 
what do you think went wrong and why? 
2. What events in the project do you think made a difference on how participants 
related? What happened? 
3.  How do you describe your relationship with the Client, Contractor or Consultant 
or Financiers?  Do you think this relationship had any effect on your 
performance and future work prospects with them?  
4. Have any of your projects delayed or failed to be completed due to how the 
Client, Consultant and Contractor related, what was the cause of this delay or 
lack of completion? 
5.  In some contracts Clients, Consultant, Contractors and Financiers resort to 
defensive positions and pass the blame if things go wrong.  Has this ever 
happened to you and how did you resolve it?  
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APPENDIX 3 
FULL LIST OF THEMATIC STARTER CODES  
 The following is a full list of the data collected and which formed the 54 Starter codes. The 
starter codes focused on the respondent themes. The concepts from these interviews and 
artefacts are in italics 
Starter  
Code 
No. 
Description/ Evidence Reflection and  possible 
theoretical Concept 
No. of 
respondent 
Statements/ 
artefacts 
1 Contractors failed to perform after 
being awarded Contract 
Performance builds Trust 
and lack of it loses Trust 
 6 
2 Contractors approached Banks for 
loans. 
Working Capital Advance 
payment  builds Trust 
 15 
3 Bank guarantee loan requirements 
could not be met in the low Cost 
Housing(LCH) Project and 
Contractors were denied bridging 
finance loan 
Collateral required to 
mitigate loan repayment 
risk. Bigger Contractors 
could use Trust by Banks 
to get loans. 
 15 
4 European Culture leans towards 
contractual obligation Clauses. 
African Culture leans towards Trust 
relational Contracting 
Effect of culture on 
construction contract 
Management style and 
Trust 
 1 
5 Contractor incapacitated by lack of 
knowledge of project procurement, 
objectives and project implementation 
road map. (Former World Bank 
Projects Advisor). Correspondence 
from Engineer request Contractor for 
site agent with 15 years‟ experience 
 
Skills Training to build 
project management skill 
and capacity. Client then 
Builds Trust. 
 8 
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Starter 
Code 
No. 
Description/Evidence Reflection and  possible 
theoretical Concept 
 No. of 
respondent 
Statements/ 
artefacts 
6. Contractor reputation can build or 
destroy Trust for future work. 
Contractors fore go Interest claims on 
late payments to build goodwill as 
shown in all the 5 projects. 
Publicity and reputation 
for future work as  
parameter for Building 
goodwill Trust 
9 
7 Client in traditional Contract is given 
28 days to make payment. Consistent 
cash flow is required for work 
progress. Contractual Clauses used for 
control and governance. JPC 
Contractor and Consultant went for a 
long time without receiving Payment. 
Linia Contract had to be changed 
from Traditional to Traditional, so 
that Contractor could raise funds. 
Library Contract quoted non-payment 
as fundamental default. 
Late payment causes 
delay. Working Capital 
advance non-Payment 
stalled work progress. 
 11 
 
 
 
 
8 Contractor says he cannot buy 
materials and he cannot be blamed 
because there is nonpayment by 
Client. Blame passing was evident in 
all the Traditional contracts. 
In traditional Contract 
when things go wrong , 
such as delays Contractor 
takes defensive position 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9  Library, JPC and Linia Client, 
Consultant and Contractor had 
worked together before,   
History of working 
together builds Trust 
5 
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10 Engineer communicated with 
UNICEF and  with non performing 
Contractor on Low Cost Housing 
(LCH) project, JPC project 
Communication builds 
Trust 
3 
 
 
 
11 Contractor had been given three 
Contracts but was now failing to 
perform 
Work load effect on 
performance and loss of 
Trust 
1 
 
 
12 Contractor putting in many spurious 
claims in the Library project and 
Linia Project 
Client loses Trust if there 
are Unjustified Claims for 
payment 
4 
 
13 Client requests Contractor to maintain 
Site Security after Completion of 
works. Contractors on various 
projects did not claim interest on late 
payments as Goodwill investment. 
 Free LCH project Site 
security seen as Goodwill 
Trust. No interest claims 
on LCH and JPC also 
Goodwill Trust 
investment. 
7 
14 The Foreign based Contractor in JPC 
Contract subcontracted 100% of the 
Physical work to Local Contractors 
Subcontracting leads to 
loss of Trust of the 
Contractor by the Client 
1 
 
15 Client and Contract arguing about 
who terminated the Contract first. 
Evidence from  Library and earlier 
JPC contract. 
All Trust is lost at 
termination of Contract. 
All parties try to 
maximize their position 
5 
16 The engineering Consultant put in 
work for no payment, as Sweat equity 
in the Moni Project  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sweat equity is a display 
of Trust in the project and 
Client by a Consultant 
2 
 
Starter Description/Evidence Reflection and  possible  No. of 
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Code. theoretical Concept respondent 
Statements 
17 Client circumvented WCA payment 
by pre-purchasing materials directly 
from the suppliers for the Low Cost 
Housing project and partly for the 
JPC project. This option appeared less 
risky to him 
Client did not Trust 
paying WCA without a 
Bank Guarantee for pay-
on-demand. He secured 
project progress by 
issuing pre-purchased 
materials.  
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 Consultant did some initial work at 
risk as Sweat Equity for the Moni 
project  
  Sweat equity to kick 
start a project implies 
that the Consultant has 
Trust in the Project 
originator 
2, 
19 
 
A lawyer was called in to draft the 
Memorandum of agreement in the 
Moni project. This however led to 
loss of Trust and parties being 
positional 
  In a relational contract 
writing down expected 
future behaviour from 
each partner can be an 
advantage 
2 
20 
 
Investor requests identification of a 
Project owner. In all the projects, 
project sites were temporarily handed 
over to the Contractors. 
Project ownership built 
Trust, and facilitated 
project Funds sourcing, 
governance and control.   
5 
21 
 
Special Clauses protected the Client 
or Contractor in a Contract. 
Presumptive Trust existed between 
Client, Consultant and Contractor for 
the Contracts to be consummated. 
Presumptive Trust due to membership 
of Sector organisations such as the 
Institution of Engineers or national 
Construction Industry Confederation.   
Contractual Trust in the 
nominal Relational 
Contract clauses. The 
intangible Clauses are in 
Trust between the Parties 
, while the tangible Trust 
is in the Contractual 
Clauses specifying  
tripartite behaviour      
5 
22 The contracting parties must have Financial competence 5 
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capacity to make required contract 
payments. A participant insisted that 
Clients must show proof that they 
have the project financial resources 
available. In the JPC and  Library 
contracts the Contractors requested 
the Client to show proof of “financial 
arrangements” 
Trust must be built. 
23  In the Library project, the Contractor 
suddenly said he had no funds to 
proceed with a relational Contract 
 Integrity Trust and prior 
due diligence checks. 
Personal integrity of the 
CEO is required. 
2 
24 A mixed Relational and Transactional 
contract is proposed i.e. a Hybrid 
Contract. In the Moni Contract, the 
Client sought to formalize the 
relationship. While in the Library 
project the Contractor wanted 
amendment clauses for the frequency 
of payments     
 
 Performance Bonds 
actualized Trust in 
Traditional and Relational 
contracts. 
Local Contractors have 
difficulty to get 
Performance Bonds. 
Banks require copies of 
the Contract and collateral 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
25  In the Library Contract, Trust was 
vitiated by  trying to unilaterally 
change a long term relational contract 
to a short term transactional contract. 
In the JPC, Moni and Linia Contracts 
mutually beneficial Contract 
amendments were done. 
 
 
Once engaged in a Trust 
Relationship, parties must 
maintain that Trust. 
The Trust must be 
sustainable. Amendments 
should be by mutual 
agreement. 
7 
 
 
Starter 
Code 
No. 
Description/Evidence Reflection and  possible 
theoretical Concept 
 No. of 
respondent 
Statements/ 
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artefacts 
 
26 
 
The Library client Board lost Trust in 
the Contractor due to his abandoning 
site and request for Contract 
amendments. The Moni Client also 
made some amendments which were 
not accepted by JV members. 
  
Contract amendments 
may lead to loss of Trust    
 
2 
 
27 
 
Contractors were prepared to maintain 
unoccupied houses in the LCH 
contract. 
 
 
Goodwill Trust through 
anticipation of future 
work    
 
4 
28  In the Traditional contracts, the 
Contractors were required to issue 
performance Guarantee Bonds within 
28 days of signing the Contract. This 
made the Clients trust that the 
Contractors will do their work 
diligently. The Performance Bond 
remains in force until completion of 
the works. 
A performance guarantee 
bond is an exhibition of 
Competence Trust given 
to the Contractor. During 
its tenure, a performance 
Bond can be used by the 
Consultant to mitigate 
non-performance of the 
Contractor. 
15 
29  Client and Contractor had a history of 
working together previously. They 
were accepting Risk on presumptive 
Trust. All the Contractors in LCH and 
JPC started  work without WCA 
By moving to Site before 
receiving the Working 
Capital Advance 
payment, the Contractor 
showed Trust in the 
Client 
13 
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30 The Client refused to release retention 
until the Contract was signed off as 
completed in the LCH project. 
Client trusted the 
contractor would correct 
defects if 10% of the 
invoice was retained until 
the end of the defects 
liability period. 
5 
    
31 
 
 
 
 
The Contractor attempted to rebuild 
Trust using a conciliatory letter in the 
Library project.  
Once Trust was lost, it 
was very difficult or 
impossible to rebuild it 
3 
32 The Engineer wrote letter urging the 
Contractor to increase work Progress 
in the JPC project. Contractors in the 
LCH project invested in Goodwill 
Trust and prospects of future Work 
 
Using inter-entity respect 
to build Trust 
13 
33  It was not clear which Government 
Department was the Client in the 
Linia PPP project. There was also 
lack of role clarity in the Moni 
project.  
 
Lack of clarity of Risk 
allocation led to mistrust 
4 
34 Payment delays led to Govt.  not 
being trusted to meet its financial 
obligations. Payments to Contractor 
and Consultant late 
 
Timely payments by 
Clients build Trust 
5 
35 Contractor Trust had to be targeted to 
a clearly defined Client 
Trust was unique and 
selective 
1 
36 There is propensity to over claim by 
Contractors. The Resident Engineers 
Over Claiming by 
Contractor was seen as 
4 
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on the LCH, Library and Linia 
contracts had to ask Contractors to 
remove spurious claims 
abuse of Trust 
37 Consultants are Trusted by both the 
Client and Contractors because of 
their impartiality. In all the 
Traditional contracts, the Consultant 
was the first point of mediation of any 
dispute. 
Consultants were at the 
center  of generating 
Trust between the Client 
and the Contractor 
13 
38 Equity distribution can lead to 
distrust. The Terminal patent holder 
did not want to share project 
ownership equitably and preferred 
dominance. In the JPC Contract, 
Client wanted assurance that both the 
Foreign and local contractors were 
involved in the work and there was 
technology transfer    
Trust was essential in a 
Joint Venture Project 
6 
40 When a performance guarantee is 
submitted, The Client can Trust that 
the Contractor is committed. In all the 
Traditional contracts, Contractors 
submitted performance guarantees 
A performance Guarantee 
generated Competence 
Trust that the Contractor 
can do the work. 
15 
 
41 
Liquidated delay damages is 
2.5% of cost of works is a control and 
governance clause to encourage the 
Contractor to complete the project on 
time. All the Contracts had a 
Liquidated delay damage clause 
Trust was built using 
liquidated delay damages 
15 
    
Starter 
Code 
No. 
Description/Evidence Reflection and  possible 
theoretical Concept 
 No. of 
respondent 
Statements/ 
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artefacts 
42 A Smaller local Contractor going into 
a Joint Venture (JV) with a larger 
foreign company can gain Client 
Trust. In the LCH Contractor two 
contractors were asked to subcontract 
some of their work. In the JPC 
contract, the Contractor was requested 
to go into a Joint Venture with an 
international contractor to in order to 
build capacity. 
JVs between a local 
Company and a large 
foreign company 
improved Trust 
relationships between 
Clients and the Contractor 
4 
 
  
43  Consultant making himself 
vulnerable by not reporting 
Contractor‟s poor work progress to 
Client, but chooses limited use of 
Power and a friendly reminder on the 
JPC contract 
Trust meant making 
oneself vulnerable to the 
action of others. The 
Consultant has 
Presumptive competence 
Trust in the Contractor 
1 
44 The JPC Contractor failing to make 
progress due to internal constraints on 
equipment, Finance and site Staff.  
Trust to be sustained and 
supported by Action, for 
example Client paying the 
Contractor on time 
2 
45 Client Requesting for bank 
Guarantees. Banks had excessive 
requirements for issuing the Bank 
guarantees. All Contractors submitted 
Performance Bonds, Contractors all 
risk insurance, but some failed to 
submit WCA guarantees, and a 
Materials Prepurchase facility had to 
be instituted to enable them to 
commence work.  
Unwritten Trust is 
formalized by request for 
irrevocable Bank 
guarantees, for 
Performance Bonds, 
Retention Bonds 
Insurance and Working 
Capital Advance 
payments 
15 
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46 Client required excessive 20 years‟ 
experience of Site Staff in  JPC 
Contract 
Demand by Client for 
written down and tangible 
clauses which guarantee 
performance and Trust 
2 
47 Contractor wanted to amend the 
Library Relational Contract. This 
eroded the very basis of a Trust 
Relationship. 
The Moni project Client wanted to 
amend the Relational Contract with 
the Consultant and the JV partners 
and this  became a problem of self-
maximization 
 Evidence shows that 
Relational contracts were 
difficult to amend because 
they are based on 
unwritten Clauses in the 
expectation of positive 
future behaviour by the 
parties 
3 
 
48  An irrevocable bank Guarantee for W 
CA payment had strict collateral 
requirements. In the   Traditional 
Contracts, Contractors had difficulty 
in obtaining Bank Guarantees for 
loans.  
Trust was operationalized 
by the demand for an 
irrevocable Bank 
Guarantee before the 
WCA is paid. 
13 
49 Contractor and Engineer requested the 
Client to reduce the Minimum value 
from $ 1 000 000 to $ 300 000. This 
was to avoid Cash flow spikes which 
could result in inconsistent work 
progress. The Financier agreed to the 
reduction. 
 A low minimum Invoice 
value by the Contractor 
may be seen as good 
control measure or  
negatively as reduced 
Trust in the Contractor 
 4 
50 Numerous constraints including 
economic volatility, regulatory and 
dispute resolution capacity constrain 
establishing PPP contracts in Malawi 
and Zimbabwe  
Governments can use PPP  
relational Contracts to 
fulfill their mandate to 
provide public 
infrastructure 
5 
    
Starter Description/Evidence Reflection and  possible  No. of 
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Code 
No. 
theoretical Concept respondent 
Statements/ 
artefacts 
51 The Library Contractor opted for 
dialogue instead of declaring a dispute 
because of a difference between his 
measurements and the Engineer‟s. 
There was also dialogue in the LCH 
contracts 
 
 
There were dispute 
resolutions Clauses in 
most Contracts.   Parties 
prefer  to use dialogue to 
resolve the 
“disagreement” 
5 
52 In the JPC Contract, the Financiers 
wanted to issue a „no objection‟ to a 
downstream contract between the 
Borrower and the Contractor. This 
implies that the Financier does not 
trust the Borrower and is getting 
involved in the minute operational 
details of the subsequent contract 
between the Client and Contractor 
Trust in a relational 
contract was latently 
dictated and written down 
in the Demand for high 
requirements in the WCA 
by the bank, high 
Contractors‟ site staff 
experience, and high 
Interim payment Invoice 
3 
 
 
53 The Financier‟s “ no objection” was 
required for downstream Contract 
Amendments in the JPC contract 
Financiers insisted to be 
consulted and give ‘No 
objection’ for the Client 
to sign the Contract 
amendments. This 
showed lack of Trust even 
though it was loan money 
and not a grant   
3 
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 54                                                                                                                               
 
 
 
 
 
Contractors could not raise bridging 
finance on a short term basis. There 
was evidence of this inability to raise 
Funds in the LCH and JPC 
contractors 
Contractors were issued  
works Commencement 
orders and were trusted to 
start work, but they could 
not start until they  
received  WCA  payment 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
154 
 
APPENDIX 4 
Clustering of Themes: Gioia Methodology 
Project Name Abbreviations: 
The following abbreviations are used in the analysis below. 
1. Low Cost Housing -LCH. 
2. University Library  -UL 
3. Moni Bus Terminal -MBT 
4. Linia Road              -LR 
5. JPC Road                -JPC 
The data was first examined for respondent outstanding statements or artefacts in the form of 
minutes of meetings, contract documents or inter-party correspondence. There were 54 starter 
theme codes. Using the Gioia, Corley and Hamilton (2013) methodology, this data was 
clustered. The 1st order clustering focused on respondents themes. This brought out four 
themes as shown below. After reflection, a 2nd order clustering was then carried out. Two 
overarching themes emerged. One was on Financial issue, while the other was on Technical 
capacity and frequently working together of Contractors in Zimbabwe and Malawi. 
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1
st
 Order analysis- Respondent focused themes on Performance and 
Competence 
Interview data Project 
Evidence 
Starter theme code 
No. 
Cluster Theme 
 Awarded 
Contractor fails to 
perform   
  Awarded 
Contractor applies 
for Extension of 
time. 
 Foreign based 
Contractor sub-
contracts 100% to 
locals 
 Client‟s 
Financials 
doubted 
 Contractor 
abandons site 
 Contractor due 
diligence 
 Contract 
Amendments 
 Clients demand 
performance 
Bonds 
LCH 
 
LCH,JPC 
JPC 
JPC 
UL     
UL, JPC 
 JPC, UL 
 
LCH,UL,JPC 
LCH,UL,JPC 
JPC,LCH  
 
JPC    
JPC 
JPC 
  
1 
 
1 
14 
22 
25,26 
23,26,28 
24,40,45,46 
24,40,41,43,45,46 
 
41,43 
45 
 
46 
49 
53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1) Respondent 
Theme On 
Performance and 
tripartite Competence 
Trust. 
 
 
156 
 
 2.5%  liquidated 
delay damages 
 Consultant reports 
bad workmanship 
 Client wants 
Contractor staff  
to have 20years 
experience 
 Contractor 
minimum value of 
Invoice to be 
reduced 
 Funder  approves 
contract 
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1
st
 Order analysis- Respondent focused themes on Working Capital. 
Interview data Project Evidence Starter 
theme code 
No. 
Cluster Theme 
 
  Contractors  approached banks 
for bridging Finance 
 Difficult collateral requirements 
from banks. 
 Late payment of WCA 
 Client issues pre-purchased 
materials in lieu of WCA 
 Consultant provides sweat equity 
to jump start project 
 Delay in releasing retention 
 
 Contractor  not paid for 10 
months and loses Trust 
 Contractor due diligence 
 Client  demands irrevocable Bank 
guarantee for WCA 
 Contractor  wants to change 
contract from Turnkey to 
monthly payment 
  Contractor unable to start 
construction without WCA 
LCH,UL,LR,JPC 
 
LCH,JPC 
 
JPC 
JPC,LCH 
 
MBT 
LCH   
   
JPC 
  
LCH,UL,JPC 
JPC,LCH  
 
UL    
  
JPC,LCH    
2 
 
3 
 
7 
17 
 
16,18 
 30 
 
 34,44 
48 
51 
 
52,53 
 
54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) 
Working 
Capital 
Advancement 
Payment make 
the Contractor 
Trust the Client 
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1st Order analysis- Respondent focused themes on Skills 
Interview data Project Evidence Starter 
theme code 
No. 
Cluster 
Theme 
 
  Local Contractors  incapacitated 
by lack of skills 
 Contractors require 
communication skills to build 
Trust 
 Patent holder who was the Client 
in Bus Terminal project wanted 
full control. 
 Client and Consultant insist on 
Contractor Joint ventures to 
improve capacity 
 Economic volatility, lack of 
regulatory framework and absence 
of Trust discourage PPP projects 
in Zimbabwe and Malawi 
JPC 
 
LCH,JPC 
  
  
MBT 
 
LCH,JPC   
  
  
UL, LR 
  
     
   
 
5 
 
10 
  
  
33 
  
42 
   
 
50,47 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3) Joint 
Venture, 
increased skills 
transfer and 
capacity 
building in 
Contractor 
generates Trust 
by Client and 
Consultant 
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1
st
 Order analysis- Respondent focused themes on previous work together. 
Interview data Project Evidence Starter theme 
code No. 
Cluster 
Theme 
 
  Strong African interpersonal 
Trust could influence  business 
 Contractors  did not claim 
interest on late payments in 
anticipation of future business 
with client 
 Due to previous work history, 
Linia Contract vacillated 
between  Relational to 
Traditional and finally to 
Relational   
 In Library, Linia and JPC 
projects, Clients and Contractors 
had history of previous work. 
  History of work together can 
lead to lack of due diligence 
check by either party or moving 
to site without WCA payment.   
LCH 
 
LCH, 
  
 
LR   
  
  
  
UL, JPC,LR 
  
     
 UL, JPC,LR  
 
4 
 
6,13,27 
  
 
7 
  
          
   
6,9,13,20,27,29 
 
 
 7,13,23,29,33. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4) History  
of previous 
and working 
together 
frequently 
generates Trust 
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2nd Order analysis- Theory and Result based Clustering 
This Section shows how the four Respondent Themes were further clustered to two 
overarching themes on the basis of theory and Results obtained in the Action research 
Respondent themes Theory and Result based overarching 
theme 
Respondents themes were based on the 
following: 
1. JPC,LCH   Good performance and 
Competence to meet tripartite 
obligations. The Client required 
capacity to pay the contractor the 
WCA and regular payments during 
project implementation 
2. Irrevocable Bank guarantees were 
required by the Client before release 
of WCA. 
Contractors failed to produce the guarantees. 
As action research, result, Client provided 
materials pre- purchased in lieu of WCA. 
 
 
 
1)  Financial issues were the 
overarching theme constraining 
project progress. The Contractual, 
Competence and Goodwill trust 
created through   deliberate action of 
materials pre-purchase and timely 
payments created collaboration and 
there was construction progress. 
Respondent themes Theory and Result based overarching 
theme 
Respondents themes were also based on the 
following: 
3.   Clients and Consultants encouraged 
Contractor Joint ventures, particularly 
with experienced multi-national 
companies in order to transfer skills 
 
 
 
 
2) Technical skills could be created 
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and improve technical capacity or 
experience which was lacking locally.           
4.  A history of previously and 
frequently working together built 
contractual, competence and goodwill 
trust which enhanced collaboration. 
The project objectives of Cost, 
Quality and Program could then be 
met. 
through Joint Ventures with multi-
national companies. In addition, local 
Contractors and Consultants should 
frequently work together to transfer 
skills and build capacity.  
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APPENDIX 5 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY POST RECOMMENDATIONS QUESTIONS 
1. Most Contractors in Zimbabwe and Malawi are not able to get Advance payments because 
of the strict Bank collateral requirements. What is your view regarding a proposal to remove 
stringent pay-on- demand Working Capital advance Payment guarantees? 
2. Most Contracts go beyond the stated completion date because they have the project start 
date as the day of signing of the Contract. In real times actual work only starts when the 
Contract has received payment of the Advance payment. What would you say if the Contract 
start date is taken as the date of receipt of the first payment? 
3. Are Clients asking for too much if they require Contractor Site Staff such as Site Agents etc. 
to have a minimum of 20years experience? 
4. Do you have any stories on building Trust and Risk allocation between Clients, 
Consultants and Contractors on Civil engineering Construction projects?  
Thank you  
 
 SUPPLEMENTARY POST- RECOMMENDATIONS INTERVIEW WITH A CONTRACTOR 
Field Notes 43: Contractor responses on 3rd February, 2017. 
 Security on both sides must be equal. 
 If these requirements are removed on advance payments, I see a situation where the Client 
might end up losing on bogus contractors who might get the advance payment and 
disappear. What I think should be done is to enter into a contract where the client procures 
all the raw materials. 
 I also propose that there be a win-win situation where the client gives an irrevocable letter 
of commitment to pay the Contractor. 
 The Governments in third world countries do not have a provision to protect their 
Contractors.  Governments forget that at the end of everything they gain from payment of   
P.A.Y.E, V.A.T, Corporate tax and employment creation.   Banks take advantage and 
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implement these draconian measures. I feel WCA guarantees need to be relaxed but not 
removed. 
 Yes I feel it’s logical to take the date of receipt of the first payment as the date of starting 
the project. 
 The Clients are right in wishing for Contractor site staff such as Site Agents to have a 
minimum of 20years experience. But these experience Engineers are not locally available 
and we cannot afford expatriates.   Remember a client wants to get value for his money on 
any project. The value of money only comes into play when the job is properly done by 
people who have seen it before. 
 When trust is built between the Client, Consultants and the Contractor on civil engineering 
construction projects it leads to; 
I. Low construction costs for the client and at the same time higher profits to the 
contractor. 
II. The environment enables innovations and technical developments.  
III. Precise predictability of works. 
IV. Contractor is able to deliver high quality of the product.  
V. Lower severity of contractual disputes  
VI. Recognizes and protects the main contractor  
VII. Creates a good marketing tool for the Contractor and the Design team. 
 
Regarding Construction Risk, currently most of the risk is “heaped” on the Contractor.  As I said 
sometimes the Client delays to pay and the Contractor is blamed for lack of project progress and 
time overruns  
Thank You 
 
